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Secure Multiplex Coding with Dependent and
Non-Uniform Multiple Messages
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Abstract—The secure multiplex coding (SMC) is a technique
to remove rate loss in the coding for wire-tap channels and
broadcast channels with confidential messages caused by the
inclusion of random bits into transmitted signals. SMC replaces
the random bits by other meaningful secret messages, and
a collection of secret messages serves as the random bits to
hide the rest of messages. In the previous researches, multiple
secret messages were assumed to have independent and uniform
distributions, which is difficult to be ensured in practice. We
remove this restrictive assumption by a generalization of the
channel resolvability technique.
We also give practical construction techniques for SMC by
using an arbitrary given error-correcting code as an ingredient,
and channel-universal coding of SMC. By using the same
principle as the channel-universal SMC, we give coding for the
broadcast channel with confidential messages universal to both
channel and source distributions.
Index Terms—broadcast channel with confidential messages,
information theoretic security, multiuser information theory,
universal coding, the secure multiplex coding
I. Introduction
A. Overview
Recently, the security of personal information is demanded
much more. The wire-tap model is a typical secure message
transmission model with the presence of an eavesdropper.
Specially, there are the legitimate sender called Alice, the
legitimate receiver called Bob, and the eavesdropper Eve.
There is also a noisy broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and
Eve. Alice wants to send secret messages reliably to Bob and
secretly from Eve. This problem was first formulated by Wyner
[35]. Csiszár and Körner generalized Wyner’s original problem
to include common messages from Alice to both Bob and
Eve, and determined the optimal information rate tuples of the
secret message and the common message, and the information
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leakage rate of the secret message to Eve, which is measured
by the conditional entropy of the secret message given Eve’s
received signal [9]. They called their generalized problem as
the broadcast channel with confidential messages, hereafter
abbreviated as BCC. The secrecy of messages over the wire-
tap channel and the BCC is realized by including meaningless
random variable, which is called the dummy message, into
Alice’s transmitted signal. This decreases the information rate.
In order to get rid of this information rate loss, Yamamoto
et al. [22] proposed the secure multiplex coding, hereafter
abbreviated as SMC, as a generalization of the wire-tap
channel coding. The SMC can be used, for example, in the
following case. When a company treats a collection of personal
information, it is required to keep the secrecy of the respec-
tive personal information. However, it may not be required
to keep the secrecy of the relation among several personal
information. For example, when all of personal information
are subject to the uniform distribution of the same length
bit sequence, the secrecy of their exclusive OR may not
be required. Consider the case when the sender Alice sends
the collection of T persons’ personal information S 1, . . . , S T
via the channel partially leaked to Eve. It is required that
the receiver Bob can decode all of S 1, . . . , S T , and that
Eve cannot obtain any information of the respective personal
information. In order to keep the secrecy of the message S i
from Eve, Yamamoto et al. [22] proposed to use the remaining
information S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T as the dummy message
for the message S i. Then, they realized the secrecy of the
message S i without loss of the information rate. This type
of coding problem is called the SMC. It is known that the
application of the channel resolvability [13] yields the security
of the wire-tap channel model [15]. Hence, employing this
method, Yamamoto et al. [22] proved the security of SMC.
On the other hand, since S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T are per-
sonal information, they are not necessarily uniform random
bits and might be dependent, while the existing papers [27],
[22] assumed their uniformity and independence. Such as-
sumption is difficult to be ensured in practice. Unfortunately,
the application of the original channel resolvability can prove
the security only when the messages S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T
are conditionally uniform and independent of S i because it
treats the approximation of the channel output distribution with
the uniform input random variable. One may consider that the
compressed data satisfies that assumption so that the removal
of that assumption is not needed. However, as is shown in [14],
[16], the compressed data is not uniform in the sense of the
variational distance nor the divergence. That is, the uniformity
assumption does not hold for such compressed data. Hence,
the removal of the assumption is essential for non-uniform
2information source.
The reader might also conceive that this problem could
be solved by a straightforward combination of the coding
for intrinsic randomness [33] and that for the original se-
cure multiplex coding [22], [27]. We emphasize that this is
false. We cannot recover the original secret messages from a
codeword generated by an intrinsic randomness encoder, and a
new technique must be deployed to remove the independence
and uniform assumption on the multiple secret messages. One
of the main contributions of this paper is to remove that
assumption. In order to treat the non-uniform and dependent
case, we need a generalization of the channel resolvability.
Hence, this paper also studies a generalization of the channel
resolvability problem [13], [15].
Even after we solve the above problem by a generalization
of the channel resolvability problem, the security of S i depends
on the randomness and the dependence of the remaining
messages S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T on S i. This dependence
causes another difficulty in the asymptotic formulation of
SMC. That is, we need to characterize the randomness and
the dependence in the asymptotic setting. For this purpose, we
introduce several kinds of asymptotic conditional uniformity
conditions and study their properties. In addition to this, for
the case when the channel is unknown, we also treat universal
coding for the secure multiplex coding [22]. Further, as a
byproduct, we obtain source-channel universal coding for the
broadcast channel with confidential messages [9]. We divide
the introductory section to six subsections.
Finally, we should explain the assumptions for our probabil-
ity spaces. In the main body, we assume that all of probability
spaces are finite sets. However, our result can be extended
to the case of measurable spaces except for the contents in
Sections VIII-A, XII, and XIII. This generalization contains
the case of continuous sets. In Appendix D, we summarize
how to generalize our results to the case of measurable spaces.
As a byproduct, we show the strong security for the Gaussian
channel.
B. Generalization of the Channel Resolvability
For a given channel W with input alphabet X and output
alphabet Y, and given information source X on X, Han and
Verdú [13] considered to find a coding f : A → X and a
random variable A such that the distributions of W( f (A)) is
close to W(X) with respect to the variational distance or the
normalized divergence, and evaluated the minimum resolution
of A to make the variational distance or the normalized
divergence asymptotically zero. In their problem formulation,
one can choose the randomness A used to simulate the channel
output distribution.
In this paper, we shall consider the situation in which we are
given a channel W, an information source X, and randomness
A and asked to find coding f : A → X such that W( f (A)) is as
close as possible to W(X) with respect to unnormalized diver-
gence. We shall study how close W( f (A)) can be to W(X) in
Theorems 14 and 17 in Section VI. Hence, this problem can be
regarded as a generalization of channel resolvability because
this problem contains the original channel resolvability as a
special case in the above sense.
C. Asymptotic Conditional Uniformity
In Subsection VIII-A, in order to characterize the
randomness and the dependence of the messages
S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T on the other message S i
asymptotically, we introduce three asymptotic conditional
uniformity conditions. Then, we can characterize
what a conditional distribution of the messages
S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T has a similar performance to
the conditionally uniform distribution when we apply SMC.
We summarize the relations among those conditions as
Theorem 29. In particular, in Appendix C, we show that
two introduced asymptotic conditional uniformity conditions
are equivalent. Hence, we essentially have two different
conditional uniformity conditions, namely, the weaker and
the stronger asymptotic conditional uniformity conditions.
In Subsection VIII-B, we give sufficient conditions for
the Slepian-Wolf compression so that the compressed data
satisfies these asymptotic conditional uniformity conditions.
For the stationary ergodic sources, we show the existence of a
sequence of Slepian-Wolf codes whose compressed data satis-
fies the weaker asymptotic conditional uniformity conditions
(Theorem 30 and Remark 31). Also for the i.i.d. sources, we
show the existence of a sequence of Slepian-Wolf codes whose
compressed data satisfies the stronger asymptotic conditional
uniformity conditions (Theorem 32 and Remark 33).
D. Secure Multiplex Coding
Here, we explain the detail of our contributions to SMC.
As is explained above, we have to realize the security of
S i when the remaining messages S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T are
not uniform and are dependent on the message S i. In order
to solve this problem, we employ our generalized channel
resolvability coding in Theorems 14 and 17. Then, we can
construct coding for a wire-tap channel that can ensure the
secrecy of message against the eavesdropper Eve when the
dummy message used by the encoder is non-uniform and
statistically dependent on the secret message that has to be
kept secret from Eve. We apply our generalized channel
resolvability coding to the above SMC case. Hence, we can
remove the independence and uniform assumption on the
multiple secret messages while the original paper [22] by
Yamamoto et al. and the previous paper [27] by the present
authors assumed the independence and the uniformity of the
multiple secret messages.
Indeed, Yamamoto et al. [22] treated only the secrecy of
each message S i, and did not evaluate the information leakage
of multiple messages S i1 , . . . , S in to Eve, and the present
authors analyzed such information leakage in [27]. The present
authors also generalized coding in [27] so that Alice’s encoder
can support the common message S 0 to both Bob and Eve. The
present authors also characterized the achievable information
leakage rate in [27]. Those enhancements are retained in this
paper.
In Section VII, we shall give two code constructions for
SMC. The first construction given in Subsection VII-B is a
simple application of channel resolvability coding in Theorem
14. Although it achieves the capacity region when there is no
3common message, it is insufficient to fully prove the capacity
region. In Subsection VII-C, to overcome this defect, we
propose the second construction given in Theorem 17, which
is based on another type of the channel resolvability coding.
By using these constructions, we shall evaluate the decoding
error probability and the mutual information to Eve in Section
VII in single-shot setting in the sense of [34].
In Section IX we formulate the capacity region of SMC,
analyze the asymptotic performance of two constructions,
and prove that the second construction achieves the capacity
region of SMC. The capacity region is defined based on the
weaker asymptotic conditional uniformity condition given in
Definition 36. In Section X, we shall prove that the mutual
information to Eve converges to zero when the normalized
mutual information to Eve converges to zero under the stronger
asymptotic conditional uniformity given in Definition 28. The
convergence is so-called the strong security [28]. In Subsection
X-B, we also derive the exponent of the mutual information
to Eve. The relation between our results and the paper [22] is
explained as (145).
Section XI addresses a more practical issue. In Theorem 22
of Section VII, we show that we can have an upper bound
of mutual information between multiple secret messages and
Eve’s received signal, by attaching randomly chosen group
homomorphisms satisfying Condition 15 to any given error-
correcting code for channels with single sender and single
receiver or the broadcast channel with degraded message sets
[23]. However, the upper bound in Theorem 22 becomes
difficult to be computed when the error-correcting code is not
given by the standard random coding in information theory.
In Section XI, we shall construct more practical codes by
combining the construction of Section VII with an arbitrary
given error-correcting code. Under these codes, we shall give
two upper bounds on the leaked mutual information that can
be computed easily in practice. Section XI gives enhancement
of our earlier proceeding paper [18].
E. Universal Coding
Universal coding is construction of encoder and decoder
that do not use the statistical knowledge on the underlying
information system (usually channel and/or source) [8]. In
Section XII we shall give a construction of SMC universal
to channel. The basic idea in Section XII is to combine the
construction in Section VII with the universal coding using
constant-type codes for the broadcast channel with degraded
messages sets (BCD) in [24], while in Sections VII–X the
superposition random coding in [23] is used as their error-
correcting mechanism. The exponent given in Section XII is
better than that given in our earlier proceeding paper [19].
Channel-universal coding for BCC had not been studied
before [19], and coding for BCC can be regarded as a special
case of SMC while Muramatsu et al. [29] treat channel-
universal coding for wire-tap channel independently of [19]. In
Section XII and [19] we consider SMC universal to channel,
but its universality to the source is not considered. In Section
XIII we give a coding for BCC universal to both channel
and source. Its channel-universality is realized by the same
principle as Section XII and [19]. The exponent given in
Section XII is also greater than that given in our earlier
proceeding paper [19].
In Section XIV, we compare the exponent of leaked in-
formation given in Sections XII and XIII and that given in
Subsection X-B. As a result, we show that the exponent in
Sections XII and XIII is greater than one of exponents in
Subsection X-B, which is the same as that in [19]. We also
derive the equality condition.
F. Organization of This Paper
The outline of this paper is given as follows. First, we
prepare notations used in this paper in Section II. Second,
we prepare information quantities and their properties used
in this paper in Section III. Then, we review the formulation
and existing results of BCC in Subsection IV-A. We give its
reformulation for the dependent and non-uniform messages
case in Subsection IV-B. This new formulation is essential
in the later discussion for SMC with dependent and non-
uniform multiple messages. In Subsection V-A, we review the
formulation and existing results of BCD as a special case of
BCC, which will be used for our codes of SMC. In Subsection
V-B, we review Körner and Sgarro [24]’s result for universal
code for BCD, which will be used for our construction of
universal codes for SMC and BCC. In Section VI, we proceed
to generalization of channel resolvability, which is a key idea
of the paper and is used for codes of SMC and universal codes
for SMC and BCC. Section VII introduces SMC with the
single-shot setting. Section VIII introduces three asymptotic
conditional uniformity conditions. Based on these conditions,
Sections IX–XI treats SMC with the asymptotic setting, as
is explained in Subsection I-D. In Section XII, combining
the discussion of Subsections V-A and VII-D, we propose
universal coding for SMC by using Körner and Sgarro [24]’s
universal coding for BCD. In Section XIII, we propose source-
channel universal coding for BCC. Appendices are devoted
for several additionally required discussions for asymptotic
conditional uniformity conditions. This paper contains two
types of descriptions for each topics, i.e., the single-shot
description [34] and the n-fold description. Formulations and
many coding theorems are given with the single-shot descrip-
tion. The definitions of capacity regions are given in the n-fold
description.
II. Notation in This Paper
X denotes the channel input alphabet and Y (resp. Z)
denotes the channel output alphabet to Bob (resp. Eve). We
assume that X, Y, and Z are finite unless otherwise stated.
We denote the conditional probability of the channel to Bob
and Eve by PYZ|X . Then, taking the marginal distribution, we
denote the conditional probability of the channel to Bob (resp.
Eve) by PY |X (resp. PZ|X). Also, we denote the distribution of
the random variable X by PX .
We denote the uniform distribution on Ω by Pmix,Ω. When
Ω is a subset of X × Y, Pmix,Ω is a joint distribution for the
random variables X and Y. We denote the marginal distribution
of Pmix,Ω for the random variable X and the random variable Y
4by PX,mix,Ω and PY,mix,Ω, respectively. Further, the conditional
distribution on the random variable X conditioned to the other
random variable Y is denoted by PX |Y,mix,Ω, i.e.,
PX |Y,mix,Ω(x|y) = PX |Y=y,mix,Ω(x) := Pmix,Ω(x, y)PY,mix,Ω(y) (1)
for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. We denote the support of the distribution
PX by supp(PX). Given a joint distribution PXY , we define
the distribution PX |Y=y on X by PX |Y=y(x) := PX |Y(x|y). When
we need to treat another distribution of the same random
variables X and Y, we denote it by QXY . This is because it is
crucial to consider several distributions on the same probability
space in this paper1. In this case, we denote the marginal
distribution over X by QX , and the conditional distribution
by QX |Y . We also define the distribution QX |Y=y on X by
QX |Y=y(x) := QX |Y (x|y).
When we have to treat more than two distributions on X,
Y, and Z, the above notation is not useful. In this case, we
consider the set P(X) of probability distributions on X or
the set W(X, Y) of conditional probability distributions from
X to Y, which are mathematically equivalent to probability
transition matrices. When the output alphabet of the channel
is given as a product set Y × Z, the alphabet is written by
W(X, Y×Z). For any probability transition matrix W ∈ W(X,
Y × Z), Wx expresses the output distribution when the input
X is x. When we focus on the random variable Y, we use the
notation WYx (y) :=
∑
z∈Z Wx(y, z).
In the following, we treat an arbitrary probability transition
matrix W ∈ W(X, Y). Given a subset Ω ⊂ X, we define the
restriction W |Ω ∈ W(Ω, Y) by W |Ω(y|x) = W(y|x) for x ∈ Ω
and y ∈ Y. We often employ another probability transition
matrix Ξ from V to X. We define the probability transition
matrix from V to Y by W ◦Ξv(y) := ∑x∈X Wx(y)Ξv(x) for v ∈
V and y ∈ Y. When a probability distribution P on X is given,
we define the distribution on Y by W◦P(y) := ∑x∈X Wx(y)P(x)
for y ∈ Y. When we need the joint distribution on X×Y, we
use the notation W ×P(x, y) := Wx(y)P(x) for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
as [6]. Similarly, when a distribution PXV on X×V is given,
we use the notation W × PXV(v, x, y) := Wx(y)PXV(x, v) for
v ∈ V, x ∈ X, and y ∈ Y.
When a function f : V → X is given and a random
variable V taking the values in V obeys the distribution PV ,
we can define the random variable f (V) taking the values in X.
The random variable f (V) takes the value x with probability∑
v∈ f−1(x) PV (v). We also use the same symbol f : V → X
to denote the probability transition matrix from V to X, in
which, the output value is deterministically determined by the
input. Then, W ◦ f is a stochastic mapping V to Y, and we
have
(W ◦ f )(y|v) = W(y| f (v)) (2)
1Recently, the meta converse theorem was introduced for the channel coding
in [48], [50]. In the meta converse theorem, it is the key point to optimize
the choice of the distribution on the output alphabet and we usually denote
the distribution different from the marginal distribution by Q[49], [50]. Also,
another recent paper [51] adopts this notation for optimizing the distribution.
This kind notation becomes more popular, recently.
for v ∈ V and y ∈ Y. Given a probability transition matrix
W′ ∈ W(U, V), we define f ◦W′ ∈ W(U, X) by
( f ◦W′)(x|u) :=
∑
v∈ f−1(x)
W′(v|u) (3)
for x ∈ X and u ∈ U. As a special case, given a distribution Q
on V, f ◦Q is defined as a distribution on X in the following
way.
( f ◦ Q)(x) :=
∑
v∈ f−1(x)
Q(v). (4)
Remember that Wx denotes the output distribution on the
output alphabet Y with input x. Then, WX is the random
variable taking its values on the output distributions on Y.
Given a real valued function g of distributions on Y, we regard
g(WX) as a random variable taking the value g(Wx) with the
probability PX(x). Hence, we obtain
EXg(WX) =
∑
x
PX(x)g(Wx),
where EX denotes the expectation concerning X.
Given two random variables X and Y, for a real valued
function h on X × Y, we regard EX |Yh(X, Y) as a random
variable taking the value EX |Y=yh(X, y) with the probability
PY (y). In order to identify an information quantity, e.g.,
mutual information I(X; Y) and the Shannon entropy H(X),
we sometimes need to specify the distribution P of interest.
In such a case, we use the notations I(X; Y)[P] and H(X)[P]
for identifying what distribution is considered.
Further, in this paper, we discuss our codes and their
performances in the single-shot setting[34] when their descrip-
tions do not require their asymptotic discussions. However, in
several parts, we need to treat n-fold memoryless extensions
when we discuss their asymptotic performances. Hence, we
need to prepare the notations for n-fold independent and
identical distributions and n-fold memoryless extensions of
given channels. For a given probability distributions Q and
PX of the random variable X on X, we denote their n-fold
independent and identical distributions by Qn and PnX .
When we consider the random variables on Xn, even if they
do not obey the independent and identical distributions, we de-
note the random variables by Xn and denote their distributions
by PXn . However, when we consider a general sequence of
random variables those take values not in the product sets Xn
but in general sets Xn, we denote the random variables by Xn
and denote their distributions by PXn . Similarly, for a given
probability transition matrices W and PY |X from X to Y, we
denote their n-fold memoryless extensions by Wn and PnY |X .
We also denote the set of positive real numbers by R+, and
denote the set of non-negative real numbers by R≥0.
III. Information Quantities
In this paper, to evaluate the secrecy and the decoding error
probabilities, we employ several information quantities. For
distributions PA on A and PAB on A × B, we define Rényi
5entropy and conditional Rényi entropy
H1+ρ(A) := −1
ρ
log
∑
a
PA(a)1+ρ
H1+ρ(A|B) := −1
ρ
log
∑
a,b
PB(b)PA|B=b(a)1+ρ.
H1(A) and H1(A|B) are defined to be H(A) and H(A|B).
Then, we have several important properties for Rényi en-
tropy and conditional Rényi entropy. Since ρ 7→ ρH1+ρ(A),
ρ 7→ ρH1+ρ(A|B) are concave and limρ→0 ρH1+ρ(A) =
limρ→0 ρH1+ρ(A|B) = 0, we have
H1+ρ′(A) ≤ H1+ρ(A), H1+ρ′ (A|B) ≤ H1+ρ(A|B) (5)
for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ′.
Similarly, as is shown in [17], we have the following
proposition for the function
ψ(ρ|Q‖P) := log
∑
a
Q(a)1+ρP(a)−ρ. (6)
Proposition 1: [17] The function ψ(ρ|Q‖P) satisfies the
following properties:
(1) ρ 7→ ψ(ρ|Q‖P) is convex.
(2) ψ(0|Q‖P) = 0.
(3) ddρψ(ρ|Q‖P)|ρ=0 = D(Q‖P).
(4) The relations
D(Q‖P) :=
∑
a
P(a) log P(a)Q(a) = limρ→+0
ψ(ρ|Q‖P)
ρ
≤ψ(ρ|Q‖P)
ρ
(7)
hold for 0 < ρ2.
For a given channel W from X to Y, we define the function
[17]:
ψ(ρ|W, PX) := log
∑
x
PX(x)eψ(ρ|Wx‖W◦PX ). (8)
When the channel is written as PZ|L, ψ(ρ|W, P) can be rewritten
as follows.
ψ(ρ|PZ|L, PL) = log
∑
z
∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)PZ|L(z|ℓ)1+ρPZ(z)−ρ. (9)
This quantity is extended as
ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
:= log
∑
u
PU(u)
∑
v
PV |U(v|u)
∑
z
PZ|V (z|v)1+ρPZ|U(z|u)−ρ.
(10)
for conditional distributions PZ|V , PV |U and a distribution PU .
Also, we introduce the following functions as in [17].
E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL)
:= log
∑
z

∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
, (11)
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
:= log
∑
u
PU(u)
∑
z

∑
v
PV |U(v|u)(PZ|V(z|v)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
. (12)
2Item (4) was not directly given in [17]. However, it can be shown by the
combination of other items.
Observe that E0 is essentially Gallager’s function E0 [12]. As
can be easily shown, these quantities satisfy the additivity as
follows[17], [12].
ψ(ρ|PnZ|L, PnL) = nψ(ρ|PZ|L, PL) (13)
ψ(ρ|PnZ|V , PnV |U , PnU) = nψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) (14)
E0(ρ|PnZ|L, PnL) = nE0(ρ|PZ|L, PL) (15)
E0(ρ|PnZ|V , PnV |U , PnU) = nE0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) (16)
Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2: [12], [17] We have the following five items
for fixed 0 < ρ < 1 and fixed conditional distribution PZ|L.
(1) The function ρ 7→ E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL) is convex for a
given distribution PL[12].
(2) exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL)) is concave with respect to PL[17,
Lemma 1].
(3) The relation ψ(ρ|PZ|L, PL) ≤ E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL), i.e.,
exp(ψ(ρ|PZ|L, PL)) ≤ exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL)) (17)
holds for any distribution PL of L[17, (16)].
(4) The relation
lim
ρ→0
ψ(ρ|PZ|L, PL)
ρ
= lim
ρ→0
E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL)
ρ
= I(Z; L)
(18)
holds for a distribution PL[17, Section III][12].
Lemma 3: When two distributions QL and PL of L satisfy
PL(ℓ) ≤ C1QL(ℓ) for any ℓ with given constants C1 ≥ 1 and
0 < ρ < 1, we have
exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL)) ≤ C1 exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, QL)). (19)
Proof: (19) can be shown as follows.
exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, PL)) =
∑
z

∑
ℓ
PL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
≤
∑
z

∑
ℓ
C1QL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
≤C1−ρ1
∑
z

∑
ℓ
QL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ)1/(1−ρ))

1−ρ
=C1−ρ1 exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, QL)) ≤ C1 exp(E0(ρ|PZ|L, QL)).
As a generalization of Item (4) of Proposition 2, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 4: The relation
lim
ρ→0
ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
ρ
= lim
ρ→0
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
ρ
=I(Z; V |U) (20)
holds for a distribution PU , and conditional distributions PZ|V
and PV |U .
Proof: Due to (18), we have
eψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ) =
∑
u
PU(u)1 + ρI(Z; V |U = u) + o(ρ)
=1 + ρI(Z; V |U) + o(ρ).
6Taking the logarithm, we obtain limρ→0 ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU )ρ =
I(Z; V |U). Similarly, we can show limρ→0 E0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU )ρ =
I(Z; V |U).
Considering the Legendre transforms, we define
˜Eψ(R, PZ,V,U) := max
0≤ρ≤1
ρR − ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU), (21)
˜EE0 (R, PZ,V,U) := max
0≤ρ≤1
ρR − E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU). (22)
Taking the maximum, we define
E0,max(ρ|PZ|V ) :=max
PV
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV )
= log max
PV
∑
z
(
∑
v
PV (v)PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=max
PVU
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU). (23)
Lemma 5: The function ρ 7→ E0,max(ρ|PZ|V) is convex.
Proof: Given convex functions x 7→ fi(x), the function
x 7→ maxi fi(x) is also convex. Hence, the item (1) of
Proposition 2 yields the desired argument.
Next, for WZ ∈ W(V, Z), we consider a different infor-
mation quantity ˜El:
˜El(R,WZ × QVU)
:= min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
(
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU)
+ [R − I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU ]]+
)
. (24)
Due to Item (3) of Proposition 2, we have
˜Eψ(R,WZ × QVU) ≥ ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU). (25)
In this paper, we will derive the following relations:
˜El(R,WZ × QVU) ≥ ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) (26)
and
min
QV
˜El(R,WZ × QV ) = minQV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV )
= max
ρ∈[0,1]
ρR − E0(ρ|WZ) (27)
as Theorems 67 and 80 in Section XIV, respectively.
Similar to ˜El, we introduce the following quantities for
WY ∈ W(V,Y) and WZ ∈ W(V,Z)
ˆEb(Rp,Rc, ˜WY × QVU)
:=min
(
[I(VU; Y)[ ˜WY × QU,V ] − Rp − Rc]+,
[I(V; Y |U)[ ˜WY × QU,V ] − Rp]+
)
, (28)
˜Eb(Rp,Rc,WY × QVU)
:= min
˜WY∈W(U×V,Y)
D( ˜WY‖WY |QVU) + ˆEb(Rp,Rc, ˜WY × QVU),
(29)
˜Ee(Rc,WZ × QU)
:= min
˜WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
D( ˜WZ‖WZ |QVU) + [I(U; Z)[ ˜WZ × QVU ] − Rc]+,
(30)
where D( ˜W Y‖WY |QVU) is defined for ˜WY ,WY ∈ W(V,Y) as
D( ˜WY‖WY |QVU) :=
∑
u,v
QVU(u, v)D( ˜WYu,v‖WYv ). (31)
In the above definition, WY and WZ are treated as elements of
W(U ×V,Y) and W(U ×V,Z), respectively.
IV. Broadcast Channels with ConfidentialMessages
A. Review of Existing Results
First, we give a formulation of broadcast channels with
confidential messages with single shot setting[34]. Let Alice,
Bob, and Eve be as defined in Section I. X denotes the channel
input alphabet and Y (resp. Z) denotes the channel output
alphabet to Bob (resp. Eve). We assume that X, Y, and Z are
finite unless otherwise stated.
We denote the conditional probability of the channel to
Bob (resp. Eve) by PY |X (resp. PZ|X). The purpose of broad-
cast channels with confidential messages is the following.
(1) Alice reliably sends the common message E to Bob
and Eve. (2) Alice confidentially and reliably sends the
secret message S to Bob. Here, we denote the sets of the
common messages and the secret messages by E and S.
Our code is given by Alice’s stochastic encoder ϕa from
S × E to X, Bob’s deterministic decoder ϕb : Y → S × E
and Eve’s deterministic decoder ϕe : Z → E. The triple
ϕ = (ϕa, ϕb, ϕe) is called a code for broadcast channels with
confidential messages. Then, when the common message E
and the secret message S obey the distribution PS ,E , the
performance is evaluated by the following quantities. (1) The
sizes of the sets of the common messages and the secret
messages, i.e., |E| and |S|. (2) Bob’s decoding error probability
Pb[PY |X , ϕ, PS ,E], which is the probability Pr{(S , E) , ϕb(Y)}
under the distribution (PY |X ◦ ϕa) × PS ,E . (3) Eve’s decoding
error probability Pe[PY |X , ϕ, PS ,E], which is the probability
Pr{E , ϕe(Z)} under the distribution (PZ|X◦ϕa)×PS ,E. (4) Eve’s
uncertainty H(S |Z)[PZ|X, ϕa, PS ,E], which is the conditional
entropy H(S |Z) under the distribution (PZ|X ◦ϕa)×PS ,E. Since
these quantities are functions of the channel and the code,
such dependencies are denoted by the symbol [PY |X , ϕ, PS ,E]
in the above notation. Instead of H(S |Z)[PZ|X, ϕa, PS ,E], we
sometimes treat (5) leaked information I(S ; Z)[PZ|X, ϕa, PS ,E],
which is the mutual information I(S ; Z) under the distribution
(PZ|X ◦ ϕa) × PS ,E .
We sometimes need to evaluate the error probability
when S and/or E is fixed. In such a case, we denote
it by Pb[PY |X , ϕ, PE|S=s], Pb[PY |X , ϕ, S = s, E = e], and
Pe[PY |X , ϕ, PS |E=e].
Now, we review the asymptotic formulation of broadcast
channels with confidential messages with the n-fold discrete
memoryless extension when both of the common messages
and the secret messages are subject to uniform distributions.
The set Sn denotes the set of the confidential message and
En does the set of the common message when the block
coding of length n is used. We shall define the achievability
of a rate triple (R1, Re, R0), where R0 and R1 are the rates
of the common and confidential messages, and Re is the
entropy rate conditioned with Eve’s random variable for the
7confidential message. For the notational convenience, we fix
the base of logarithm, including one used in entropy and
mutual information, to the base of natural logarithm.
Definition 6: [9] The rate triple (R1, Re, R0) is said to be
achievable for the information leakage rate criterion if the
following condition holds. The size of the sets of the common
and confidential messages are |En| = enR0 and |Sn| = enR1 . The
common and confidential messages are subject to the uniform
and independent distribution on Sn and En. There exists a
sequence of the codes ϕn = (ϕa,n, ϕb,n, ϕe,n), i.e., Alice’s
stochastic encoder ϕa,n from Sn×En to Xn, Bob’s deterministic
decoder ϕb,n : Yn → Sn × En and Eve’s deterministic decoder
ϕe,n : Zn → En such that
lim
n→∞
Pb[PnY |X , ϕn, Pmix,Sn,En] = 0
lim
n→∞
Pe[PnZ|X , ϕn, Pmix,Sn,En] = 0
lim inf
n→∞
H(S n|Zn)[PnY |X , ϕa,n, Pmix,Sn,En]
n
≥ Re.
The capacity region with the information leakage rate criterion
of the BCC is the closure of the achievable rate triples for the
information leakage rate criterion.
Theorem 7: [9] The capacity region with the information
leakage rate criterion of the BCC is given by the set of R0, R1
and Re such that there exists a Markov chain U → V → X →
YZ and
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V; Y |U) +min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
Re ≤ I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U),
Re ≤ R1.
As described in [25], U can be regarded as the common mes-
sage, V the combination of the common and the confidential
messages, and X the transmitted signal.
In this paper, we treat the source-channel universal coding
for BCC, in which, we guarantee the security independently of
the choice of the source distribution. While the lower bound
of the above conditional entropy H(S n|Zn)[PnY |X , ϕa,n, PS n,En ]
depends on the the source distribution PS n,En , we can find
an upper bound of mutual information that does not depend
on the source distribution, as is shown in Section XIII. As
a preparation for the above source-channel universal coding
for BCC, we propose another type of capacity region for
the uniform and independent distributed case while the non-
uniform and dependent case will be treated latter.
Definition 8: The rate triple (R1, Rl, R0) is said to be
achievable for the leaked information criterion if the following
conditions hold. In this notation, R1, Rl, and R0 denote the
rates of the confidential message, the leaked information, and
the common message, respectively. The size of the sets of
the common and confidential messages are |En| = enR0 and
|Sn| = enR1 , and the common and confidential messages are
subject to the uniform and independent distribution on Sn and
En. There exists a sequence of the codes ϕn = (ϕa,n, ϕb,n, ϕe,n),
i.e., Alice’s stochastic encoder ϕa,n from Sn × En to Xn,
Bob’s deterministic decoder ϕb,n : Yn → Sn × En and Eve’s
deterministic decoder ϕe,n : Zn → En such that
lim
n→∞
Pb[PnY |X , ϕn, Pmix,Sn,En ] = 0
lim
n→∞
Pe[PnZ|X , ϕn, Pmix,Sn,En ] = 0
lim sup
n→∞
I(S n; Zn)[PnY |X , ϕa,n, Pmix,Sn,En ]
n
≤ Rl.
The capacity region with the leaked information criterion of
the BCC is the closure of the achievable rate triples.
The capacity region with the leaked information criterion
of the BCC is characterized as a corollary of Theorem 7.
Corollary 9: The capacity region with the leaked informa-
tion criterion of the BCC is given by the set of R0, R1 and Rl,
such that there exists a Markov chain U → V → X → YZ and
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V; Y |U) +min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
Rl ≥ R1 − [I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U)]+,
where [x]+ := max(x, 0). That is, when R1 + R0 < I(V; Y |U) +
min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)] and R0 < min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)], there
exists a sequence of the codes ϕn = (ϕa,n, ϕb,n, ϕe,n), i.e.,
Alice’s stochastic encoder ϕa,n from Sn × En to Xn, Bob’s
deterministic decoder ϕb,n : Yn → Sn × En and Eve’s
deterministic decoder ϕe,n : Zn → En such that
lim
n→∞
Pb[PnY |X , ϕn, Pmix,Sn,En ] = 0
lim
n→∞
Pe[PnZ|X , ϕn, Pmix,Sn,En ] = 0
and
lim sup
n→∞
I(S n; Zn)[PnY |X , ϕa,n, Pmix,Sn,En]
n
≤R1 − I[(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U)]+.
B. Our Approach to BCC
Next, we consider the BCC with the single-shot setting
when the common and confidential messages do not obey
the uniform and independent distributions on S and E, i.e.,
the confidential message S may have a correlation with the
common messages E. When the confidential message S is
independent of the common messages E,
I(S ; Z) ≤ I(S ; ZE) = I(S ; Z|E) + I(S ; E) = I(S ; Z|E),
I(S ; Z) = H(S ) − H(S |Z) ≥ H(S |E) − H(S |Z)
=H(S |E) − (H(S |ZE) + I(S ; E|Z)) = I(S ; Z|E) − I(S ; E|Z)
≥I(S ; Z|E) − H(E|Z) ≥ I(S ; Z|E) − H(E|ϕe(Z)).
When the error probability goes to zero, Fano’s inequality
guarantees that H(E|Z) goes to zero. Hence, I(S ; Z) and
I(S ; Z|E) have the same asymptotic behaviors. So, even if we
replace I(S ; Z) by I(S ; Z|E) in Definition 8, we obtain the same
capacity region. However, when the confidential message S is
dependent on the common messages E, I(S ; Z) and I(S ; Z|E)
have the different asymptotic behavior as follows. Since
I(S ; Z) = I(S ; ZE) − I(S ; E|Z)
≥I(S ; E) − H(E|Z) ≥ I(S ; E) − H(E|ϕe(Z)),
8I(S ; Z) is asymptotically lower bounded by I(S ; E) when
the error probability goes to zero. That is, when the mutual
information I(S ; E) is positive, the mutual information I(S ; Z)
cannot go to zero because Eve can infer the secret message
from the common message. Thus, it is not suitable to treat
the mutual information I(S ; Z) as leaked information from Z.
Hence, we adopt the conditional mutual information I(S ; Z|E)
as leaked information from Z.
Remark 10: Csiszár and Körner [9] treated BCC with non-
uniform information source. However, their formulation was
different from our formulation in the following point. In their
formulation, they fixed a correlated non-uniform distribution
PS ,E on S × E and assumed that the information source S n
and En obey its n-fold independent and identical distribution
PnS ,E . In addition to this, their code depends on the distribution
PS ,E . However, in our formulation, we do not assume the
independent and identical distributed condition for the dis-
tribution PS n,En of the information source S n and En. This is
because information source is not given as an independent and
identical distribution or known, in general. Hence, we study a
universal code independent of the distribution PS n,En of sources
in Section XIII. Thus, our code is useful for a realistic case.
V. Broadcast Channels with DegradedMessage Sets
A. Capacity Region
Next, we review the broadcast channel with degraded mes-
sage sets (abbreviated as BCD) considered by Körner and
Marton [23] in the single-shot setting. If we set Re = 0 in
the BCC, the secrecy requirement is removed from BCC, and
the coding problem is equivalent to BCD. In this problem,
we treat the private message S p taking values in Sp and the
common message S c taking values in Sc.
Corollary 11: [23] The capacity region of the BCD is given
by the pair of the rate Rc of common message and the rate
Rp of private message such that there exists a Markov chain
U → V = X → YZ and
Rc ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
Rc + Rp ≤ I(V; Y |U) +min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)].
Note that the statement of our Corollary 11 is the same as
[9, Corollary 5] and different from [23]. However, as is stated
in [9, Remark 5], the equivalence between the two statements
can be easily shown by some algebra.
Here, we only consider a sequence of codes that achieves
the rate pair (Rc,Rp) satisfying
Rc < min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)], Rp < I(V; Y |U). (32)
For a given Markov chain U → V = X → YZ, we construct
an ensemble of codes by the following random coding with
the single-shot setting, which is mathematically equivalent to
the construction by Kaspi and Merhav [21].
Code Ensemble 1 (Kaspi and Merhav [21, Section II]):
3 For an arbitrary element sc ∈ Sc, Φc(sc) is the random
variable taking values in U and is subject to the distribution
PU , and is independent of Φc(s′c) with s′c , sc ∈ Sc. For an
arbitrary element sp ∈ Sp, Φp(sc, sp) is the random variable
taking values in V, is independent of Φp(s′c, s′p) with s′c , sc,
and depends on the random variable Φc(sc). Under the
condition Φc(sc) = u, the random variable Φp(sc, sp) is subject
to the distribution PV |U=u and is conditionally independent of
Φp(sc, sp′ ) with s′p , sp. Bob’s decoder Φb and Eve’s decoder
Φe are defined as the maximum likelihood decoders. The
quartet (Φp,Φc,Φb,Φe) is abbreviated as Φ.
Here, the all values of the random variables {Φc(sc)}sc and
{Φp(sc, sp)}sc,sp are disclosed to all players prior to the real
communication because these random variables decides our
code.
Lemma 12: [21, Theorem 1 and Section IV] The above
ensemble of codes Φ satisfies the following inequalities.
EΦPb[PY |V ,Φ] ≤|Sp|ρeE0 (−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU )
+ (|Sc||Sp|)ρeE0(−ρ|PY |U,V ,PU,V ) (33)
EΦPe[PZ|V ,Φ] ≤|Sc|ρeE0(−ρ|PZ|U ,PU ), (34)
where E0(−ρ|PZ|U , PU) and E0(−ρ|PY |V , PV |U , PU) are defined
in (11) and (12).
Here, we should remark that Inequalities (33) and (34) hold
for any distribution over the messages because the proof by
[21] does not make any assumption for the distribution over
the messages.
Due to Lemma 12, Markov inequality guarantees that
PrΩ1 <
1
2
, PrΩ2 <
1
2
Ω1 :=
{
Pb[PY |V ,Φ, Pmix,Sp,Sc] > 2|Sp|ρeE0(−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU )
+2(|Sc||Sp|)ρeE0(−ρ|PY |U,V ,PU,V )
}
Ω2 := {Pe[PZ|V ,Φ, Pmix,Sp,Sc ] > 2|Sc|ρeE0 (−ρ|PZ|U ,PU )}.
Since Pr(Ω1 ∪Ω2) < 1, we have Pr(Ωc1 ∩Ωc2) > 0. That is, for
an arbitrary distribution PSp,Sc over the messages, there exists
a code ϕ such that
Pb[PY |V , ϕ, PSp,Sc ] ≤2|Sp|ρeE0 (−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU )
+ 2(|Sc||Sp|)ρeE0(−ρ|PY |U,V ,PU,V ) (35)
Pe[PZ|V , ϕ, PSp,Sc ] ≤2|Sc|ρeE0(−ρ|PZ|U ,PU ). (36)
Now, we apply the above inequalities to the n-fold discrete
memoryless extension. Then, for an arbitrary distribution
PSp,n,Sc,n over the messages, there exists a sequence of codes
ϕn with the rate of common message Rc and the rate of private
3A code ensemble and a code construction play a distinguished role in this
paper because they give a procedure to make our codes. Hence, we give them
serial numbers that are separate from other environments, Theorems, Lemmas,
and Remarks. Although both of a code ensemble and a code construction give
a procedure for our code, the procedure by a code ensemble is less practical,
and that by a code construction is more practical. To clarify this difference,
we assigned one of two environments to them dependently of their properties.
Code constructions will be given in Section XI after code ensembles are
presented in the previous sections.
9message Rp of length n such that
Pb[PnY |V , ϕn, PSp,n,Sc,n ] ≤2en(ρRp+E0(−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU ))
+ 2en(ρ(Rp+Rc)+E0 (−ρ|PY |U,V ,PU,V )) (37)
Pe[PnZ|V , ϕn, PSp,n,Sc,n ] ≤2en(ρRc+E0(−ρ|PZ|U ,PU )). (38)
The above values go to zero under the condition (32), because
the condition (32) guarantees that both exponents are positive
with sufficiently small ρ > 0.
Indeed, Kaspi and Merhav [21] derived a better bound than
(34) by employing four parameters even in the single-shot
setting. The bound (34) can be seen as a special case of Kaspi
and Merhav [21]’s bound. Since the bound (34) can derive
the capacity region of SMC, we only use the bound (34) for
simplicity.
B. Universal Code for BCD
Körner and Sgarro [24] provided the code that attains the
above rate region universally for source and channel in the
following sense.
Theorem 13: [24] For an arbitrary real number ǫ > 0, there
exists an integer N satisfying the following. For an arbitrary
integer n ≥ N, a given joint type QVU of length n on the sets
V ×U, and rates Rp and Rc, there exists a code ϕn with the
rates Rp and Rc such that
Pb[Wn, ϕn, S p,n = sp,n, S c,n = sc,n]
≤ exp(−n[ ˜Eb(Rp,Rc,WY × QU,V ) − ǫ]), (39)
Pe[Wn, ϕn, S p,n = sp,n, S c,n = sc,n]
≤ exp(−n[ ˜Ee(Rc,WZ × QU,V ) − ǫ]) (40)
for any sp,n ∈ Sp,n, sc,n ∈ Sc,n and any W ∈ W(V, Y× Z),
where the exponents ˜Eb(Rp,Rc,WY × QU,V ) and ˜Ee(Rc,WZ ×
QU,V ) are defined in (29) and (30), respectively.
VI. General Channel Resolvability
In the wire-tap channel model, when the dummy message
obeys the uniform distribution, channel resolvability [13] can
be used for guaranteeing the security [15]. In this paper,
we consider the security of SMC with non-uniform and
dependent secret messages. For the analysis of this case,
we have to consider the secrecy when the dummy message
does not necessarily obey the uniform distribution. Hence,
the security evaluation [15] based on the original channel
resolvability cannot be extended to the security of SMC with
non-uniform and dependent secret messages. Thus, we need
a generalization of channel resolvability. In this section, we
propose a generalization of channel resolvability in the single-
shot setting.
First, we fix a channel W from the alphabet X to the
alphabet Y. For a fixed distribution PX on X, we focus
on an encoder Λ from the message set A to the alphabet
X. The purpose of the encoder Λ is approximation of the
average output distribution W ◦ PX by the output distribution
with input Λ(A). The original channel resolvability [13] treats
the minimum asymptotic rate of |A| such that the output
distribution W ◦Λ◦Pmix,A can approximate the average output
distribution W ◦ PX with a suitable choice of Λ in the sense
that the variational distance goes to zero. In the single-shot
setting, the problem can be converted to the following way:
How well the given average output distribution W ◦PX can be
approximated by the output distribution W◦Λ◦Pmix,A when the
cardinality |A| is less than a given amount. In this paper, we
consider this approximation problem when the message A does
not obey the uniform distribution Pmix,A. Since our problem
can be regarded as a generalization of channel resolvability,
it is called general channel resolvability, which is essential
for the secure multiplex coding with common messages with
dependent and non-uniform secret messages.
Now, we apply the random coding on the alphabet A with
the probability distribution PA. For an arbitrary a ∈ A, Λ(a)
is the random variable subject to the distribution PX on X.
For a , a′ ∈ A, Λ(a) is independent of Λ(a′). Then, the
random encoder Λ := {Λ(a)}a∈A gives the map from A to X
as a 7→ Λ(a).
Then, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 14 (General channel resolvability): For
ρ ∈ (0, 1], we have
EΛeρD(W◦Λ◦PA‖W◦PX ) ≤ EΛeψ(ρ|W◦Λ◦PA‖W◦PX )
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(A)eψ(ρ|W,PX).
By applying Jensen inequality to the function x 7→ ex,
Theorem 14 yields
EΛD(W ◦ Λ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX) ≤ 1
ρ
log EΛeρD(W◦Λ◦PA‖W◦PX )
≤1
ρ
log(1 + e−ρH1+ρ(A)eψ(ρ|W,PX)),
which is non-uniform generalization of [15, Lemma 2]. This
theorem will be used for the proof of Theorem 20.
Proof: Due to (7), we have
ρD(W ◦Λ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX) ≤ ψ(ρ|W ◦ Λ ◦ PA‖W ◦ PX).
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The average of eψ(ρ|W◦Λ◦PA‖W◦PX ) is evaluated as
EΛeψ(ρ|W◦Λ◦PA‖W◦PX )
=EΛ
∑
y
(∑
a
PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
)1+ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ
=EΛ
∑
y
(∑
a
PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
)(∑
a′
PA(a′)WΛ(a′)(y)
)ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ
=
∑
y
∑
a
(
EΛ(a)PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)EΛ|Λ(a)
(
PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
+
∑
a′,a
PA(a′)WΛ(a′)(y)
)ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
(
EΛ(a)PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
(
PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
+ EΛ|Λ(a)
∑
a′,a
PA(a′)WΛ(a′)(y)
)ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ) (41)
=
∑
y
∑
a
(
EΛ(a)PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
(
PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
+
∑
a′,a
PA(a′)(W ◦ PX)(y)
)ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
(
EΛ(a)PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)(PA(a)WΛ(a)(y) + (W ◦ PX)(y))ρ
· (W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ
)
(42)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
EΛ(a)PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)
(PA(a)ρWΛ(a)(y)ρ + (W ◦ PX)(y)ρ)(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ (43)
=
∑
y
∑
a
EΛ(a)PA(a)WΛ(a)(y)(1 + PA(a)ρWΛ(a)(y)ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ)
=1 +
∑
y
∑
a
EΛ(a)PA(a)1+ρWΛ(a)(y)1+ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ
=1 +
∑
a
PA(a)1+ρ
∑
y
∑
x
PX(x)Wx(y)1+ρ(W ◦ PX)(y)−ρ
=1 + (
∑
a
PA(a)1+ρ)eψ(ρ|W,PX).
In the above derivation, (41) follows from the concavity of
x 7→ xρ, (42) follows from ∑a′,a PA(a′) ≤ 1, (43) follows
from the inequality (x + y)ρ ≤ xρ + yρ.
Next, in order to reduce the complexity of encoding, we
consider the case when X and A are Abelian groups. We in-
troduce the following condition for the ensemble for injective
homomorphisms F from A to X.
Condition 15: Let F be a random variable that takes its val-
ues on injective4 homomorphisms from A to X. For arbitrary
elements x , 0 ∈ X and a , 0 ∈ A, the relation F(a) = x
holds with probability at most 1|X|−1 .
When X and A are vector spaces over a finite field Fq,
the set of all injective homomorphisms from A to X satisfies
Condition 15.
Remark 16: When X and A have the same Abelian group
structure as the vector space over a finite field F2 with the the
same dimension k, these can be regarded as the finite filed
F2k . For y ∈ F2k , the homomorphism fy from A to X from A
4The condition of injectivity is not necessarily for Theorem 17. However,
the injectivity for F will needed in the discussion in Subsection XI-C. Hence,
to avoid to make so many conditions, we assume the injectivity, here.
to X is defined by the multiplication as fy : x → xy. Then,
as mentioned in [44, Remark 9], when the random variable Y
chosen in F2k subject to the uniform distribution, the function-
valued random variable fY satisfies Condition 15. To realize
the function-valued random variable fY , we need to choose
a finite filed F2k with efficient multiplication. Constructions
of such a finite filed F2k are given in [45, Appendix D], [46,
Section 7.3.1].
We choose another random variable G in X that obeys the
uniform distribution on X and is independent of the choice of
F. Then, we define a map ΛF,G(a) := F(a) + G and have the
following theorem:
Theorem 17 (Algebraic channel resolvability): Under the
above choice, we obtain
EF,GeρD(W◦ΛF,G◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X) ≤ EF,Geψ(ρ|W◦ΛF,G◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X)
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(A)eψ(ρ|W,Pmix,X). (44)
This theorem will be used for the proof of Lemma 21, which
is essential for the proof of Theorem 22.
Proof: We introduce the random variable Za := ΛF,G(a) =
F(a) + G. The random variable Za is independent of the
choice of F. For a′ ∈ A, ΛF,G(a′) = F(a′ − a) + Za.
Since (|X| − 1)EF|Za WΛF,G (a)(y) = (|X| − 1)EFWF(a′−a)+Za (y) ≤∑
x Wx(y) = |X|W ◦ Pmix,X(y) for a ∈ A and y ∈ Y, we obtain
EF|Za WΛF,G (a)(y) ≤ |X||X|−1 W ◦ Pmix,X(y) for a ∈ A and y ∈ Y.
Further, since F is injective, we have |A| ≤ |X|, which implies∑
a PA(a)2 ≥ 1|A| ≥ 1|X| . Hence, since x 7→ xρ is concave, we
obtain
∑
a
PA(a)(1 − PA(a)1 − 1/|X| )
ρ ≤ (1 −
∑
a PA(a)2
1 − 1/|X| )
ρ ≤ (1 − 1/|X|
1 − 1/|X| )
ρ = 1.
(45)
Our proof of Theorem 14 can be applied to our proof of
Theorem 17 by replacing Λ(a), Λ|Λ(a), and PX by Za, F |Za
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and Pmix,X. Then, we obtain
EF,Geψ(ρ|W◦ΛF,G◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
(
EZa PA(a)WΛF,G (a)(y)
(
PA(a)WΛF,G (a)(y)
+ EF|Za
∑
a′,a
PA(a′)WΛF,G (a′)(y)
)ρ
W ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ
)
(46)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
(
EZa PA(a)WZa(y)
(
PA(a)WZa(y)
+
|X|
|X| − 1
∑
a′,a
PA(a′)W ◦ Pmix,X(y)
)ρ
W ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ
)
(47)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
(
EZa PA(a)WZa(y)
(
PA(a)WZa(y)
+
1 − PA(a)
1 − 1/|X|W ◦ Pmix,X(y)
)ρ
W ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ
)
(48)
≤
∑
y
∑
a
(
EZa PA(a)WZa(y)
(
PA(a)ρWZa (y)ρ
+ (1 − PA(a)
1 − 1/|X| )
ρW ◦ Pmix,X(y)ρ
)
W ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ
)
(49)
=
∑
y
∑
a
(
EZa PA(a)WZa(y)((
1 − PA(a)
1 − 1/|X| )
ρ
+ PA(a)ρWZa (y)ρW ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ)
)
=
∑
a
PA(a)(1 − PA(a)1 − 1/|X| )
ρ
+
∑
y
∑
a
EZa PA(a)1+ρWZa (y)1+ρW ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ)
=
∑
a
PA(a)(1 − PA(a)1 − 1/|X| )
ρ
+
∑
a
PA(a)1+ρ
∑
y
∑
x
PX(x)Wx(y)1+ρW ◦ Pmix,X(y)−ρ)
≤1 + (
∑
a
PA(a)1+ρ)eψ(ρ|W,Pmix,X). (50)
In the above derivation, (46) follows in the same way as
(41), (47) follows from Condition 15, (48) follows from∑
a′,a PA(a′) ≤ 1, (49) follows from the inequality (x + y)ρ ≤
xρ + yρ. The final inequality follows from (45).
In the following, we assume that the input alphabet X is an
Abelian group, and an action of X on the output alphabet Y
is given as x · y for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. A channel W from X
to Y is regular in the sense of Delsarte-Piret [10], if there is
a probability distribution PY such that
Wx(y) = PY (x · y).
Since a regular channel W satisfies
D(W ◦ ΛF,g ◦ PA‖W ◦ Pmix,X) = D(W ◦ΛF,g′ ◦ PA‖W ◦ Pmix,X)
for any g, g′ ∈ X, we obtain the following corollary. This
corollary implies that we do not need the additional random
variable G in the regular channel case.
Corollary 18: When the channel W is a regular channel
given by a distribution PY on Y, we obtain
EFeρD(W◦ΛF,g◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X) ≤ EFeψ(ρ|W◦ΛF,g◦PA‖W◦Pmix,X)
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(A)eψ(ρ|W,Pmix,X) = 1 + e−ρH1+ρ(A)eψ(ρ|PY‖PY ) (51)
for any g ∈ X, where PY (y) := ∑x Pmix,X(x)PY(x · y).
Proof: Due to Theorem 14, it is enough to show
ψ(ρ|W, Pmix,X) = ψ(ρ|PY‖PY ). Since PY (y) = W ◦ Pmix,X(y) =
W ◦ Pmix,X(x · y), we have
eψ(ρ|W,Pmix,X) =
∑
x
Pmix,X(x)
∑
y
PY (x · y)1+ρPY (y)−ρ
=
∑
x
Pmix,X(x)
∑
y
PY (y)1+ρPY (x−1 · y)−ρ
=
∑
x
Pmix,X(x)
∑
y
PY (y)1+ρPY (y)−ρ
=
∑
y
PY (y)1+ρPY (y)−ρ = eψ(ρ|PY‖PY ).
VII. SecureMultiplex Coding with CommonMessages:
Single-Shot Setting
In this section, we give the formulation of the secure mul-
tiplex coding with common messages. After the formulation,
we give two kinds of random construction of codes for the
secure multiplex coding with common messages and evaluate
their performance in the single-shot setting.
A. Formulation and Preparation
In the secure multiplex coding with common messages,
Alice sends the common message S 0 to Bob and Eve, and
T secret messages S 1, . . . , S T to Bob. We do not necessarily
assume the uniformity nor independence for the distributions
of messages S 0, S 1, . . . , S T . Hence, there might exist statistical
correlations among messages S 0, S 1, . . . , S T . Even in this
scenario, Alice and Bob can use S 1, . . . , S i−1, S i+1, . . . , S T
as random bits making S i ambiguous to Eve. When we
focus on S I := (S i; i ∈ I) for a non-empty proper sub-
set I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }, the remaining information S Ic
serves as random bits making S I ambiguous to Eve. The
messages S 0, S 1, . . . , S T are assumed to belong to the sets
S0,S1, . . . ,ST . The set S1 × . . .×ST of all secret messages is
denoted by S. In order to explain the SMC model without
S0, we consider the following example. Consider the case
when S 1, . . . , S T are personal information for T persons. That
is, S i corresponds to the personal information of the i-th
person. Assume that it is required only to keep the secrecy of
the respective personal information S 1, . . . , S T from the third
party. The secrecy of the relation among respective personal
informations is not required. For example, when S 1, . . . , S T are
the uniform random bits with the same size, the secrecy of the
sum S 1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ S T is not required, where ⊕ is exclusive OR.
In order to treat this secrecy problem, we give a formulation
of the SMC model as follows.
The purpose of the coding in the SMC model is to reliably
send the messages S 0, S 1, . . . , S T to Bob, and to make S I
ambiguous to Eve by using the remaining information S Ic for
several non-empty proper subsets I ( {1, . . . , T }. Our code is
given by Alice’s stochastic encoder ϕa from S × S0 to X,
Bob’s deterministic decoder ϕb : Y → S × S0 and Eve’s
deterministic decoder ϕe : Z → S0. The triple ϕ = (ϕa, ϕb, ϕe)
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channel PYZ|X
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Fig. 1. Communication structure used in Sections VII–XII
is called a code for the secure multiplex coding with common
messages. Then, the performance is evaluated by the following
quantities: (1) The sizes of the sets of the common messages
and all of the secret messages, i.e., |S0|, |S1|, . . . , |ST |. (2)
Bob’s decoding error probability Pb[PY |X , ϕ, PS T ], which is the
probability Pr{(S 0, S 1, . . . , S T ) , ϕb(Y)} under the distribution
(PY |X ◦ ϕa) × PS T with T := {0, . . . , T }. (3) Eve’s decoding
error probability Pe[PZ|X , ϕ, PS T ], which is the probability
Pr{S 0 , ϕe(Z)} under the distribution (PZ|X ◦ ϕa) × PS T . (4)
Leaked information I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ] for non-empty
proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }, which is the mutual information
I(S I; Z|S 0) under the distribution (PZ|X ◦ϕa)×PS T . Instead of
I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ], other researchers sometimes treat
(5) Eve’s uncertainty H(S I|Z, S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ], which is
the conditional entropy H(S I|Z, S 0) under the distribution
(PZ|X ◦ ϕa) × PS T . However, when we treat the universality
of our code, leaked information I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X, ϕa, PS T ] is
used as criterion for performance of our code. That is, we
adopt leaked information I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ] rather than
Eve’s uncertainty H(S I|Z, S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ].
In the above formulation, we treat the leaked information
I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ] for several non-empty proper sub-
sets I ( {1, . . . , T }. Depending on the situation, we decide
which non-empty proper subset I is considered. Hence, in
that case, we can fix a family J of non-empty proper sub-
sets I of {1, . . . , T } for which we discuss the leaked infor-
mation I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS T ]. For example, in the case
of the above personal information, we consider the subsets
{1}, {2}, . . . , {T }. Hence, we choose J as J := {{1}, {2}, . . . , {T }}.
When we do not specify the family J, we treat the leaked in-
formation I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|X, ϕa, PS T ] for all non-empty proper
subsets I of {1, . . . , T }.
This model can be regarded as a generalization of the wire-
tap model in the following way. When there is no common
messages and T = 2, there exist only two messages S1 and
S2 in the secure multiplex coding. In the wire-tap channel
model, S 1 corresponds to the message to be secretly sent
to Bob, and S 2 does to the dummy message making S 1
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ambiguous to Eve. As a special case of our code, a wire-
tap code is given by Alice’s stochastic encoder ϕa from
S1 × S2 to X and Bob’s deterministic decoder ϕb : Y → S1.
Then, the performance is evaluated by the following quantities.
(1) The size of the secret message |S1|. (2) Bob’s decoding
error probability Pb[PY |X , ϕ, PS 1,2]. (4) Leaked information
I(S 1; Z)[PZ|X , ϕa, PS 1,2].
In order to guarantee that the leaked information is small,
we employ the method of generalized channel resolvability
given in Section VI. In order to employ this method, we have
to use the random coding method to construct a code ϕ. In
this section, we propose two kinds of random construction for
our code. For a simple application of Theorem 14, which is
a simple generalization of channel resolvability, we propose
the first construction in Subsection VII-B. When there is
no common message, this construction achieves the capacity
region, as is mentioned in Remark 39. However, it cannot fully
achieve the capacity region that will be defined in Section IX-B
when there exists a common message S 0.
To resolve this defect, in Subsection VII-C, we propose the
second construction, which attains the capacity region. This
construction has two steps. In the first step, similar to the
BCD encoder, we use the superposition random coding. In the
second step, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we split the confidential
message into the private message B2 and a part B1 of the
common message encoded by the BCD encoder. The coding
scheme for BCC in [9] uses this kind of message splitting.
The average leaked information under this kind of construction
is evaluated by Theorem 17, which is an algebraic version
of channel resolvability. However, when there is no common
message, the first construction realizes a better exponential
decreasing rate for leaked information than the second con-
struction.
When we fix a code ϕ, we obtain the following observations.
Any distribution ˜PZ on Z and any non-empty proper subset
I ( {1, . . . , T } satisfy
ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕ, PS T ]
=ρ
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)I(S I; Z|S 0 = s0)[PZ|V , ϕ, PS T ]
=ρ
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)D(PZ,S I|S 0=s0,ϕ‖PZ|S 0=s0,ϕ × PS I |S 0=s0,ϕ)
≤ρ
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)D(PZ,S I|S 0=s0,ϕ‖ ˜PZ × PS I |S 0=s0,ϕ) (52)
=
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0(sI|s0)ρD(PZ|S I=sI,S 0=s0,ϕ‖ ˜PZ), (53)
where (52) follows from the following general inequality
D(PX,Y‖PX × PY) ≤ D(PX,Y‖QX × PY ) (54)
for any distribution QX over X. Due to (7), we have
ρD(PZ|S I=sI,S 0=s0,ϕ‖ ˜PZ) ≤ ψ(ρ|PZ|S I=sI,S 0=s0,ϕ‖ ˜PZ). (55)
Thus, combining Jensen inequality and the above observations,
we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 19: Any distribution ˜PZ on Z and any non-empty
proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T } satisfy
eρI(S I;Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,ϕ,PST ] ≤ e
∑
s0 PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI PSI|S 0 (sI |s0)ρD(PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,ϕ‖ ˜PZ )
≤
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0(sI|s0)eρD(PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,ϕ‖ ˜PZ ) (56)
≤
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0(sI|s0)eψ(ρ|PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,ϕ‖ ˜PZ ). (57)
B. First Construction
Now, we introduce the first kind of random coding for SMC.
Code Ensemble 2: For a given Markov chain U → V →
X → YZ, we give the random coding Φc and Φp in the same
way as Code Ensemble 1 with Sc = S0 and Sp = S1 × · · · ×
ST . Similar to the case of BCD, Bob’s decoder Φb and Eve’s
decoder Φe are defined as the maximum likelihood decoders.
Hence, our code is written by the quartet(Φc,Φp,Φb,Φe).
As a special case of Code Ensemble 2, a wire-tap code is
given as the case when T = 2 and we do not have the random
variables S 0. The averaged performance of the above code is
evaluated by the following theorem. Indeed, we cannot derive
the capacity region from the following theorem. However,
the following theorem has an advantage when the conditional
mutual information goes to zero. As is explained in Section X,
the following theorem yields a better bound for the exponential
decreasing rate of the conditional mutual information than
Theorem 22 in a specific case.
Theorem 20: The above ensemble of codes Φ =
(Φc,Φp,Φb,Φe) satisfies the following inequalities.
EΦ exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φ, PS T ])
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ), (58)
EΦPb[PY |V ,Φ, PS T ]
≤|S|ρeE0(−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU ) + (|S0||S|)ρeE0(−ρ|PY |U,V ,PU,V ), (59)
EΦPe[PZ|V ,Φ, PS T ] ≤ |S0|ρeE0(−ρ|PZ|U ,PU ). (60)
Theorem 20 yields the following observation. Applying
Jensen’s inequality to the convex function x 7→ ex, we obtain
EΦρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φ, PS T ]
≤ log(1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ))
≤e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ). (61)
The number of non-empty proper subsets I ( {1, . . . , T } is
2T −2. Similar to (35) and (36), since 2(2T−2)+2 = 2T+1−2 <
2T+1, Markov inequality guarantees that there exists a code ϕ
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such that
exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕ, PS T ])
≤2T+1(1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ))
≤2T+2e[−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU )]+ , (62)
ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕ, PS T ]
≤2T+1e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+ψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ), (63)
Pb[PY |V , ϕ, PS T ]
≤2T+1|S|ρeE0(−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU ) + 2T+1|S0|ρeE0(−ρ|PY |U ,PU ), (64)
Pe[PZ|V , ϕ, PS T ]
≤2T+1|S0|ρeE0(−ρ|PZ|U ,PU ). (65)
Taking the logarithm in (62), we obtain
I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φ, PS T ]
≤(T + 2) log 2
ρ
+ [1
ρ
ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) − H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)]+.
(66)
Proof of Theorem 20:
Inequalities (59) and (60) can be shown by Lemma 12. The
remaining inequality (58) can be shown as follows.
EΦeρI(S I;Z|S 0,Φ)
(a)≤EΦ
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)eψ(ρ|PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φ‖PZ|U=Φc (s0))
=
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)
· EΦc EΦp |Φc eψ(ρ|PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φ‖PZ|U=Φc (s0))
(b)≤
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)
· EΦc (1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)eψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=Φc (s0)))
=
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)
· (1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)eψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ))
=1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)eψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ),
(a) follows from application of (57) to the case with ˜PZ =
PZ|U=Φc (s0), and (b) follows from Theorem 14.
C. Second Construction
Next, we give the second kind of random coding for SMC
as follows.
Code Ensemble 3: First Step: For a given Markov chain
U → V → X → YZ, we introduce two random variables B1
and B2 that take values in Abelian groups B1 and B2 and
are subject to the uniform distributions. The pair of random
variables (B1, B2) is used for sending the all of secret messages
in S1 × · · · × ST . Assuming that S1 × . . .×ST has an Abelian
group structure, we give the random coding Φc and Φp in
the same way as Code Ensemble 1 with Sc = S0 × B1 and
Sp = B2.
Second Step: We choose an ensemble satisfying Condition
15 of isomorphisms F′ from S1×· · ·×ST to B1×B2 as Abelian
groups. We choose the random variable G′ ∈ B1 × B2 that
obeys the uniform distribution on B1 ×B2 and is independent
of the choice of F′ and anything else. Then, we define a
map ΛF′ ,G′ (s) := F′(s) + G′. Combining the above codes, we
construct the code Φa = Φp ◦ΛF′ ,G′ : S0 ×S1 × · · · × ST →V
as (s0, s1, . . . , sT ) 7→ Φp(s0,ΛF′ ,G′ (s1, . . . , sT )). Similar to the
case of BCD, Bob’s decoder Φb and Eve’s decoder Φe are
defined as the maximum likelihood decoders. Hence, our code
is written by the triple (Φa,Φb,Φe). The structure of encoder
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
As a special case of Code Ensemble 3, a wire-tap code
is given as the case when T = 2 and we do not have
the random variables S 0. For a fixed code ϕp, PZ|S 0=s0,Φp=ϕp
denotes the average output distribution of the channel of the
transmitted codeword ϕp(s0, B1, B2) averaged over B1, B2. In
order to evaluate the averaged performance of the above code
(Φa,Φb,Φe), we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 21: When the code Φp is fixed to ϕp in the BCD
part, we have the following average performance.
EF′ ,G′ exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ])
≤EF′ ,G′
∑
s0
PS 0(s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)
· eρD(PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ‖PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp )
≤1 +
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)
· eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 ). (67)
Further, when PZ|V is a regular channel and the map ϕp|S 0=s0 :
(b1, b2) 7→ ϕp(b1, b2, s0) is a homomorphism from an Abelian
group B1 × B2 to an Abelian group V for any s0 ∈ S0, the
inequalities (67) hold even when G′ is a constant g′.
Lemma 21 will be applied for the evaluation of the per-
formance of Code Ensemble 3. However, it will be also used
for the evaluation of the performance of another type of codes
without common messages based on a specific error correcting
code in Section XI. Hence, Lemma 21 addresses the case when
the map ϕp|S 0=s0 is a homomorphism.
Lemma 21 yields the following observation. Applying
Jensen’s inequality for the convex function x 7→ ex and the
inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x, we obtain
EF′ ,G′ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ]
≤ log
(
1 +
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0(sI |s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)
· eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 )
)
≤
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0 (sI|s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)
· eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 ). (68)
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Proof: Applying (56) and (57) to the case when ˜PZ =
˜PZ|S 0=s0,Φp=ϕp , we obtain
EF′ ,G′eρI(S I;Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,ϕp◦ΛF′ ,G′ ,PST ]
≤EF′ ,G′
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0 (sI|s0)
· eρD(PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ‖PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp )
≤EF′ ,G′ |Φp=ϕp
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0 (sI|s0)
· eψ(ρ|PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ‖PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ). (69)
For a fixed sI, we apply Theorem 17 to the case when A is
SIc , X is B1×B2, G is G′+F′(sI, 0), which is independent of
F′, and F is the map sIc 7→ F′(0, sIc) that satisfies Condition
15. Then, ΛF′ ,G′ (sI, sIc ) = F′(sI, sIc ) +G′ = F′(0, sIc) + ZsI .
Thus, we obtain
EF′ ,G′eψ(ρ|PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ‖
˜PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp )
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0 ,Φp=ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 ). (70)
Thus, we obtain (67).
Further, when PZ|V is a regular channel and the map
ϕp|S 0=s0 : (b1, b2) 7→ ϕp(b1, b2, s0) is a homomorphism from
an Abelian group B1 × B2 to an Abelian group V for any
s0 ∈ S0, the channel PZ|V ◦ ϕp|S 0=s0 is a regular channel from
B1 × B2 to V. Hence, due to Corollary 18, the inequalities
(67) hold even when G′ is a constant g′.
Using the above lemma, we obtain the following theorem,
which gives the averaged performance of the above code
(Φa,Φb,Φe). By using this theorem, we will give the capacity
region in Subsection IX-B.
Theorem 22: Assume that the code Φ = (Φa,Φb,Φe) is the
ensemble given in Code Ensemble 3. Then, the inequalities
EΦa exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φa, PS T ])
≤EΦa
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0(sI|s0)eρD(PZ|SI=sI ,S 0=s0 ,Φa ‖PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp )
≤1 + |B1|ρe−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+E0 (ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ), (71)
and
EΦPb[PY |V ,Φ, PS T ] ≤|B2|ρeE0(−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU )
+ (|S0||S|)ρeE0(−ρ|PY |U,V ,PU,V ) (72)
EΦPe[PZ|V ,Φ, PS T ] ≤|S0|ρeE0 (−ρ|PZ|U ,PU ). (73)
hold.
Theorem 22 yields the following observation. Applying
Jensen’s inequality to the convex function x 7→ ex, we obtain
EΦaρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φa, PS T ]
≤ log(1 + |B1|ρe−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+E0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ))
≤|B1|ρe−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+E0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ). (74)
Here, we choose ρ0 as
ρ0 := argmin
ρ∈[0,1]
[
log |B1| + 1
ρ
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
− H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)
]
+
+ (T + 2) log 2
ρ
.
(75)
Then, Similar to (35) and (36), since 2(2T −2)+2 = 2T+1−2 <
2T+1, Markov inequality guarantees that there exists a code
ϕ = (ϕa, ϕb, ϕe) such that
exp(ρ0I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕa, PS T ])
≤2T+1(1 + |B1|ρ0e−ρ0H1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+E0(ρ0 |PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ))
≤2T+2e[ρ0 log |B1|−ρ0H1+ρ0 (S Ic |S I,S 0)+E0 (ρ0 |PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ),PST ]+ , (76)
I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕa, PS T ]
≤ min
0≤ρ≤1
2T+1
ρ
|B1|ρe−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)+E0 (ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ), (77)
Pb[PY |V , ϕ, PS T ]
≤2T+1 min
0≤ρ≤1
(|B2|ρeE0(−ρ|PY |V ,PV |U ,PU ) + (|S0||S|)ρeE0 (−ρ|PY |UV ,PUV )),
(78)
Pe[PZ|V , ϕ, PS T ]
≤2T+1 min
0≤ρ≤1
|S0|ρeE0(−ρ|PZ|U ,PU ) (79)
for any non-empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. Taking the
logarithm in (76), we obtain
I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φa, PS T ]
≤
[
log |B1| + 1
ρ0
E0(ρ0|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) − H1+ρ0 (S Ic |S I, S 0)
]
+
+ (T + 2) log 2
ρ0
= min
ρ∈[0,1]
[
log |B1| + 1
ρ
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) − H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)
]
+
+ (T + 2) log 2
ρ
. (80)
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Proof of Theorem 22: We show (71). Using (17), we
obtain
EΦp ,Φc eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 )
≤EΦp ,Φc eE0(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 ) (81)
=EΦp ,Φc
∑
z
(
∑
b1,b2
PB1,B2(b1, b2)PZ|B1,B2,S 0=s0,Φp (z|b1, b2)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=EΦp ,Φc
∑
z
(
∑
b1,b2
1
|B1||B2|PZ|V (z|Φp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
≤EΦp ,Φc
∑
z
∑
b1
(
∑
b2
1
|B1||B2|PZ|V (z|Φp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ (82)
=EΦp ,Φc
∑
z
∑
b1
|B1|ρ
|B1| (
∑
b2
1
|B2|PZ|V (z|Φp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
(83)
≤EΦc
∑
z
∑
b1
|B1|ρ
|B1| (
∑
b2
1
|B2|EΦp |Φc PZ|V (z|Φp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
(84)
=
∑
z
∑
b1
|B1|ρ
|B1| EΦc (
∑
b2
1
|B2|
∑
v
PV |U(v|Φc(s0, b1))PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
(85)
=
∑
z
∑
b1
|B1|ρ
|B1| EΦc (
∑
v
PV |U(v|Φc(s0, b1))PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=
∑
z
∑
b1
|B1|ρ
|B1|
∑
u
PU(u)(
∑
v
PV |U(v|u)PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=
∑
z
|B1|ρ
∑
u
PU(u)(
∑
v
PV |U(v|u)PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=|B1|ρeE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ), (86)
where (81), (82) (84), and (85) follow from (17), the inequality
(x + y)1−ρ ≤ x1−ρ + y1−ρ, the concavity of x 7→ x1−ρ, and the
definition of the ensemble of the code Φp, respectively.
Summarizing the above discussion, we obtain
EΦa eρI(S I;Z|S 0)[PZ|V ,Φa,PST ]
≤EΦa
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0 (sI|s0)eρD(PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp ‖ ˜PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp )
(87)
=EΦp EF′ ,G′ |Φp
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I |S 0(sI|s0)
· eρD(PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp ‖ ˜PZ|S 0=s0 ,Φp )
≤
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)
· EΦp (1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0 ,Φp ,PB1 ,B2 )) (88)
≤
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)
· (1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I=sI,S 0=s0)|B1|ρeE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU )) (89)
=1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0)|B1|ρeE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ),
where (87), (88), and (89) follow from (56), the second
inequality in Lemma 21, and (86), respectively. Then, we
obtain (71).
Further, (72) and (73) follow from Lemma 12.
D. Group Symmetry
Next, when the channel has a nice property with respect
to group action, we treat the upper bound of the leaked
information with a fixed BCD code ϕp. That is, we discuss
the upper bound given in Lemma 21 under an assumption for
group action, which will be given latter. The following analysis
is required for evaluation of universal coding in Sections XII
and XIII and a practical code construction in Subsection XI-B.
For simplicity, we first discuss the case with no common
message, i.e., |S0| = 1 and |B1| = 1. Assume that a group G
acts on V and Z. The action of g ∈ G is written as g · v and
g · z for v ∈ V and z ∈ Z. Then, due to Eqs. (2), (3), and (4),
we have
(g−1 ◦ PZ|V ◦ g)(z|v) = PZ|V(g · z|g · v)
(g−1 ◦ PV )(v) = PV(g · v).
Then, the set V can be divided to orbits {Vo}o∈O by the action
of G. The set O of indexes of the orbits is called the orbit
space. Given a code ϕp as an injective map from B2 to V,
Recall that we denote the uniform distribution on the image
Imϕp by Pmix,Imϕp , and we define the distribution Pϕp(o) :=
| Imϕp ∩Vo|/| Imϕp| on the orbit space O and the distribution
Pϕp on V by Pϕp (v) :=
Pϕp (o)
|Vo| when the element v belongs to
the subset Vo. Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 23: When the relation g−1 ◦ PZ|V ◦ g = PZ|V holds
for any g ∈ G, v ∈ Z, and v ∈ V,
ψ(ρ|PZ|B2,Φp=ϕp , Pmix,B2 ) = ψ(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,Imϕp )
≤E0(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,Imϕp ) ≤ E0(ρ|PZ|V , Pϕp ). (90)
In particular, when the image Imϕp is included in one orbit
Vo, Pϕp is the uniform distribution on the orbit Vo.
Proof: Since eE0(ρ|g−1◦PZ|V◦g,g−1◦Pmix,ϕp ) = eE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,g−1◦Pmix,ϕp ),
we have
eψ(ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,Im ϕp ) ≤ eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,Imϕp )
=
∑
g∈G
1
|G|e
E0(ρ|g−1◦PZ|V◦g,g−1◦Pmix,Im ϕp )
=
∑
g∈G
1
|G|e
E0(ρ|PZ|V ,g−1◦Pmix,Im ϕp )
≤eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,
∑
g∈G
1
|G| g
−1◦Pmix,Imϕp ) = eE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,Pϕp ). (91)
Next, we consider the general case. Assume that a group G
acts on U, V, and Z. The code pair code (ϕc, ϕp) is a map
from S0 × B1 ×B2 to U ×V. For a given s0 ∈ S0, we define
the maps ϕc|S 0=s0 and (ϕc, ϕp)|S 0=s0 by
ϕc|S 0=s0 (b1) := ϕc(s0, b1) ∈ U
(ϕc, ϕp)|S 0=s0 (b1, b2) := (ϕc(s0, b1), ϕp(s0, b1, b2)) ∈ U ×V.
For simplicity, we assume that the image of (ϕc, ϕp)|S 0=s0 is
included in one orbit in U×V, which is denoted by (V×U)o.
Hence, the image of ϕc|S 0=s0 is included in one orbit in U,
which is denoted by Uo.
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Lemma 24: Assume that the image of (ϕc, ϕp)|S 0=s0 is in-
cluded in a orbit (V × U)o in U × V. When the relation
g−1 ◦ PZ|V ◦ g = PZ|V holds for any g ∈ G, the relation
eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 )
≤|B1|ρeE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U,mix,(V×U)o ,Pmix,Uo ) (92)
holds for any s0 ∈ S0.
Proof: For a given u ∈ Uo, we define the stabilizer of
u by Hu := {g ∈ G|g · u = u}, which is a subgroup of G.
For arbitrary u ∈ Uo, we define the two subsets V′u,Vu ⊂ V
by {u} × V′u = Im(ϕc, ϕp)|S 0=s0 ∩ ({u} × V) and {u} × Vu =
(V×U)o ∩ ({u} × V). Then, we obtain the relations
PV |U=u,mix,Im(ϕc ,ϕp)|S 0=s0 = PV |mix,V′u (93)
PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o = PV |mix,Vu . (94)
For the definitions of the left hand sides, see (1). We can also
show that
∪g∈Hu {g · v|v ∈ V′u} = Vu.
Since g−1◦PV |U=g·u,mix,(V×U)o = PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o , the condition
g−1 ◦ PZ|V ◦ g = PZ|V implies that
eE0 (ρ|g
−1◦PZ|V◦g,g−1◦PV |U=g·u,mix,(V×U)o )
=eE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o ). (95)
We obtain the following relations. In the following derivation,
(96) and (98) follow from (83) and (95), respectively. Applying
Lemma 23 to the case of G = Hu, we obtain the inequality
(97) from (93) and (94).
eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Φp=ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 )
≤
∑
z
∑
b1
|B1|ρ
|B1| (
∑
b2
1
|B2|PZ|V (z|ϕp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ (96)
=|B1|ρ
∑
z
∑
u
PU,mix,Imϕc |S 0=s0 (u)
·
[∑
v
PV |U=u,mix,Im(ϕc ,ϕp)|S 0=s0 (v)PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ
]1−ρ
=|B1|ρ
∑
u
PU,mix,Imϕc |S 0=s0 (u)e
E0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=u,mix,Im(ϕc ,ϕp)|S 0=s0 )
≤|B1|ρ
∑
u
PU,mix,Imϕc |S 0=s0 (u)eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o ) (97)
=|B1|ρ
∑
g∈G
1
|G|
∑
u
PU,mix,Imϕc |S 0=s0 (g · u)eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o )
(98)
=|B1|ρ
∑
u
PU,mix,(V×U)o (u)eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o )
=|B1|ρeE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U=u,mix,(V×U)o ,PU,mix,Uo ).
Remark 25: Section VII deals with the security when a
channel PZ|V from V to Z is given. The discussion of
Section VII can be extended to the case with a channel
PZ|VU from V×U to Z. In this case, ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) and
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) are modified to
ψ(ρ|PZ|V,U, PV |U , PU)
:= log
∑
u
PU(u)
∑
v
PV |U(v|u)
∑
z
PZ|V,U(z|v, u)1+ρPZ|U(z|u)−ρ
E0(ρ|PZ|V,U, PV |U , PU)
:= log
∑
u
PU(u)
∑
z

∑
v
PV |U(v|u)PZ|V,U(z|v, u)1/(1−ρ)

1−ρ
.
All of the discussions in this section are still valid even if we
replace PZ|V (z|v) by PZ|V,U(z|v, u) with the above modification.
These extensions to the channel PZ|VU will be used in Section
XII as a mathematical tool for our proof.
VIII. Asymptotic Conditional Uniformity
A. Three Kinds of Asymptotic Conditional Uniformity Condi-
tions
In SMC, we use the message S Ic as a dummy message. The
secrecy of the message S I depends on the conditional entropy
of the dummy message S Ic given S I. Then, it is not easy to
treat the asymptotic performance without fixing the conditional
entropy rate of the dummy message S Ic . Hence, we need to
characterize the randomness of the dummy message S Ic under
the condition with respect to S I in the asymptotic setting. In
order to treat the capacity region and the strong security, we
introduce several kinds of asymptotic conditional uniformity
conditions for a general sequence of source distributions PS T ,n
on the message sets Si,n for i = 0, 1, . . . , T satisfying the
relations |Si,n| := enRi for i = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Definition 26: The sequence of distributions PS T ,n of the
dummy message S Ic,n is called weak asymptotically con-
ditionally uniform (WACU) for a non-empty proper subset
I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T } when
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n) =
∑
i∈Ic
Ri. (99)
Definition 27: The sequence of distributions PS T ,n of the
dummy message S Ic ,n is called semi-weak asymptotically con-
ditionally uniform (SWACU) for a non-empty proper subset
I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T } when the relation
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ δ
n
(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n) =
∑
i∈Ic
Ri (100)
holds for any δ > 0.
Definition 28: Fix an arbitrary fixed real number ǫ ≥ 0. The
sequence of distributions PS T ,n of the dummy message S Ic ,n is
called ǫ-strong asymptotically conditionally uniform (ǫ-SACU)
for for a non-empty proper subset I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T } when
the relation
Hlog(Ic) ≥
∑
i∈Ic
(Ri − ǫ), (101)
where
Hlog(Ic) := limδ→∞ lim infn→∞
1
n
H1+ δ log n
n
(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n). (102)
Since ρ − 1 behaves as δ log n
n
in (102), we use the subscript
log in (102). In the case of ǫ = 0, it is simply called strong
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asymptotically conditionally uniform (SACU) for a non-empty
proper subset I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }. In this case, the condition
(101) is equivalent with
Hlog(Ic) =
∑
i∈Ic
Ri (103)
because the opposite inequality holds due to the cardinalities
of respective message sets.
In particular, when the sequence of distributions PS T ,n of
the dummy message S Ic,n is WACU for any non-empty
proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }, it is simply called WACU. We
sometimes fix a family J of non-empty proper subsets I of
{1, . . . , T }, and treat only non-empty proper subsets I ∈ J. In
this case, we call the sequence of distributions PS T ,n WACU for
a family J when it is WACU for any non-empty proper subset
I ∈ J. We also apply these conventions to SWACU, SACU,
and ǫ-SACU. The relations among the above conditions are
summarized as follows.
Theorem 29: The following relations hold.
SACU ⇒ SWACU ⇔ WACU
⇓
ǫ-SACU
Proof: The equivalence between SWACU and WACU will
be shown as Lemma 93 in Appendix C. Other relations are
trivial from their definitions.
In fact, as is shown in Subsection VIII-B, even if the original
information does not satisfy the WACU condition (99) or the
SACU condition (103) with ǫ = 0, if we apply Slepian-Wolf
data compression [30] to the original sources so that the total
compressed rate of the whole data attains the entropy rate of
the whole sources, the compressed data satisfies the WACU
condition (99) and/or the SACU condition (103). Similarly, as
is shown in Subsection VIII-B, even if the original information
does not satisfy the ǫ-SACU condition (101), if we apply
Slepian-Wolf data compression [30] to the original sources
so that the error probability goes to zero exponentially and
the difference between the entropy rate of the whole system
and the total compressed rate is less than ǫ, the compressed
data satisfies the ǫ-SACU condition (101).
B. Asymptotic Conditional Uniformity Conditions and
Slepian-Wolf Data Compression
In Subsection X-A, we have introduced several asymp-
totic conditional uniformity conditions. In this subsection,
we clarify which kind of data compressed by Slepian-Wolf
compression satisfies asymptotic conditional uniformity con-
ditions. For this purpose, we assume that the random variables
S nT = (S n0, S n1, . . . S nT ) are subject to the n-fold stationary
ergodic joint distribution PnS T over Sn0 × Sn1 × · · · × SnT . The
symbols H(S 0, . . . , S T ), H(S I), and H(S 0, S I) describe the
entropy rates of the respective random variables for any non-
empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. The following theorem
treats the WACU condition for the compressed data.
Theorem 30: We choose the asymptotic compression rates
R0, . . . ,RT such that
∑T
i=0 Ri = H(S 0, . . . , S T ) and
∑
i∈I Ri ≤
H(S I), R0 + ∑i∈I Ri ≤ H(S 0, S I) for any non-empty proper
subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. Choose a sequence mn such that mnn →
1.
Let ϕni : Smni → {1, . . . , ⌈enRi⌉} be Slepian-Wolf encoders and
ϕˆn : {1, . . . , ⌈enR0⌉} × · · · × {1, . . . , ⌈enRT ⌉} → Smn0 × · · · × SmnT be
its Slepian-Wolf decoder for any positive integer n such that
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) := Pr{(S mn0 , . . .S mnT ) , ϕˆn(ϕn0(S mn0 ), . . . , ϕnT (S mnT ))} → 0,
(104)
where ϕn = (ϕn0, . . . , ϕnT ). Then, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
H((ϕni (S mni ))i∈Ic |(ϕni (S mni ))i∈I, ϕn0(S mn0 )) =
∑
i∈Ic
Ri (105)
for any non-empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. That is, the
compressed data satisfies the WACU condition (99).
Remark 31: Theorem 30 gives only a sufficient condition
(104) for the compressed data satisfying the WACU condition.
For construction of the compressed data satisfying the WACU
condition, it is needed to clarify the existence of a code whose
the compressed data satisfying the condition (104).
In the single terminal Markovian case, under the condition
mn
n
→ 1, the second order asymptotic analysis in [16, Section
VII] guarantees that there exists sequence of the pairs of
an encoder and a decoder satisfying (104) if and only if
n−mn√
n
→ ∞. The extension to the Slepian-Wolf coding has
been done with the i.i.d. case [32]. For the boundary of the
attainable rate region of Slepian-Wolf data compression in
the stationary ergodic case [5], we can show the existence of
the pair of an encoder and a decoder satisfying (104) with a
suitable choice of the sequence mn under the condition mnn → 1
in the following way5.
Choose the rates Ri + δ for any δ > 0. Let ϕni,δ :
Sni → {1, . . . , ⌈enRi(1+δ)⌉} be Slepian-Wolf encoders and ϕˆnδ :
{1, . . . , ⌈enR0(1+δ)⌉} × · · · × {1, . . . , ⌈enRT (1+δ)⌉} → Sn0 × · · · × SnT
be its Slepian-Wolf decoder such that ε(ϕn
δ
, ϕˆn
δ
) → 0 with
ϕnδ := (ϕn0,δ, . . . , ϕnT,δ). For an arbitrary integer l, we choose
an integer nl such that the inequality ε(ϕn1/l, ϕˆn1/l) ≤ 1l holds
for any n ≥ nl. We define mn to be mn := ⌊ n1+1/l ⌋, where
we choose l such that nl ≤ n < nl+1. Here, we can choose the
integer l for any positive integer n. The construction guarantees
that Ri(1 + 1/l)(mn + 1) ≥ Rin ≥ Ri(1 + 1/l)mn. We define the
pair of an encoder and a decoder (ϕn, ϕˆn) to be (ϕmn1/l, ϕˆmn1/l).
That is, ϕni is chosen to be ϕ
mn
i,1/l. Our choices guarantee that
mn
n

1
1+1/l → 1, and ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) = ε(ϕmn1/l, ϕˆmn1/l) ≤ 1/l → 0.
In this construction, the encoder ϕni is a map from Smni to
{1, . . . , ⌈emnRi(1+1/l)⌉} ⊂ {1, . . . , ⌈enRi⌉} because Rin ≥ mnRi(1 +
1/l). Hence, the pair of an encoder and a decoder (ϕn, ϕˆn)
satisfies the assumption of Theorem 30.
Proof of Theorem 30: Assume that the code ϕn =
(ϕn0, . . . , ϕnT ) satisfies (104). Since the stationary ergodic source
satisfies the strong converse property for the data compression,
due to folklore source coding theorem [14, Theorem 3.1], the
5The following discussion does not require any property for source distri-
bution. That is, it can be extended to Slepian-Wolf data compression for the
general information source [42] in the sense of Han-Verdú[13].
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code ϕn satisfies
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(ϕn0(S mn0 ), . . . , ϕnT (S mnT )) =
T∑
i=0
Ri.
Since 1
n
H((ϕni (S mni ))i∈Ic |(ϕni (S mni ))i∈I, ϕn0(S mn0 )) ≤
∑
i∈Ic Ri and
1
n
H((ϕni (S mni ))i∈I, ϕn0(S mn0 )) ≤ R0 +
∑
i∈I Ri, we obtain (105).
In Subsection X-A, we have introduced the ǫ-strong asymp-
totic conditional uniformity (101) as another kind of asymp-
totic conditional uniformity. The following theorem shows the
ǫ-strong asymptotic conditional uniformity for the compressed
data.
Theorem 32: We fix a sequence mn such that mnn → 1. We
also fix an arbitrary ǫ ≥ 0 and an arbitrary non-empty proper
subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. Then, we choose the asymptotic com-
pression rates R0, . . . ,RT such that
∑T
i=0 Ri = H(S 0, . . . , S T )+ǫ
and
∑
i∈I
Ri ≤ H(S I), R0 +
∑
i∈I
Ri ≤ H(S 0, S I). (106)
We choose a Slepian-Wolf encoder ϕn = (ϕn0, . . . , ϕnT ) and a
Slepian-Wolf decoder ϕˆn as a map ϕni : Smni → {1, . . . , ⌈enRi⌉}
and a map ϕˆn : {1, . . . , ⌈enR0⌉}×· · ·×{1, . . . , ⌈enRT ⌉} → Smn0 ×· · ·×
SmnT . When the decoding error probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) satisfies
that
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)p(n) → 0 (107)
for any polynomial p(n), the relation
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρn((ϕni (S ni ))i∈Ic |(ϕni (S ni ))i∈I, ϕn0(S n0))
≥(
∑
i∈Ic
Ri) − ǫ ≥
∑
i∈Ic
(Ri − ǫ) (108)
holds with ρn = δ log nn for any δ > 0. That is, the compressed
data (ϕn0(S n0), . . . , ϕnT (S nT )) satisfies the ǫ-SACU condition (101)
for the non-empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. In particular,
in the case of ǫ = 0, the compressed data (ϕn0(S n0), . . . , ϕnT (S nT ))
satisfies the SACU condition for the non-empty proper subset
I ( {1, . . . , T }.
Hence, if the relation (106) holds for any non-empty
proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }, the compressed data
(ϕn0(S n0), . . . , ϕnT (S nT )) satisfies the ǫ-SACU condition (101).
Remark 33: Theorem 32 gives only a sufficient condition
(107) for the compressed data satisfying the ǫ-SACU condition
(101). Hence, it is necessary to clarify the existence of a code
whose compressed data satisfying the condition (107).
In the i.i.d. case, for an arbitrary ǫ > 0 and an arbitrary
sequence mn satisfying limn→∞ mnn = 1, there exists a sequence
of Slepian-Wolf codes (ϕn, ϕˆn) with any rate tuples given in
Theorem 32 such that the decoding error probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)
goes to zero exponentially with respect to n[39]. That is, there
exists a Slepian-Wolf code satisfying the condition (107) in
Theorem 32. However, it is not so easy to give a required
code in the case of ǫ = 0. In Appendix B, we give such a
code when mn := n1+ c
nt
with t > 1/2 and ∞ > c > 0.
C. Proof of Theorem 32
For the proof of Theorem 32, we prepare the following
lemma for treating the relation between the conditional Rényi
entropy of the compressed data and the decoding error prob-
ability. The following lemma treats the single terminal data
compression for a random variable S on a set S in the single-
shot setting.
Lemma 34: Any encoder ϕ : S → {1, . . . , M} and any
decoder ϕˆ : {1, . . . , M} → S for a random variable S satisfy
e−ρH1+ρ(S ) ≤ e−ρH1+ρ(ϕ(S )) ≤ 2ρe−ρH1+ρ(S ) + 2ρε(ϕ, ϕˆ)1+ρ, (109)
where ε(ϕ, ϕˆ) is the decoding error probability Pr{S ,
ϕˆ(ϕ(S ))}.
Proof: First, we show the first inequality. Using the
inequality x1+ρ + y1+ρ ≤ (x + y)1+ρ for x, y ≥ 0, we obtain( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)
)1+ρ ≥ ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)1+ρ
for any i = 1, . . . , M. Hence,
e−ρH1+ρ(ϕ(S )) =
M∑
i=1
( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)
)1+ρ
≥
M∑
i=1
∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)1+ρ =
∑
s
PS (s)1+ρ = e−ρH1+ρ(S ),
which implies the first inequality of (109).
Next, we show the second inequality of (109). Given an
arbitrary element i in the codebook, we have two cases: (1)
The element si := ϕˆ(i) belongs to ϕ−1(i), i.e., there exists exact
one element si ∈ ϕ−1(i) such that ϕˆ(ϕ(si)) = si. (2) There exists
no element si ∈ ϕ−1(i) such that ϕˆ(ϕ(si)) = si. In case (1),( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)
)1+ρ
=
(
PS (si) +
∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ
=21+ρ
(1
2
PS (si) + 12
∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ
≤21+ρ
(1
2
PS (si)1+ρ + 12
( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ)
=2ρPS (si)1+ρ + 2ρ
( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ
.
In case (2),( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)
)1+ρ
=
( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ
.
Hence, we obtain
e−ρH1+ρ(ϕ(S )) =
∑
i
( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i)
PS (s)
)1+ρ
≤2ρ
∑
i
PS (si)1+ρ + 2ρ
∑
i
( ∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ
≤2ρ
∑
s
PS (s)1+ρ + 2ρ
(∑
i
∑
s∈ϕ−1(i):ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ (110)
=2ρ
∑
s
PS (s)1+ρ + 2ρ
( ∑
s:ϕˆ(ϕ(s)),s
PS (s)
)1+ρ
=2ρe−ρH1+ρ(S ) + 2ρε(ϕ, ϕˆ)1+ρ,
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where (110) follow from the inequality x1+ρ+y1+ρ ≤ (x+y)1+ρ
for x, y ≥ 0. Hence, we obtain the second inequality.
Then, we obtain the following corollary of Lemma 34. The
following corollary treats the single terminal data compression
for a general sequence of random variables S n.
Corollary 35: Let ϕn be an encoder and ϕˆn be a decoder for
a general sequence of random variables S n. When the decoding
error probabilities ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) and the sequence {ρn} of positive
real numbers satisfy
lim
n→∞
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)1+ρn eρnH1+ρn (S n) = 0, (111)
we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρn (ϕn(S n)) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρn (S n). (112)
Proof of Corollary 35: The inequality
limn→∞ 1n H1+ρn (ϕn(S n)) ≤ limn→∞ 1n H1+ρn(S n) follows
from the first inequality (109). We show only the inequality
limn→∞ 1n H1+ρn (ϕn(S n)) ≥ limn→∞ 1n H1+ρn(S n). Using the
second inequality in (109), we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρn (ϕn(S n)) = lim
n→∞
−1
nρn
log e−ρnH1+ρn (ϕn(S n))
≥ lim
n→∞
−1
nρn
log(2ρne−ρnH1+ρn (S n) + 2ρnε(ϕn, ϕˆn)1+ρn)
= lim
n→∞
−1
nρn
log(2ρne−ρnH1+ρn (S n)) (113)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
(H1+ρn (S n) − log 2) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρn(S n),
where (113) follows from the assumption (111).
Now, we show Theorem 32.
Proof of Theorem 32: For the proof of Theorem 32, we
choose ρ′n so that ρ′n(1 − ρ′n) = ρn. Since limn→∞ mnn = 1 and
ρ ≥ ρ′n for all n, we have
H1+ρ(S 0, . . . , S T ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρ′n (S mn0 , . . . , S mnT )
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρ′n(S mn0 , . . . , S mnT ) ≤ H(S 0, . . . , S T ).
Since ρ′n → 0 and limρ→+0 H1+ρ(S 0, . . . , S T ) = H(S 0, . . . , S T ),
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρ′n (S mn0 , . . . , S mnT ) = H(S 0, . . . , S T ). (114)
Since ρ′n behaves as
δ log n
n
, due to the relation (114), the quan-
tity eρ
′
nH1+ρ′n (S
mn
0 ,...S
mn
T ) behaves as eδ(log n)H(S 0,...,S T ) = nδH(S 0,...,S T ).
Since ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)1+ρ′n ≤ ε(ϕn, ϕˆn), the condition (107) guarantees
the condition (111). Hence, Corollary 35 guarantees that
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρ′n(ϕn0(S mn0 ), . . . , ϕnT (S mnT )) = (
T∑
i=0
Ri) − ǫ.
Since log |ϕn0(Smn0 )×
∏
i∈I ϕni (Smni )| = n(R0+
∑
i∈I Ri), Corollary
87 in Appendix A implies (108).
IX. Secure Multiplex Coding with CommonMessages:
Asymptotic Performance
In this section, we treat the asymptotic performance for
the secure multiplex coding with common messages when the
channel is given as the n-fold discrete memoryless channel
of a given broadcast channel PYZ|X . First, we treat what
performance can be achieved by using Code Ensemble 3 and
Theorem 22 in Subsection VII-C without any assumption for
the distribution of sources. In the next step, we define the ca-
pacity region under the asymptotic uniformity of information
sources. In SMC, this restriction for the sources is essential
for our definition of the capacity region. After this definition,
we concretely give the capacity region.
A. General Sequence of Information Sources
First, we treat the secure multiplex coding with common
messages with general sequence of information sources. For a
given set of rates (Ri)Ti=0, we give a general sequence of source
distributions PS T ,n on the message sets Si,n for i = 0, 1, . . . , T
satisfying the relations |Si,n| := enRi for i = 0, 1, . . . , T . For
a given Markov chains U → V → X → YZ, we give an
asymptotic code construction in the following way.
Code Construction 4: Let ϕn be a code given in Code
Ensemble 2 in Subsection VII-B satisfying (66), (63), (64),
and (65) of length n with |Si,n| := enRi for i = 0, 1, . . . , T and
a given Markov chain U → V → X.
The performance of the code ϕn of Code Construction 4
is characterized as follows. The conditions (64) and (65)
guarantee (115) and (116) given as follows.
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log Pb[PnY |V ,Φn, PS T ,n ]
≥ − ρ
T∑
i=1
Ri − max[E0(−ρ|PY |V , PV |U , PU), E0(−ρ|PY |U,V , PV,U)],
(115)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log Pe[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T ,n ] ≥ −ρR0 − E0(−ρ|PZ|U , PU)
(116)
with any ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Further, due to (66), the leaked information
for S I,n can be evaluated as
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤
[1
ρ
ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) − 1
n
H1+ρ(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
]
+
+ (T + 2) log 2
nρ
.
We substitute ρ = a/n with an arbitrary real a > 0 and take
the limits n → ∞. Then, (20) of Lemma 4 leads the inequality
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤
[
I(V; Z|U) − lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+a/n(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
]
+
+(T + 2) log 2
a
.
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Taking the limits a → ∞, we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤
[
I(V; Z|U) − lim
a→∞
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+a/n(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
]
+
. (117)
So, the asymptotic performance of our code given in Code
Construction 4 is characterized in (115), (116), and (117).
In Code Construction 4, the parameter R0 is chosen to be
Rc in BCD. However, to realize the capacity region of SMC,
we need to choose the parameter R0 to be a smaller value
than Rc in BCD in general. To realize such a choice, we
introduce another code construction by using Code Ensemble
3 in Subsection VII-C. As is explained in Remark 39, such
a construction is crucial for achieving the capacity region in
general although Code Construction 4 achieves the capacity
region with no common message.
Code Construction 5: For a given set of rates (Ri)Ti=0, we
introduce other parameters Rp and Rc satisfying
Rc + Rp =
T∑
i=0
Ri, Rc ≥ R0. (118)
In the following, we denote the set of ((Ri)Ti=0,Rp,Rc) satisfying
the above condition by RT . In order to apply Code Ensemble
3 in Subsection VII-C, we fix Abelian groups B1,n and B2,n
satisfying |B1,n| := en(Rc−R0) and |B2,n| := enRp . Applying Code
Ensemble 3 and Theorem 22 to the n-fold discrete memoryless
extension Un → Vn → Xn → YnZn of the above Markov chain
and the Abelian groups B1,n and B2,n, we find the code ϕn =
(ϕa,n, ϕb,n, ϕe,n) with the message sets Si,n for i = 0, 1, . . . , T
satisfying (76), (77), (78), and (79).
The performance of the code ϕn of Code Construction 5 is
characterized as follows. The relations (78) and (79) guarantee
that
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log Pb[PnY |V , ϕn, PS T ,n ]
≥min
[
−ρRp − E0(−ρ|PY |V , PV |U , PU),
− ρ(Rp + Rc) − E0(−ρ|PY |U,V , PV,U)
]
, (119)
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log Pe[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n ] ≥ −ρRc − E0(−ρ|PZ|U , PU)
(120)
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, due to (18) and (20), above
both exponents (119) and (120) are positive, i.e., both error
probabilities go to zero exponentially when
Rp < I(Y; V |U), Rp + Rc < I(Y; VU) = I(Y; U) + I(Y; V |U),
Rc < I(Z; U),
which are satisfied when
Rc < min[I(Y; U), I(Z; U)], Rp < I(Y; V |U). (121)
Further, due to (80), the leaked information for S I,n can be
evaluated as
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤
[
[Rc − R0]+ + 1
ρ
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) − 1
n
H1+ρ(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
]
+
+ (T + 2) log 2
nρ
.
Similar to (117), we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤
[
(Rc − R0) + I(V; Z|U)
− lim
a→∞
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+a/n(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
]
+
. (122)
So, the asymptotic performance of our code in Code Construc-
tion 5 is characterized in (119), (120), and (122).
B. Capacity Region
Next, in order to characterize the limit of the asymptotic
performance of the secure multiplex coding with common
messages, we define the capacity region based on the WACU
condition (99). For this purpose, we treat the transmission
rate tuple (Ri)i=0,...,T = (R0, R1, . . . , RT ) and the information
leakage rate tuple (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }, where I takes every non-
empty proper subset of {1, . . . , T }. The latter describes the rates
of the leaked information for the message S I,n. Combining
both tuples, we call ((Ri)i=0,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) the rate tuple.
Definition 36: The rate tuple ((Ri)i=0,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) is
said to be achievable for the secure multiplex coding with T
secret messages for the channel PYZ|X if there exist a sequence
of codes ϕn = (ϕa,n, ϕb,n, ϕe,n), i.e., Alice’s stochastic encoder
ϕa,n from S0,n × S1,n × · · · × ST,n to Xn, Bob’s deterministic
decoder ϕb,n : Yn → S0,n × S1,n × · · · × ST,n and Eve’s
deterministic decoder ϕe,n : Zn → S0,n satisfying the following
conditions: (1) The i-th secret message set Si,n has cardinality
enRi for i = 1, . . . , T , and the common message set S0,n has
cardinality enR0 . (2) When a sequence of joint distributions
PS T ,n on the message sets Si,n for T = 0, 1, . . . , T satisfies
the WACU condition (99) for a non-empty proper subset
I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }, the relations
lim
n→∞
Pb[PnY |X , ϕn, PS T ,n ] = 0 (123)
lim
n→∞
Pe[PnZ|X , ϕn, PS T ,n ] = 0 (124)
lim sup
n→∞
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0)[PnZ|X , ϕa,n, PS T ,n ] ≤ Rl,I (125)
hold. The capacity region C of the secure multiplex
coding is the closure of the achievable rate tuples
((Ri)i=0,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }).
Theorem 37: The capacity region of the secure multiplex
coding with common messages is given by the set of rate tu-
ples ((Ri)i=0,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) such that there exist a Markov
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chain U → V → X → YZ and
R0 ≤ min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
T∑
i=0
Ri ≤ I(V; Y |U) +min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)]
Rl,I ≥
∑
i∈I
Ri − [I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U)]+ (126)
for any non-empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }.
Now, we define the capacity region Cnc of the se-
cure multiplex coding with no common messages as
the set of rate tuples ((Ri)i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) satisfying
(0, (Ri)i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) ∈ C. As a corollary, the case
with no common message is characterized as follows.
Corollary 38: Cnc is given as the set of rate tuples
((Ri)i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) such that there exist a Markov
chain V → X → YZ and
T∑
i=1
Ri ≤ I(V; Y)
Rl,I ≥
∑
i∈I
Ri − [I(V; Y) − I(V; Z)]+ (127)
for any non-empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }.
Proof of Theorem 37: The converse part of this cod-
ing theorem follows from that for Corollary 9 with the
uniform distribution on the whole message sets. The di-
rect part can be shown by Lemma 41. That is, for a rate
tuple ((Ri)i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) given in (126) and an ar-
bitrary small real number ε > 0, the rate tuple ((Ri −
ǫ
T )i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) can be achieved by Lemma 41 when
the T + 1-th message S T+1 is used as the dummy message
subject to the uniform distribution and its rate RT+1 is chosen
to be max(I(V; Y |U) −∑Ti=0 Ri − ǫT , 0).
Remark 39: As is mentioned in Proof of Theorem 37, to
derive the capacity region, we employ Lemma 41, which
is based on Code Construction 5 instead of Code Con-
struction 4 because the case ∑Ti=1 Ri > I(V; Y |U) requires
Code Construction 5. This is the reason why we introduce
Code Construction 5 as well as Code Construction 4. When∑T
i=1 Ri ≤ I(V; Y |U), the rate tuple ((Ri)i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T })
given in (126) can be approximately achieved by Lemma 40,
which is based on Code Construction 4. That is, the rate tuple
((Ri − ǫT )i=1,...,T , (Rl,I)∅,I({1,...,T }) can be achieved by Lemma
40 when the T + 1-th message S T+1 is used as the dummy
message subject to the uniform distribution and its rate RT+1
is chosen to be max(I(V; Y |U) − ∑Ti=0(Ri − ǫT ) − ǫ, 0). Then,
Code Construction 4 gives only the special rate tuple in the
capacity region.
When there is no common message, it is enough to attain the
region given in Corollary 38. Hence, it is sufficient to consider
the case with R0 = 0, which implies that
∑T
i=1 Ri ≤ I(V; Y |U).
That is, if we need to show only Corollary 38, it is enough
to use Lemma 40, which is based on Code Construction 4
instead of Code Construction 5.
Lemma 40: Choose a sufficiently small real number ǫ > 0
and (Ri)T+1i=0 for i = 0, 1, . . . , T, T + 1 satisfying
R0 < min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)], (128)
T+1∑
i=1
Ri < I(V; Y |U) ≤ (
T+1∑
i=1
Ri) + ǫ. (129)
Then, the code ϕn given by Code Construction 4 satisfies
lim
n→∞
Pb[PnY |V , ϕn, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n ] = 0 (130)
lim
n→∞
Pe[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n ] = 0 (131)
and
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n ]
≤
∑
i∈I
Ri − [I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U)]+ + ǫ (132)
when the sequence of the joint distributions PS T ,n of informa-
tion source satisfies the WACU condition (99) for any non-
empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T } and PS T+1,n is the uniform
distribution.
Lemma 41: Choose a sufficiently small real number ǫ > 0
and (Ri)T+1i=0 for i = 0, 1, . . . , T, T + 1 satisfying
R0 <min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)], (133)
I(V; Y |U) ≤ (
T+1∑
i=0
Ri) + ǫ <I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)].
(134)
Then, the code ϕn given by Code Construction 5 with the
choices
Rp := I(V; Y |U) − ǫ and Rc :=
T+1∑
i=0
Ri − Rp (135)
satisfies (130), (131), and (132) when the sequence of the joint
distributions PS T ,n of information source satisfies the WACU
condition (99) for any non-empty proper subset I ( {1, . . . , T }
and PS T+1,n is the uniform distribution.
Proof of Lemma 40: Since the conditions (128) and
(129) guarantee the conditions (121), we obtain (130)
and (131). We need to show only (132). Assume that
I(V; Y |U) ≤ I(V; Z|U). Since |SI,n| = en
∑
i∈I Ri , we obtain
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n ] ≤
∑
i∈I Ri, which
implies (132). Hence, it is enough to consider the case
I(V; Y |U) > I(V; Z|U). Since, as is shown in Lemma 93 in
Appendix C, the equivalence between the SWACU condition
(100) and the WACU condition (99) holds, we obtain
lim
a→∞
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+a/n(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n) =
∑
i∈Ic
Ri. (136)
23
The relations (117) and (136) yield
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n ]
≤I(V; Z|U) −
∑
i∈Ic
Ri
= −
T+1∑
i=1
Ri + I(V; Z|U) +
∑
i∈I
Ri
≤ǫ − I(V; Y |U) + I(V; Z|U) +
∑
i∈I
Ri, (137)
which implies (132)
Proof of Lemma 41: Since the conditions (133), (134),
and (135) guarantee the conditions (121), we obtain (130)
and (131). We need to show only (132). When I(V; Y |U) ≤
I(V; Z|U), we can show (132) by the same way as Lemma 40.
Hence, it is enough to consider the case I(V; Y |U) > I(V; Z|U).
By the same way as Lemma 40, the relations (122) and (136)
yield
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕa,n, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n ]
≤(Rc − R0) + I(V; Z|U) −
∑
i∈Ic
Ri
=Rc −
T+1∑
i=0
Ri + I(V; Z|U) +
∑
i∈I
Ri
= − Rp + I(V; Z|U) +
∑
i∈I
Ri. (138)
Therefore, since Rp = I(V; Y |U)− ǫ, (138) implies (132) when
I(V; Y |U) > I(V; Z|U).
X. SecureMultiplex Coding with CommonMessages: Strong
Security
A. Strong Security
In this section, we treat the strong security. A sequence of
codes ϕn is called strongly secure for a subset I ( {1, . . . , T }
and a sequence of distributions PS T ,n when the relation
lim
n→∞
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|X , ϕn, PS T ,n ] = 0 (139)
holds. Now, we fix a family J of non-empty proper subsets I
of {1, . . . , T }, and consider only the security of the messages
S I,n for all I ∈ J.
Theorem 42: Assume that the transmission rate tuple
(Ri)i=0,...,T = (R0,R1, . . . ,RT ) belongs to the inner of the
capacity region with Rl,I = 0 for any subset I ∈ J, i.e., there
exist an information leakage rate tuple (Rl,I)∅,I∈Jc such that
((Ri)i=0,...,T , (0)I∈J, (Rl,I)∅,I∈Jc ) ∈ inn(C), (140)
where inn(C) denotes the inner of the set C. Then, there exists
a Markov chain U → V → X such that
ǫ :=min
I∈J
I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U) −∑i∈I Ri
|Ic| > 0, (141)
R0 <min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
T∑
i=0
Ri <I(V; Y |U) +min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)].
Next, we choose RT+1 := max(I(V; Y |U) − ∑Ti=0 Ri, 0) and
a small real ǫ′ > 0 such that ǫ′ < ǫ2 , ǫ
′ < I(V; Y |U) +
min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)] − ∑T+1i=0 Ri. The code ϕn given by Code
Construction 5 with the choices Rp := I(V; Y |U) − ǫ′ and
Rc :=
∑T+1
i=0 Ri−Rp satisfies (130), (131), and the strong security
lim
n→∞
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n ] = 0 (142)
for any subset I ∈ J when the sequence of distributions PS T ,n
satisfies the (ǫ − 2ǫ′)-SACU condition (101) for the subset I.
Thanks to Theorem 42, the strong security holds at all inner
points of the capacity region C with Rl,I = 0 for any subset
I ∈ J under the ǫ-SACU condition (101) for any subset I ∈ J.
Here, we address the relation with the paper [22]. When
there is no common message, the paper [22] defined the region
RIsto as follows.
Definition 43: The region RIsto is the closure of the set of
the rate tuples (Ri)i=1,...,T satisfying the following. There exist a
sequence of codes ϕn = (ϕa,n, ϕb,n, ϕe,n), i.e., Alice’s stochastic
encoder ϕa,n from S1,n × · · · × ST,n to Xn, Bob’s deterministic
decoder ϕb,n : Yn → S1,n × S1,n × · · · × ST,n satisfying the
following conditions: (1) The i-th secret message set Si,n has
cardinality enRi for i = 1, . . . , T , (2) When the message obeys
the uniform distribution, the relations (123) and
lim sup
n→∞
I(S t,n; Zn|S 0)[PnZ|X , ϕa,n, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n] = 0 (143)
hold for t = 1, . . . , T .
On the other hand, we define the region ˜RIsto as the set of
rate tuples (Ri)i=1,...,T such that there exists a Markov chain
V → X → YZ and
T∑
i=1
Ri ≤ I(V; Y), Rt ≤ [I(V; Y) − I(V; Z)]+ (144)
for t = 1, . . . , T . Then, Theorem 42 and Corollary 38 guarantee
the relation
RIsto = ˜RIsto, (145)
which is the same as the result by the paper [22, (138)]. Here,
Corollary 38 implies RIsto ⊂ ˜RIsto and Theorem 42 does RIsto ⊃
inn( ˜RIsto). Since RIsto and ˜RIsto are the closed sets, we obtain
(145).
In order to show Theorem 42, we prepare the following
lemma.
Lemma 44: We fix a subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. Assume that the
transmission rate tuple (Ri)i=0,...,T , the sequence of distributions
PS T ,n , and a Markov chain U → V → X satisfy that
δ′ :=
1
2
(
Hlog(Ic)
− (
T∑
i=1
Ri − I(V; Y |U) + I(V; Z|U))
)
> 0, (146)
R0 <min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
T∑
i=0
Ri <I(V; Y |U) +min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)].
When we choose RT+1 := max(I(V; Y |U) − ∑Ti=0 Ri, 0) and a
small real ǫ′ > 0 such that ǫ′ ≤ δ′ and ǫ′ < I(V; Y |U) +
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min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)] − ∑T+1i=0 Ri, the code ϕn given by Code
Construction 5 with the choices Rp := I(V; Y |U)−ǫ′ and Rc :=∑T+1
i=0 Ri − Rp satisfies (130), (131), and the strong security
lim
n→∞
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n × PS T+1,n] = 0. (147)
Proof of Theorem 42: First, we fix an arbitrary subset I ∈
J. Hence,
∑
i∈Ic
(Ri − (ǫ − 2ǫ′)) − (
T+1∑
i=1
Ri − I(V; Y |U) + I(V; Z|U))
≥(
∑
i∈Ic
Ri) − |Ic|(ǫ − 2ǫ′) − (
T+1∑
i=1
Ri − I(V; Y |U) + I(V; Z|U))
=I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U) −
∑
i∈I
Ri − |Ic|(ǫ − 2ǫ′)
≥|Ic|ǫ − |Ic|(ǫ − 2ǫ′) = 2|Ic|ǫ′ ≥ 2ǫ′.
Thus, since the sequence of distributions PS T ,n satisfies the
ǫ − 2ǫ′-SACU condition (101) for the subset I,
δ′ :=
1
2
(
Hlog(Ic)
− (
T+1∑
i=1
Ri − I(V; Y |U) + I(V; Z|U))
)
≥1
2
(∑
i∈Ic
(Ri − (ǫ − 2ǫ′)) − (
T+1∑
i=1
Ri − I(V; Y |U) + I(V; Z|U))
)
≥ǫ′.
Hence, any real number ǫ′ > 0 given in Theorem 42 satisfies
the condition for ǫ′ > 0 in Lemma 44. Thus, applying Lemma
44, we obtain (142) for the subset I. Since the subset I is an
arbitrary element of J, we obtain Theorem 42.
Proof of Lemma 44: Since ǫ′ > 0, we have the second
condition of (121). Due to the choice of ǫ′ > 0,
0 =I(V; Y |U) − ǫ′ − Rp
>I(V; Y |U) −
(
I(V; Y |U) + min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)]−
T+1∑
i=0
Ri
)
− Rp
=
T+1∑
i=0
Ri −min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)] − Rp
=Rc −min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)],
which implies the first condition of (121). Hence, we obtain
(130) and (131).
Next, we define
ρn :=
2 log n
nδ′
,
Cn :=
(
−ρnn(Rc − R0) + ρnH1+ρn(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
− nE0(ρn|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
)
.
The condition (146) and ǫ′ ≤ δ′ imply that
lim inf
n→∞
Cn
nρn
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρn(S Ic,n|S I,n, S 0,n) −
T+1∑
i=1
Ri + Rp − I(V; Z|U)
≥Hlog(Ic) −
T+1∑
i=1
Ri + I(V; Y |U) − δ′ − I(V; Z|U)
=
1
2
(
Hlog(Ic) −
T+1∑
i=1
Ri + I(V; Y |U) − I(V; Z|U)
)
=δ′ > 0. (148)
That is, we can choose a sufficiently large integer N such that
Cn
nρn
≥ δ
′
2
(149)
for n ≥ N. Due to (77), the leaked information for S I,n can
be evaluated as
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T ,n ] ≤
2T+2
ρn
e−Cn .
Since (149) implies that
− log(2
T+2
ρn
e−Cn ) = −(T + 2) log 2 +Cn + log ρn
≥ − (T + 2) log 2 + δ
′
2
nρn + log ρn
= − (T + 2) log 2 + log log n − log δ
′
2
→ ∞,
we obtain (147).
B. Exponential Decreasing Rate
In this subsection, we treat the exponential decreasing rate
of leaked information. In this subsection, we assume that the
T + 1-th message S T+1,n is subject to the uniform distribution.
We simplify PS T ,n×PS T+1,n by PS T ,n . For a subset I ( {1, . . . , T },
we denote the complementary set in {1, . . . , T } by Ic and
simplify the set Ic ∪ {T + 1} to Ic,∗. Unfortunately, the ǫ-
SACU condition (101) is not sufficient for deriving a good
exponential decreasing rate of leaked information. Hence, in
this subsection, given a sequence of distributions PS T ,n , we
introduce the following quantity
H1+ρ(Ic,∗) := lim infn→∞
1
n
H1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n|S I,n, S 0,n) (150)
for any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . , T } and any ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Theorem 45: For given (Ri)Ti=0, we choose Rp and Rc as
follows.
Rc ≥ R0, Rc + Rp =
T+1∑
i=0
Ri.
We fix a real number ǫ > 0. We choose a code ϕn given by
Code Construction 5 with the above choices Rp and Rc and
a given Markov chain U → V → X. When the sequence of
distributions PS T ,n satisfies the ǫ-SACU condition (101) for a
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non-empty proper subset I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }, the sequence of
codes ϕn satisfies (119), (120), and
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T ,n ]
≥ sup
0<ρ<1
ρ(H1+ρ(Ic,∗) − Rc + R0) − E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU). (151)
In particular, when the distribution PS T ,n is uniform, we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T+∞,n ]
≥ ˜EE0 (Rp −
∑
i∈I
Ri, PZ,V,U), (152)
where ˜EE0 (R, PZ,V,U) is defined in (22).
Theorem 45 yields the following observation. When Rp−ǫ−∑
i∈I Ri > I(V; Z|U) and H1+ρ(Ic) ≥ (
∑
i∈Ic Ri) − ǫ holds with
a small ρ > 0, the exponent (151) is positive, i.e., the leaked
information goes to zero exponentially. In particular, when
T+1∑
i=1
Ri < I(V; Y |U), R0 < min[I(U; Y), I(U; Z)], (153)
we can choose Rp and Rc by
Rp :=
T+1∑
i=1
Ri, Rc := R0. (154)
Then, the inequalities (119) and (120) can be simplified to
(115) and (116). Then, the both decoding error probabilities
goes zero exponentially. Further, the inequality (151) can be
simplified to
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T+∞,n ]
≥ sup
0<ρ<1
ρH1+ρ(Ic,∗) − E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU). (155)
Further, in the case of (153) and (154), when the WACU
condition holds for I, the inequality (122) can be simplified
to
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T+∞,n ]
≤Rc − R0 + I(V; Z|U) −
∑
i∈Ic,∗
Ri = I(V; Z|U) −
∑
i∈Ic,∗
Ri. (156)
Proof of Theorem 45: In Subsection IX-A, we have already
shown (119) and (120). Hence, we need to only show (151).
Due to (77), the leaked information for S I,n can be evaluated
as
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V , ϕn, PS T+∞,n ]
≤2
T+2
ρ
eρn(Rc−R0)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)+nE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ).
Hence,
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)
≥ρ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
− ρ(Rc − R0) − E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
≥ρ(H1+ρ(Ic,∗) − Rc + R0) − E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU).
Taking the supremum for ρ ∈ [0, 1], we obtain (151).
When the condition (153) holds, the exponent (155) can be
improved by using Theorem 20 with Code Construction 4 in
the following way.
Theorem 46: We fix a real number ǫ ≥ 0. Let ϕn be a
code given in Code Construction 4 in Subsection IX-A. The
sequence of codes ϕn satisfies (115), (116), (156), and
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T+∞,n ]
≥ max
0≤ρ≤1
ρH1+ρ(Ic,∗) − ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU). (157)
In particular, when the distribution PS T ,n is uniform, we obtain
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T+∞,n ]
≥ ˜Eψ(
∑
i∈Ic,∗
Ri, PZ,V,U),
where ˜Eψ(R, PZ,V,U) is defined in (21).
Now, we compare Theorems 45 and 46. Since the RHS of
(157) is larger than the RHS of (155) due to (17), Theorem
46 is better than Theorem 45 when the relation (153) holds.
Otherwise, the error exponent of (115) and/or (116) is not
positive. That is, Theorem 46 cannot yield a reliable commu-
nication. In summary, Theorem 45 has a wider applicability
than Theorem 46. In the special case (153), Theorem 46 is
better than Theorem 45.
Proof: Relations (115) and (116) have been shown in Sub-
section IX-A. Due to the ǫ-SACU condition, (117) guarantees
(156). Using (63) and the ǫ-SACU condition, we obtain
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T+∞,n ]
≤2
T+2
ρ
e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)+nψ(ρ|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ).
Then,
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[PnZ|V ,Φn, PS T ,n ]
≥ρH1+ρ(Ic,∗) − ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU). (158)
Hence, we obtain (157).
When the above discussion is applied to the wire-tap chan-
nel model, we obtain an extension of existing results to the
case of the asymptotic uniform dummy message. That is, we
consider the case with no common messages and T = 2 when
S 1 corresponds to the message to be secretly sent to Bob,
and S 2 does to the dummy message making S 1 ambiguous
to Eve. For a given rate R1 of secret message and a given
rate R2 of dummy message, the RHS of (115) coincides with
the Gallager exponents, the RHS of (155) coincides with the
RHS of (59) in [15], and the RHS of (157) coincides with the
exponents of the RHS of (15) in [17].
XI. Practical Code Construction
In Section XI, we consider how we can construct practically
usable encoder and decoder for the secure multiplex coding.
When the channel has additive structure, the paper [17, Section
V] constructed a code for wire-tap channel code from an or-
dinary linear error correcting code, and the paper [22, Section
26
VI] did a secure multiple code without common message from
an ordinary linear error correcting code. Here, we construct a
secure multiple code with/without common message when the
channel does not necessarily have additive structure and the
message does not necessarily obey the uniform distribution.
We shall show how to convert an ordinary error correcting
code without secrecy consideration to a code for the secure
multiplex coding. In this section, we treat practical code
construction in the single-shot setting unless otherwise stated.
It is a common practice to assume the uniform distribution
of messages when one evaluates the decoding error probability,
and decoding error probabilities with non-uniform message
distributions are rarely considered in practice. Thus, we al-
ways assume the uniform message distribution because this
assumption is necessary for the analysis of the decoding error
probability. However, this assumption is unnecessary for that
of the leaked information to Eve. The analysis of this section
holds for general channels with finite alphabets except for
Lemma 50. Only Lemma 50 assumes the regularity of the
channel.
A. First Practical Code Construction: First Type Evaluation
We construct a code for the secure multiplex coding based
on a given code ϕp for BCD with the common message in Sc
and the private message in Sp. We assume that encoding and
decoding of ϕp can be efficiently executed. We shall attach F′
and G′ in the second step of Code Ensemble 3 to ϕp so that
the resulting code for SMC enables efficient encoding and
decoding. This type of construction is much more practical
than Code Ensemble 3 because Code Ensemble 3 uses the
random coding for the error correcting code ϕp, which does
not enable efficient encoding nor decoding. To use the code
with F′ and G′ attached, we have to evaluate decoding error
probability and the amount of information leaked to Eve. The
former is less than or equal to that of the underlying error
correcting code ϕp, and the average of the latter over the
ensemble of F′ and G′ can be evaluated by Lemma 21 with
a fixed error correcting code ϕp. In our code, we employ a
dummy message to realize the secrecy of message when the
leaked information is very close to the mutual information
with the normal receiver and the number of T is fixed. Now,
we present a code construction.
Code Construction 6: First, in order to apply Lemma 21,
we divide the common message set Sc of the BCD code
ϕp to S0 × B1, and denote the private message set Sp of
ϕp by B2. That is, the code ϕp is regarded as a map from
S0 × B1 × B2 to X. Then, based on the code ϕp, assuming
the Abelian group structures in B1 and B2, we choose an
ensemble of isomorphisms6 F′ from S1 × · · · × ST+1 to
B1 × B2 as Abelian groups satisfying Condition 15 while
we do not assume any algebraic assumption for the code
ϕp. In this scenario, S 0 is common message, S 1, . . . , S T
are secret messages, and S T+1 is the dummy randomness
whose secrecy is not required. We choose the random variable
G′ ∈ B1×B2 that obeys the uniform distribution on B1×B2 and
6Remark 16 discusses an efficient realization of an ensemble of isomor-
phisms F satisfying Condition 15.
is independent of the choice of F′ and anything else. Then, by
defining a map ΛF′ ,G′ (s) := F′(s)+G′, we obtain our encoder
ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ (s0, s1, . . . , sT+1) = ϕp(s0,ΛF′ ,G′ (s1, . . . , sT+1)). The
decoder is constructed by applying the inverse Λ−1F′ ,G′ (b1, b2) =
F′−1((b1, b2) −G′) to the decoded message of the code ϕp.
The average of the leaked information of the above con-
structed code is evaluated as follows.
Lemma 47: For a subset I ( {1, . . . , T }, the quantity
E0,max(ρ|PZ|V ) defined in (23) satisfies
EF′ ,G′ I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ]
≤e
E0,max (ρ|PZ|V )−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I,S 0)
ρ
. (159)
Proof: Applying Lemma 21, we obtain
EF′ ,G′ exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ])
≤1 +
∑
s0
PS 0(s0)
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I=sI,S 0=s0)
· eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,ϕp ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 ). (160)
Since
eψ(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,ϕp ,S 0 ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 ) ≤ eE0(ρ|PZ|B1 ,B2 ,ϕp ,S 0 ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 )
=
∑
z
(
∑
b1,b2
1
|B1||B2|PZ|V (z|ϕp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ,
∑
sI
PS I|S 0 (sI|s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I=sI,S 0=s0) = e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I,S 0=s0),
we obtain
EF′ ,G′ exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ])
≤1 +
∑
s0
PS 0 (s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I,S 0=s0)
·
∑
z
(
∑
b1,b2
1
|B1||B2|PZ|V (z|ϕp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ. (161)
It can be simplified as follows.∑
z
(
∑
b1,b2
1
|B1||B2|PZ|V (z|ϕp(s0, b1, b2))
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
≤max
PV
∑
z
(
∑
v
PV (v)PZ|V(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=max
PV
eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV ) = eE0,max (ρ|PZ|V ).
That is, using the relation
∑
s0 PS 0 (s0)e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I,S 0=s0) =
e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I,S 0), we have
EF′ ,G′ exp(ρI(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ])
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I,S 0)eE0,max (ρ|PZ|V ). (162)
Combining the Jensen inequality for x 7→ ex, we obtain the
desired upper bound (159).
The logarithm of the RHS of (159) has the following
property.
Lemma 48: The functions ρ 7→ E0(ρ|PZ|V) −
ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I, S 0) − log ρ and ρ 7→ E0,max(ρ|PZ|V) −
ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I, S 0) − log ρ are convex.
Proof: The function ρ 7→ E0(ρ|WZ , QV ) is convex [12].
Also the function ρ 7→ ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I, S 0) is concave. Hence,
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E0(ρ|PZ|V , QV ) − ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I, S 0) − log ρ is convex. Sim-
ilarly, due to Lemma 5, the function ρ 7→ E0,max(ρ|PZ|V ) −
ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I, S 0) − logρ is convex.
As is explained latter, the bound eE0,max (ρ|PZ|V ) is computable
in the discrete memoryless case. On the other hand, the
error probabilities can be upper bounded by the average error
probabilities of the code ϕp.
Next, we determine the necessary amount of dummy ran-
domness so that the amounts of leaked information is below
specified levels. Suppose that we are given arbitrary error-
correcting code ϕp for the broadcast channel PYZ|V . The code
ϕp can be, for example, an LDPC code [40] or a Turbo code
[41] when there is no common message. Then, we assume that
S T+1 obeys the uniform distribution on its alphabet ST+1 and
is statistically independent of all other random variables. As
a corollary to Lemma 47, we have:
Lemma 49: For I ⊂ {1, . . . , T }, we have
EF′ ,G′ I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ]
≤e
E0,max (ρ|PZ|V )−ρ(log |ST+1 |+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0))
ρ
. (163)
By using Eq. (163), from ϕp we can construct a code
for the secure multiplex coding as follows. For each proper
nonempty set I ( {1, . . . , T }, ǫI denotes the maximum
acceptable information leakage for I(S I; Z). Denote by ǫ2
the maximum acceptable probability for a chosen F′,G′ not
making I(S I; Z|S 0) below ǫI for some I.
Adjust the size |ST+1| of the dummy randomness so that
ǫI :=
2T
ǫ2
(
inf
ρ∈(0,1)
eE0,max (ρ|PZ|V )−ρ(log |ST+1 |+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0))
ρ
)
.
Then, due to (163), we obtain
EF′ ,G′ I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ] ≤ ǫ2ǫI/2T
Then, by the Markov inequality the probability of choosing
F′ and G′ making I(S I; Z|S 0) ≤ ǫI simultaneously for all
I ( {1, . . . , T } is ≥ 1 − ǫ2.
When the channel is a regular channel in the sense of
Delsarte-Piret [10], the value E0,max(ρ|PZ|V) can be calculated
as follows:
Lemma 50: When the channel PZ|V is regular in the sense
of Delsarte-Piret [10],
E0,max(ρ|PZ|V) = E0(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,V). (164)
Further, when the code ϕp is a homomorphism as Abelian
group, the inequality
EF′ |G′=g′ I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,g′ , PS T ]
≤e
E0(ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V)−ρ(log |ST+1 |+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I,S 0))
ρ
(165)
holds for any g′ ∈ G′.
Thanks to Lemma 50, in the regular case, when the code
ϕp is a homomorphism as Abelian group, the above procedure
for the construction of our code (Code Construction 6) can
be simplified to the following way. It is enough to choose
F′ and to fix G′ to be 0, and we can replace E0,max(ρ|PZ|V )
by E0(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,V). That is, it is enough to calculate
infρ∈(0,1) E0(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,V)− ρ(log |ST+1|+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0))−
log ρ. Due to Lemma 48, E0(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,V) − ρ(log |ST+1| +
H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)) − logρ is convex with respect to ρ, and the
infimum is computable by the bisection method [4, Algorithm
4.1].
Proof of Lemma 50: First, we choose P′V such that
E0,max(ρ|PZ|V) = E0(ρ|PZ|V , P′V). (166)
Define P′V,v0 for v0 ∈ V by
P′V,v0(v) = P′V (v + v0).
Then,
eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,P
′
V ) = eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,P
′
V,v0
)
. (167)
Hence, we obtain
eE0,max (ρ|PZ|V )
(a)
= eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,P
′
V ) (b)=
∑
v0∈V
1
|V|e
E0(ρ|PZ|V ,P′V,v0 )
(c)≤eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,
∑
v0∈V
1
|V| P
′
V,v0
)
= eE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V)
(d)≤ eE0,max (ρ|PZ|V ),
where (a), (b), (c), and (d) follow from (166), (167), the
concavity of PV 7→ eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,PV ) (Item (2) of Proposition 2),
and the definition (23) of E0,max(ρ|PZ|V), respectively. Thus,
we have (164).
Next, we show (165). When the code ϕp is a homo-
morphism as Abelian group, as is mentioned in Lemma
21, we have EF′ |G′=g′ I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,g′ , PS T ] =
EF′ ,G′ I(S I; Z|S 0)[PZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,g′ , PS T ]. Hence, combining
(163), we obtain (165).
When the channel is given as the n-fold discrete memory-
less extension PnZ|V of PZ|V , E0,max(ρ|PnZ|V) has the following
characterization. Using [1], we obtain
max
PVn
∑
zn
(
∑
vn
PVn (vn)PZn |Vn (zn|vn)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ = enE0,max (ρ|PZ|V ).
Thus, we can apply the above discussion to the n-fold
memoryless case by replacing E0,max(ρ|PZ|V) and PZ|V by
nE0,max(ρ|PZ|V) and PnZ|V . That is, it is enough to calculate
infρ∈(0,1) nE0,max(ρ|PZ|V ) − ρ(log |ST+1| + H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)) −
log ρ. Since, as is mentioned in Proposition 2, QV 7→
eE0(ρ|W
Z
,QV ) is concave and x 7→ log x is monotone increas-
ing and concave, QV 7→ E0(ρ|WZ , QV ) is concave. Hence,
E0,max(ρ|PZ|V , QV) = maxQV E0(ρ|PZ|V , QV ) can be easily com-
puted. Due to Lemma 48, nE0,max(ρ|PZ|V) − ρ(log |ST+1| +
H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)) − log ρ is convex concerning with respect
to ρ, the infimum is computable by the bisection method [4,
Algorithm 4.1]. Therefore, we can calculate the minimum
size |ST+1| satisfying that nE0,max(ρ|PZ|V ) − ρ(log |ST+1| +
H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0)) − log ρ is smaller than a specified level for
all of I ( {1, . . . , T }.
B. First Practical Construction: Second Type Evaluation
In the above discussion, we have to consider the maximum
value E0,max(ρ|PZ|V). However, when there is no common
message and the channel PZ|V is not regular, one can improve
the bound (159) in the n-fold memoryless case under the same
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code construction (Code Construction 6) as the following way.
In the following, we treat the n-fold memoryless extension
PnZ|V . Given an encoder ϕp : B2 → Vn, we define the weight
distribution Pϕp over the set Tn(V) of types of length n of the
set V by
Pϕp(QV ) :=
|{vn ∈ Imϕp|the type of vn is QV .}|
| Imϕp| (168)
for QV ∈ Tn(V). Using the above weight distribution Pϕp , we
define the distribution
Pϕp (vn) :=
Pϕp (QV )
|Tn(QV )|
for vn ∈ Vn, where QV is the type of vn and
Tn(QV ) := {vn ∈ Un|the type of vn is QV .}.
We construct our code by the same way as Subsection
XI-A. We apply Lemma 23 to the case when G is the n-th
permutation group, V is Vn, and PZ|V is PnZ|V . Then,
eψ(ρ|PZn |B1 ,Pmix,B2 ) ≤ eE0(ρ|PnZ|V ,Pϕp ).
Hence, combining (160), we obtain
EF′ ,G′ exp(ρI(S I; Z)[PnZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ])
≤1 + eE0(ρ|PnZ|V ,Pϕp )−ρ(log |ST+1 |+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I)).
Since ex is convex, we obtain
EF′ ,G′ I(S I; Z)[PnZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ]
≤e
E0 (ρ|PnZ|V ,Pϕp )−ρ(log |ST+1 |+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I))
ρ
.
However, it is not easy to calculate the weight distribution
Pϕp for a given code ϕp, but it is possible to give an upper
bound for each Pϕp (QV ) in some special cases. For example,
the upper bound in the case of binary BCH codes is discussed
in [31]. We assume that another distribution Qϕp over the set
Tn(V) and a constant C1 satisfy
C1Qϕp (QV ) ≥ Pϕp (QV )
for any QV ∈ Tn(V). Similar to Pϕp , we define the distribution
Qϕp by
Qϕp (vn) :=
Qϕp (QV )
|Tn(QV )|
for vn ∈ Vn, where QV is the type of vn. Hence, Proposition
2 yields
eE0(ρ|P
n
Z|V ,Pϕp ) ≤ C1eE0(ρ|P
n
Z|V ,Qϕp ).
Therefore, we obtain
EF′ ,G′ I(S I; Z)[PnZ|V , ϕp ◦ ΛF′ ,G′ , PS T ]
≤C1 e
E0(ρ|PnZ|V ,Qϕp )−ρ(log |ST+1 |+H1+ρ(S Ic |S I))
ρ
. (169)
When C1 is sufficiently small and Qϕp does not give the
maximum E0,max(ρ|PnZ|V ), the RHS of (169) is smaller than
the RHS of (159). Similar to the regular case of Subsection
XI-A, we can calculate infρ∈(0,1) E0(ρ|PnZ|V , Qϕp )−ρ(log |ST+1|+
H1+ρ(S Ic |S I, S 0))− log ρ+ log C1 by the bisection method [4,
Algorithm 4.1]. Therefore, in the above case, the method in
this subsection improves that in Subsection XI-A.
C. Second Practical Construction
In the previous construction, when the channel is not a
regular channel, we have to use an upper bound (159), which is
larger than e
E0 (ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V )−ρH1+ρ (SIc,∗ |SI ,S 0)
ρ
. In order to use a smaller
upper bound e
E0 (ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V )−ρH1+ρ (SIc,∗ |SI ,S 0)
ρ
even for a non-regular
channel, we introduce another practical construction when
there is no common message.
Assume that V has an Abelian group structure. Now, we
give a code ensemble from an arbitrary Abelian group B and
an arbitrary encoder ϕ : B2 → V satisfying that the map ϕ
is an injective homomorphism. In particular, when B2 and V
are vector spaces over the finite field F2, the map ϕ can be
given as a linear code, such as an LDPC code [40] or a Turbo
code [41]. However, we do not necessarily need to assume any
algebraic structure in the channel PZ,Y |V , for now. We stress
that in Code Ensemble 7 we use single encoder ϕ, while in
Code Construction 8 we use multiple encoders with the same
code length and different information rates.
Code Ensemble 7: We modify the random code given in
Lemma 21 as follows. We choose an ensemble of isomor-
phisms F′ from S1 × · · ·×ST+1 to B2 satisfying Condition 15.
We choose the random variable G′′ ∈ V that obeys the uniform
distribution on V statistically independent of the choice of F′.
Then, we define the encoder ˜ΛF′ ,G′′ (s) := (ϕ◦F′)(s)+G′′. The
decoder is given by ˆ˜ΛF′ ,G′′ (v) = F′−1(ϕˆ(v −G′′)) by using the
decoder ϕˆ of ϕ.
This code ensemble can be understood in the following
way. We define the random variable H in the quotient group
V/ϕ(B2) that obeys the uniform distribution. Let {yh} be the
set of coset representatives. Let G′ be the random variable
subject to the uniform distribution on B2. Then, G′′ is given
as ϕ(G′) + yH . That is, the encoder and the decoder can be
given as follows. ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H(s) := (ϕ ◦ F′)(s) + G′ + yH and
ˆ
˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H(v) := F′−1(ϕˆ(v −G′ − yH)).
In Code Ensemble 7, the random variable H corresponds to
the choice of the codebook for error correction. Let εH be the
decoding error probability when we use H as the codebook
and the message obeys the uniform distribution. Hence, we
consider that εH expresses the decoding error probability when
we use H as the codebook in the following code construction.
For Code Ensemble 7, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 51: The inequality
EF′ ,G′ ,HeρI(S I;Z)[PZ|V ,
˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H ,PST ]
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V) (170)
holds for each subset I ( {1, . . . , T }. Thus, applying Jensen
inequality to x 7→ ex, we have
EF′ ,G′ ,H I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H , PS T ]
≤e
E0(ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)
ρ
. (171)
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Proof: We apply (161) to the case when |S0| = 1,
S0 = {s0}, |B1| = 1, B1 = {b1}, and the map ϕp is given
as ϕp(s0, b1, b2) = ϕ(b2)+ yh for any b2 ∈ B2. Then, we obtain
EF′ ,G′eρI(S I ;Z)[PZ|V ,
˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,h,PST ]
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)
∑
z
(
∑
b2
1
|B2|PZ|V (z|ϕ(b2) + yh)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ.
Hence, we obtain
EF′ ,G′ ,HeρI(S I;Z)[PZ|V ,
˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H ,PST ]
=EHEF′ ,G′ |HeρI(S I;Z)[PZ|V ,
˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H ,PST ]
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)EH
∑
z
(
∑
b2
1
|B2|PZ|V(z|ϕ(b2) + yH)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)
∑
z
(EH
∑
b2
1
|B2|PZ|V (z|ϕ(b2) + yH)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=1 + e−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)eE0(ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V),
which implies (170).
In order to construct a code for the secure multiplex
coding (with no common message), we define the notations
as follows. Let ǫI be the maximum acceptable information
leakage for I(S I; Z) for each I ( {1, . . . , T }. Let ǫb be
the maximum acceptable error probability. Let ǫ2 be the the
maximum acceptable probability a chosen F′,G′′ not making
I(S I; Z) below ǫI. These parameters ǫb, ǫI, and ǫ2 are the
requirements for our code construction.
Code Construction 8: In this construction, in contrast to
Subsections XI-A and XI-B we assume that we are given
multiple error-correcting codes with the same code length
n and different information rates. Using (171), we construct
a code for the secure multiplex coding (with no common
message) as follows:
1) We choose a suitable Abelian group B2, a suitable
code ϕ, a suitable sacrifice bit length (the size of T -th
message), and a suitable real value ǫ1 ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
that
ǫb ≥ EHεH
ǫ1
(172)
ǫI ≥ 2T min
ρ∈(0,1)
eE0 (ρ|PZ|V ,Pmix,V)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ |S I)
ρǫ2(1 − ǫ1) . (173)
2) We choose H randomly. Then, we check that εH is less
than ǫb. If not, we choose another H. We repeat this
process until it is successful. We denote the final choice
of H by H′. Thanks to Markov inequality and (172), the
successful probability for one trial is at least 1 − ǫ1.
3) We choose F′ and G′ randomly. Then, we obtain the
pair of the encoder ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H′(s) := (ϕ ◦ F′)(s) +G′ + yH′
and the decoder ˆ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H′(v) := F′−1(ϕˆ(v −G′ − yH′)).
Theorem 52: Under the above construction, the inequality
I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H′ , PS T ] ≤ ǫI (174)
holds for all subsets I ( {1, . . . , T } with at least with
probability 1 − ǫ2.
Proof: Markov inequality guarantees that Pr{εH ≤ ǫb} ≥
1 − ǫ1. Hence, we obtain
EF′ ,G′ ,H′ I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H , PS T ]
=EF′ ,G′ ,H|εH≤ǫb I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H, PS T ]
≤Pr{εH ≤ ǫb}
Pr{εH ≤ ǫb}EF
′ ,G′ ,H|εH≤ǫb I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H , PS T ]
+
Pr{εH > ǫb}
Pr{εH ≤ ǫb}EF
′ ,G′ ,H|εH>ǫb I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H , PS T ]
=
1
Pr{εH ≤ ǫb}EF
′ ,G′ ,H I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H , PS T ]
≤ 1
1 − ǫ1 EF
′ ,G′ ,H I(S I; Z)[PZ|V , ˜ΛF′ ,G′ ,H , PS T ]
≤ǫ2ǫI/2T
for every I, where EF′ ,G′ ,H|εH≤ǫb denotes the expectation under
the condition εH ≤ ǫb. The final inequality follows from (171).
Since the above choice of F′, G′ and H′ is restricted to the set
{( f ′, g′, h′)|εh ≤ ǫb}, due to Markov inequality, the probability
of choosing F′, G′ and H′ making (174) simultaneously for
all I ( {1, . . . , T } is not less than 1 − ǫ2.
Further, when the channel is given as the n-fold dis-
crete memoryless extension PnZ|V of PZ|V , the quantity
E0(ρ|PnZ|V , Pmix,Vn) is simplified to nE0(ρ|PZ|V , Pmix,V). Hence,
similar to the regular case of Subsection XI-A, we can
calculate the right hand side of (173) by the bisection method
[4, Algorithm 4.1].
XII. Channel-Universal Coding for SecureMultiplex
Coding with CommonMessages
In order to treat universal coding for the multiplex coding
with common messages, we introduce the universally attain-
able exponents of the multiplex coding with common messages
in the n-fold discrete memoryless setting by adjusting the
original definition for the BCD given by Körner and Sgarro
[24]. Similar to Subsection X-B, in this section, we employ
T + 1-th message S T+1 as a dummy message subject to the
uniform distribution, and assume that the T + 1-th message
S T+1,n is subject to the uniform distribution. We simplify
PS T ,n ×PS T+1,n by PS T ,n . For a subset I ( {1, . . . , T }, we denote
the complementary set in {1, . . . , T } by Ic and simplify the set
Ic ∪ {T + 1} to Ic,∗.
In order to treat universal coding for secure multiplex coding
with common messages, we focus on 2T+1 − 2 functions to
express the evaluations of the exponential decreasing rates of
decoding error probabilities and the asymptotic evaluations of
leaked information. For describing bounds of the exponential
decreasing rates of both decoding error probabilities, we need
two functions. For treating the asymptotic evaluations of
leaked information, we need 2T+1 − 4 functions because the
number of non-empty proper subsets I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }
is 2T − 2 and we treat the exponential decreasing rates
and the information leakage rates of leaked information for
respective non-empty proper subsets I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }.
Then, we need to treat 2T+1 − 2 functions. Since we do not
assume the uniformity, we cannot describe our bounds of
the exponential decreasing rate and the information leakage
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rate of leaked information as functions of the rate tuples (Rp,
Rc, (Ri)i=0,1,...,T,T+1). In the following discussion, we treat our
bound of the exponential decreasing rate of leaked information
for a non-empty proper subset I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T } as a
function of H2(Ic,∗), Rc, and R0 as well as the channel W.
Similarly, we treat our bound of the information leakage rate
of leaked information for a non-empty proper subset I(, ∅) (
{1, . . . , T } as a function of Hlog(Ic,∗), Rc, and R0 as well as the
channel W. Our bounds of the exponential decreasing rates of
both decoding error probabilities are described as functions of
Rp, Rc, and the channel W. Hence, the outcomes of the above
2T+1−2 functions are decided by 2T+1−1 real numbers Rp, Rc,
R0, and (H2(Ic,∗), Hlog(Ic,∗))I(,∅)({1,...,T } as well as the channel
W.
Definition 53: A set of functions (Eb, Ee, (EI+ , EI−)I({1,...,T })
from R2T+1−1≥0 × W(X, Y × Z) to R2
T+1−2
≥0 is said to be a
universally attainable set of exponents and information leakage
rate for the family W(X, Y × Z) if for any ǫ > 0 and any
rate tuples (Rp, Rc, (Ri)i=0,1,...,T ), there exist a sufficiently large
integer N and a sequence of codes ϕn of length n satisfying the
following conditions: (1) The i-th secret message set Si,n of the
code ϕn has cardinality enRi for i = 1, . . . , T , and the common
message sets S0,n has cardinality enR0 . (2) Any sequence of
joint distributions PS T ,n for all of the i-th secret S i,n on Si,n
and the common message S 0,n on S0,n satisfies the inequalities
Pb[Wn, ϕn, PS T+∞,n ] ≤ exp(−n[Eb(Rp,Rc,R0,W) − ǫ]), (175)
Pe[Wn, ϕn, PS T+∞,n ] ≤ exp(−n[Ee(Rp,Rc,R0,W) − ǫ]), (176)
and
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Wn, ϕn, PS T+∞,n ]
≥EI+(Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T },W), (177)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Wn, ϕn, PS T+∞,n ]
≤EI−(Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T },W), (178)
hold for any channel W ∈ W(X, Y × Z), any non-empty
proper subset I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }, and any n ≥ N.
Here, Eb(Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T },W) and
Ee(Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T },W) are abbre-
viated to Eb(Rp,Rc,R0, ,W) and Ee(Rp,Rc,R0,W) because they
do not depend on
(H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T }.
For the reason why we employ the limiting forms in (177)
and (178), see Remark 60. Note that we do not consider here
the universality for source while Körner and Sgarro [24] show
the universality for source as well as that for channel, as
reviewed in Theorem 13 of this paper. In order to guarantee the
secrecy for SI,n, we need sufficient randomness of SIc ,n. That
is, the secrecy of SI,n depends on H2(Ic) and Hlog(Ic), which
depends on the source distribution. Hence, it is impossible to
show the universality for source in SMC.
We fix a distribution QVU on U×V and a channel Ξ : V →
X. Then, we present a universally attainable set of exponents
and leaked information rate in terms of QVU and Ξ in the
following way. Given a broadcast W : X → Y×Z and the real
numbers (Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T }), the tu-
ple of exponents and information leakage rate are given as
Eb =Eb(Rp,Rc,R0,W)
:= ˜Eb(Rp,Rc, (WY ◦ Ξ) × QVU), (179)
Ee =Ee(Rp,Rc,R0,W)
:= ˜Ee(Rc, (WZ ◦ Ξ) × QVU), (180)
EI+ =E
I
+(Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T },W)
:= ˜El(H2(Ic,∗) − Rc + R0, (WZ ◦ Ξ) × QVU), (181)
EI− =E
I
−(Rp,Rc,R0, (H2(I′c,∗), Hlog(I′c,∗))I′(,∅)({1,...,T },W)
:=I(V; Z|U)[(WZ ◦ Ξ) × QVU] − Hlog(Ic,∗) + Rc − R0
(182)
for a non-empty proper subset I(, ∅) ( {1, . . . , T }, where
˜Eb, ˜Ee, ˜EE0 , and ˜El are given by (29), (30), (22), and (24),
respectively.
Hence, our quadruple of exponents and information leakage
rate depends on QVU and Ξ.
Theorem 54 (Extension of [24, Theorem 1, part (a)]):
Eqs. (179)–(182) are universally attainable rates of exponents
and information leakage rate in the sense of Definition 53.
Proof: In the proof, since we treat the channel WZ ◦ Ξ :
V → Z, we abbreviate it as WZ . First, we give the outline
of our proof. We shall modify the constant composition code
used by Körner and Sgarro [24]. We do not evaluate the
decoding error probability, because that of our code is not
larger than that given in [24]. Observe that our exponents in
Eqs. (179) and (180) are the same as [24] with the channel
WZ = WZ ◦Ξ. We shall evaluate only the mutual information.
For this purpose, we prepare general notations and properties
of type and conditional type in Step (1). Next, in Steps (2)
and (3), we prepare several notations and properties of type
and conditional type that are specific to our proof. In Step
(4), we apply the random coding and evaluate the leaked
information when the channel is given by the conditional
types. Then, we choose a code whose leaked information is
evaluated for all conditional types and whose error is evaluated
for all discrete memoryless channels. In Step (5), we evaluate
the leaked information under the above chosen code for all
discrete memoryless channels.
Step (1): Preparation of general notations and properties of
type and conditional type:
For the following construction of our code, we prepare
general notations for types. These notations will be used also
in the next section. For a given type QU of length n on a set
U, we define the set Tn(QU) as
Tn(QU) :={un ∈ Un|the type of un is QU}.
Hence, for a given type QVU of length n on a set V×U, the
set Tn(QVU) is written as
Tn(QVU) ={(un, vn) ∈ Vn ×Un|the type of (vn, un) is QVU }.
The marginal distribution QU overU of the type QVU of length
n on the set V×U is a type of length n on the set U. Given
a type QV of length n on the set U, we define the set of
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conditional types on the set V with respect to QV as
Tn,V(QU)
:={probability transition matrix W from U to V
|W × QU is a type of length n on a set V×U}.
The cardinality |Tn,V(QU)| is upper bounded as [8]
|Tn,V(QU)| ≤ (n + 1)|V×U|. (183)
In particular, given a type QVU of length n on the set V×U, we
define the conditional type QV |U such that QVU = QV |U × QU .
We also define the set Tn(QV |U)Un=un as
Tn(QV |U)Un=un :={vn ∈ Vn|the type of (vn, un) is QVU}.
We denote the uniform distribution Pmix,Tn(QU ) on Tn(QU) by
Υn(QU). Then, for a given type QVU of length n on a set V×
U, Υn(QVU) represents the uniform distribution Pmix,Tn(QVU ) on
Tn(QVU). Further, for an arbitrary W ∈ Tn,V(QU), Υn(W×QU)
represents the uniform distribution on Tn(W × QU). Then, we
define the probability transition matrix Υn(W) from Vn to Un
such that Υn(W) × Υn(QU) = Υn(W × QU).
When PVnUn is a distribution over Vn × Un and invariant
under the permutation of the indices, the distribution PVnUn
can be written as
PVnUn =
∑
QVU
λPVnUn (QVU)Υn(QVU) (184)
with non-negative constants λ(QVU). In particular, the inde-
pendent and identical distribution PnV of PV can be written
as
PnV =
∑
QV
λPnV (QV )Υn(QV ) (185)
with
λPnV (QV) = PnV (Tn(QV )) ≤ e−nD(QV ‖PV ). (186)
When the marginal distribution over Un of PVnUn can be
written as Pmix,Tn(QU ) = Υn(QU) with a type QU on the set
U, we have
PVnUn =
∑
QV |U∈Tn,V(QU )
λPVnUn (QV |U × QU)Υn(QV |U × QU )
=
∑
QV |U∈Tn,V(QU )
λPVnUn (QV |U × QU)(Υn(QV |U) × Υn(QU))
=
( ∑
QV |U∈Tn,V (QU )
λPVnUn (QV |U × QU)Υn(QV |U)
)
× Υn(QU).
(187)
We define the channel PVn|Un by PVnUn = PVn |Un × Υn(QU)
and the real number λPVn |Un (QV |U) := λPVnUn (QV |U × QU) for
QV |U ∈ Tn,V(QU). Then, we obtain
PVn |Un =
∑
QV |U∈Tn,V(QU )
λPVn |Un (QV |U)Υn(QV |U). (188)
Now, we consider the n-fold discrete memoryless channel
PnV |U . For a given type QU on the set U, we apply the relation
(187) to the joint distribution PnV |U |Tn(QU )×Υn(QU). Then, (188)
implies that
PnV |U |Tn(QU ) =
∑
QV |U∈Tn,V (QU )
λPnV |U (QV |U)Υn(QV |U). (189)
Choosing un ∈ Tn(QU), we have
Υn(Q′V |U)(Tn(QV |U)Un=un |Un = un) =
{
1 if Q′V |U = QV |U
0 otherwise.
(190)
Combining (189) and (190), we obtain
λPnV |U (QV |U)
=PnV |U |Tn(QU )(Tn(QV |U)Un=un |Un = un)
=
∏
u∈U
(PV |U=u)nQU (u)(Tnu(QV |U=u))
≤e−
∑
u∈U nQU (u)D(QV |U=u ‖PV |U=u ) (191)
=e−nD(QV |U ‖PV |U |QU ), (192)
where (191) follows from (186).
Step (2): Preparation of notations and properties of condi-
tional types based on a joint type on U ×V:
In this step, we prepare several important properties based
on a type of length n on the set U ×V ×Z. Now, we focus
on a conditional type WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU), which gives a type
WZ × QVU of length n on the set U × V × Z. Note that in
order to make a type of length n on the set U ×V × Z, we
need to choose WZ not from Tn,Z(QV ) but from Tn,Z(QVU).
Now, we treat the channel WZ as a channel from V × U to
Z while the output distribution of the channel WZ does not
depend on the choice of u ∈ U. In our code ϕa,n, the random
variable VnUn takes values in the subset Tn(QVU). Hence, it
is sufficient to treat the channel whose input alphabet is the
subset Tn(QVU) of Vn×Un. Based on (189), we make a convex
decomposition
WZ,n|Tn(QVU ) =
∑
WZ∈Tn,Z(QVU )
λn,T (WZ)Υn(WZ), (193)
with non-negative constants λn,T (WZ). Then, due to (192), we
have
λn,T (WZ) ≤ e−nD(WZ‖W
Z |QVU ). (194)
For an arbitrary code ϕa,n, the joint convexity of the condi-
tional relative entropy yields that
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤
∑
WZ∈Tn,Z(QVU )
λn,T (WZ)I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ), ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ].
(195)
Next, in order to treat each channel Υn(WZ), we fix a
conditional type WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU) and study the properties of
the channel Υn(WZ). Under the joint type QZVU := WZ ×QVU ,
we define the numbers
N(U) := |Tn(QU)|, N(UZ) := |Tn((WZ ◦ QV |U) × QU)|,
N(VU) := |Tn(QVU)|, N(VUZ) := |Tn(WZ × QVU)|,
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and
N(Z|U) := N(UZ)/N(U), N(V |UZ) := N(VUZ)/N(UZ),
N(V |U) := N(VU)/N(U), N(Z|VU) := N(VUZ)/N(VU).
Then, due to [8], we have
|Tn,Z(QU)|−1enH(Z|U)[WZ×QVU ] ≤ N(Z|U) ≤ enH(Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]
(196)
|Tn,Z(QVU)|−1enH(Z|VU)[WZ×QVU ] ≤ N(Z|VU) ≤ enH(Z|VU)[WZ×QVU ].
(197)
Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 55: Any conditional type WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU) satisfies
E0(ρ|Υn(WZ), PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU ), Pmix,Tn(QU ))
=ρ log N(Z|U)
N(Z|VU) (198)
=ρI(V; Z|U)[Υn(WZ) × Pmix,Tn(QVU )] (199)
≤nρI(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU] + ρ log |Tn,Z(QVU)| (200)
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1). Here PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU ) is defined as a special
case of Eq.(1).
Proof: Under the joint type QZVU := WZ × QVU , since
Υn(WZ) = PZn |VnUn ,mix,Tn(QZVU ), we obtain
eE0(ρ|Υn(W
Z ),PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
=eE0(ρ|PZn |VnUn ,mix,Tn (QZVU ),PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
=
∑
un∈Tn(QU )
1
N(U)
∑
zn∈Tn(QZ|U )Un=un )
(
∑
v∈Tn(QV |ZU )Zn Un=(zn ,un ))
PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU )(vn|un)
· (PZn |VnUn ,mix,Tn(QZVU )(zn|vn, un)) 11−ρ
)1−ρ
=
∑
un∈Tn(QU )
1
N(U)
∑
zn∈Tn(QZ|U )Un=un )
(
∑
v∈Tn(QV |ZU )Zn Un=(zn ,un ))
1
N(V |U) (
1
N(Z|VU) )
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
=N(U) 1
N(U) N(Z|U)(N(V |UZ)
1
N(V |U)(
1
N(Z|VU) )
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=
N(ZU)ρN(VU)ρ
N(VUZ)ρN(U)ρ =
N(Z|U)ρ
N(Z|VU)ρ ,
which implies (198). Since
log N(Z|U) − log N(Z|VU)
=H(Z|U)[Υn(WZ) × Pmix,Tn(QVU )]
− H(Z|VU)[Υn(WZ) × Pmix,Tn(QVU )]
=I(V; Z|U)[Υn(WZ) × Pmix,Tn(QVU )],
we obtain (199). Combining (196) and (197), we obtain (200).
Step (3): Preparation of notations and properties concerning
conditional types based on a type on V:
In this step, we focus only on a convex decomposition
different from (193). For a given type QV of length n on a
set V, we focus on the set
Wn,Z(QV ) :={Υn(WZ)|WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QV )}.
In our code ϕa,n, the random variable Vn takes values in the
subset Tn(QV ). Hence, if we focus on the set Vn as inputs, it
is sufficient to treat the channel whose input alphabet is the
subset Tn(QV ) of Vn. Then, due to (189), we have another
type of convex combination:
WZ,n|Tn(QV ) =
∑
Θn∈Wn,Z(QV )
λn,W(Θn)Θn, (201)
where λn,W(Θn) is a non-negative constant. Then, for an
arbitrary code ϕa,n, the joint convexity of the conditional
relative entropy yields that
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤
∑
Θn∈Wn,Z(QV )
λn,W(Θn)I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Θn, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]. (202)
Next, we introduce the quantity
εn,ρ,I(WZn , QVn,Un )
:= exp
(
nρ(Rc − R0) − ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
+ E0(ρ|WZn , QVn |Un , QUn )
)
(203)
for any channel WZn fromVn to Zn and any distribution QVnUn
on Vn ×Un.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 56: Any joint type QVU of length n on a set V×U
and any channel Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ) satisfy
exp(E0(ρ|WZ,n, PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU ), Pmix,Tn(QU )))
≤(n + 1)|U|2|V| exp(E0(ρ|WZ,n, QnV |U , QnU)), (204)
λn,W (Θn)εn,ρ(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU ))
≤(n + 1)|U|2|V|εn,ρ,I(WZ,n, QV,U). (205)
We have
lim sup
n→∞
1
nρn
log εn,ρn,I(W
Z,n
, QnV,U)
≤I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU] − Hlog(Ic,∗) + Rc − R0 = EI− . (206)
with ρn = δ log nn for any δ > 0. Further, when S Ic,∗ ,n is the
uniform random number and independent of S I,n and S 0,n,
we have
εn,ρ,I(WZ,n, QnV,U) = ε1,ρ,I(W
Z
, QV,U)n (207)
and
lim
ρ→0
[log ε1,ρ,I(WZ , QV,U)]+
ρ
= I(V; Z|U) − Rp +
∑
i∈I
Ri. (208)
The convergence in (208) is uniform.
Proof: First, we show (204). For arbitrary u ∈ U and
v ∈ V, the distribution Pmix,Tn(QVU ) satisfies
PVn |Un ,mix,Tn(QVU )(v|u) ≤ (n + 1)|U×V|QnV |U(v|u) (209)
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by [8, Lemma 2.5, Chapter 1], and
Pmix,Tn(QU )(u) ≤ (n + 1)|U|QnU (u), (210)
by [8, Lemma 2.3, Chapter 1]. Then, due to the relation (209),
and (210), Lemma 3 with C1 = (n+1)|U|2|V| yields the relation
(204).
Next, we show (205). We can also show that
λn,W (Θn)eE0(ρ|Θn,PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
=
∑
u
Pmix,Tn(QU )(u)
∑
z
(∑
v
PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU )(v|u)
·
(
λn,W (Θn)Θn(z|v)
) 1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
≤
∑
u
Pmix,Tn(QU )(u)
∑
z
(∑
v
PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU )(v|u)
·
( ∑
Θ′n∈Wn,Z(QV )
λn,W(Θ′n)Θ′n(z|v)
) 1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
=eE0 (ρ|W
Z,n
,PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU )). (211)
Combining (204) and (211), we obtain
(n + 1)|U|2|V|eE0(ρ|W
Z,n
,QnV |U ,QnU )
≥λn,W(Θn)eE0(ρ|Θn,PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU )). (212)
Due to the definition of εn,ρ(WZn , QVn,Un ), the relation (212) is
equivalent with the relation (205).
By using (16), the relation (206) can be shown as follows.
lim sup
n→∞
1
nρn
log εn,ρn,I(W
Z,n
, QnV,U)
= lim sup
n→∞
[
(Rc − R0) − 1
n
H1+ δ log n
n
(S Ic,∗ ,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
+
1
ρn
E0(ρn|WZ , QV |U , QU)
]
≤Rc − R0 − Hlog(Ic,∗) + I(V; Z|U) = EI− .
The relations (207) and (208) are trivial.
Step (4): Evaluation of the leaked information when the chan-
nel is given by the uniform distribution on a fixed conditional
type:
Recall the fixed code ϕp,n for BCD given in Theorem 13.
The message sets of the code ϕp,n are S0,n×B1,n and B2,n with
|B1,n| = en(Rc−R0) and |B2,n| = enRp . We attach the other random
coding ΛF,G,n for message S 1,n, . . . , S T,n given as Second Step
of Code Ensemble 3 in Subsection VII-C to the code ϕp,n.
That is, the encoder is given by Φa,n = (ϕp,n,ΛF,G,n). In the
following, Bob’s decoderΦb,n and Eve’s decoderΦe,n are given
as the maximum mutual information decoder. We treat the
ensemble of codes Φn := (Φa,n,Φb,n,Φe,n).
First, related to the decomposition (193), we focus on a fixed
arbitrary element WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU), We recall the discussion
in Subsection VII-D. As is mentioned in Remark 25, the
discussion in Section VII can be applied the channel WZ ,
whose output distribution depends on the element of U as well
as the element of V. Then, we apply Lemma 24 to the case
when PZ|V = WZ , G is the n-th permutation group, (U×V)o is
Tn(QUV ), and PV |U is Υn(WZ). Note that the n-th permutation
group acts on Tn(QUV ) transitively. We obtain
eψ(ρ|PZn |B1 ,B2 ,S 0=s0 ,Pmix,B1 ,B2 )
=eψ(ρ|Υn(W
Z ),PVn |Un ,mix,Imϕp ,PU,mix,Imϕp )
≤enρ(Rc−R0)+E0 (ρ|Υn(WZ ),PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU )).
Combining Lemma 21 and the above inequality, we obtain
EΦa,n exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤1 + enρ(Rc−R0)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)eE0(ρ|Υn(WZ ),PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU )).
(213)
Hence, we obtain the following relations. In the following
derivation, the first inequality follows from the convexity of
x 7→ ex. The third inequality follows from (200).
exp(ρEΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤EΦa,n exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤1 + enρ(Rc−R0)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)eE0(ρ|Υn(WZ ),PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
≤1 + |Tn,Z(QVU)|ρenρ(Rc−R0)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)enρI(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1). Taking the limit ρ→ 1 − 0, we have
exp(EΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤1 + |Tn,Z(QVU)|en(Rc−R0)−H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)enI(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ].
(214)
Since log(1 + x) ≤ x, taking the logarithm in (214), we have
EΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤ log(1 + |Tn,Z(QVU)|en(Rc−R0)−H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)enI(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ])
≤|Tn,Z(QVU)|en(Rc−R0)−H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)enI(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ].
Since log |Zn| = n log |Z| ≤ |Tn,Z(QVU)|, we have
EΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ] ≤ |Tn,Z(QVU)|.
(215)
Hence,
EΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−[H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)−n(Rc−R0+I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ])]+ .
(216)
Next, related to the decomposition (201), we focus on a
fixed arbitrary Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ). Similar to (213), Lemmas 21
and 24 yield that
EΦa,n exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Θn,Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤1 + enρ(Rc−R0)−ρH1+ρ(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)eE0(ρ|Θn,PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
=1 + εn,ρ,I(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU )). (217)
Observe that we have shown that the averages over
Φa,n of exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ]) and
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Θn,Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ] are smaller than (216) and
(217) , respectively.
Choosing p1(n) := 2T (|Tn,Z(QVU)|+ |Wn,Z(QV )|)+1, thanks
to the Markov inequality in the same as (35) and (36), given a
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fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1), we can see that there exists at least one code
ϕn such that the relations
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ), ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤p1(n)EΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤p1(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|en(Rc−R0)−H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)enI(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]
(218)
exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Θn, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤p1(n)EΦa,n exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Θn,Φa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤p1(n)(1 + εn,ρ,I(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU ))). (219)
hold for any WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU) and Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ).
Step (5): Evaluation of the leaked information when the
channel is given by discrete memoryless channel:
Using (218), we obtain
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤
∑
WZ∈Tn,Z(QVU )
λn,T (WZ)I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ), ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
(220)
≤
∑
WZ∈Tn,Z(QVU )
[
λn,T (WZ)p1(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|
· e−[H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)−n(Rc−R0+I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ])]+
]
(221)
≤
∑
WZ∈Tn,Z(QVU )
[
p1(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|
· e−nD(WZ‖W
Z |QVU )−[H2(S Ic,∗ ,n |S I,n,S 0,n)−n(Rc−R0+I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ])]+
]
(222)
≤
∑
WZ∈Tn,Z(QVU )
p1(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−Kn(W
Z
,QVU ,Rc,R0|S ) (223)
=p1(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|2e−Kn(W
Z
,QVU ,Rc,R0|S ), (224)
where Kn(WZ , QVU ,Rc,R0|S ) is defined as
Kn(WZ , QVU ,Rc,R0|S )
:=min
WZ
[
nD(WZ‖WZ |QVU) +
[
H2(S Ic,∗ ,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
− n(Rc − R0 + I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU])
]
+
]
,
and (220), (221), and (222) follow from (195), (218), and
(194), respectively.
Hence,
lim inf
n→∞
−1
n
log I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
min
WZ
[
nD(WZ‖WZ |QVU) +
[
H2(S Ic,∗,n|S I,n, S 0,n)
− n(Rc − R0 + I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU])
]
+
]
=min
WZ
[
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU)
+
[
H2(Ic,∗) − Rc + R0 − I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU])
]
+
]
=EI+ (225)
Next, defining
p2(n) := p1(n)(n + 1)|U|2|V||Wn,Z(QV )|, (226)
we obtain the following inequalities, in which, the first,
second, and third inequalities follow from the convexity of
function x 7→ exp(x) and (202), (219), and (205), respectively.
The final equation follows from (226).
exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤
∑
Θn∈Wn,Z(QV )
λn,W(Θn) exp(ρI(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Wn, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ])
≤
∑
Θn∈Wn,Z(QV )
λn,W(Θn)p1(n)(1 + εn,ρ,I(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU )))
≤
∑
Θn∈Wn,Z(QV )
p1(n)(n + 1)|U|2|V|(1 + εn,ρ,I(WZ,n, QV,U))
=p1(n)|Wn,Z(QV )|(n + 1)|U|2|V|(1 + εn,ρ,I(WZ,n, QV,U))
=p2(n)(1 + εn,ρ,I(WZ,n, QV,U)). (227)
Taking the logarithm, we have
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ]
≤ log p2(n)(1 + εn,ρ,I(W
Z,n
, QV,U))
ρ
≤ log(2p2(n))
ρ
+
[log εn,ρ,I(WZ,n, QV,U)]+
ρ
. (228)
Now, we have
lim
n→∞
log(2p2(n))
n · δ log n
n
= lim
n→∞
log(2p2(n))
δ log n
=
deg(p2)
δ
, (229)
where deg(p2) is the degree of the polynomial p2. Due to
(206) in Lemma 56, (228), and (229), choosing ρn = δ log nn ,
we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ] ≤
deg(p2)
δ
+ EI−.
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[WZ,n, ϕa,n, PS T+∞,n ] ≤ EI− . (230)
Therefore, using (225) and (230), we can see that (Eb, Ee, EI+ ,
EI−) is a universally attainable quadruple of exponents in the
sense of Definition 53.
Remark 57: One might consider that if we apply the
random coding of Theorem 20 to the uniform distri-
bution Pmix,Tn(QVU ), we obtain a better exponent. How-
ever, this method yields the same exponent because
ψ(ρ|Υn(WZ), PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU ), Pmix,Tn(QU )) is the same as
E0(ρ|Υn(WZ), PVn|Un ,mix,Tn(QVU ), Pmix,Tn(QU )), which is shown as
eψ(ρ|Υn(W
Z ),PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
=
∑
u∈Tn(QU )
1
N(U)
∑
v∈Tn(QV |U=u )[
1
N(V |U)
∑
z∈Tn(QZ|VU=(u,v) )
( 1
N(Z|VU) )
1+ρ( 1
N(Z|U) )
−ρ
]
=
N(Z|U)ρ
N(Z|VU)ρ .
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XIII. Source-Channel Universal Coding for BCC
Now, we introduce the concept of “source-channel universal
code for BCC” for the n-fold discrete memoryless extension
of a discrete channel. In a realistic setting, we do not have
statistical knowledge of the sources and the channel, precisely.
In order to treat such a case, we have to make a code whose
performance is guaranteed independently of the statistical
properties of the sources and the channel. Such a kind of
universality is called source-channel universality, and studied
for the case of BCD [24]. For the case of wire-tap channel,
the source universality is divided into two parts. One is the
source universality for decoding error probability and the other
is that for the leaked information. The paper [26] studied the
latter part. Although the transmission rates are characterized
by the pair (R0,R1), in order to make a code achieving the
capacity region of BCC, we employ other two parameters Rc
and Rp that satisfy R0 ≤ Rc and R0 + R1 ≤ Rc + Rp. Hence, in
the following definition of a universally attainable quadruple
of exponents and leaked information rate, we focus on the set
R4BCC := {(Rp,Rc,R0,R1) ∈ (R+)4|R0 ≤ Rc, R0 +R1 ≤ Rc +Rp}.
Definition 58: A set of functions (Eb, Ee, E+, E−) from
R4BCC × W(X, Y × Z) to R4≥0 is said to be a universally
attainable quadruple of exponents and leaked information rate
for the family of channels W(X, Y × Z) and for sources if
for ǫ > 0 and (Rp,Rc,R0,R1) ∈ R4BCC, there exist a sufficiently
large integer N and a sequence of codes Φn of length n satis-
fying the following conditions. (1) The confidential message
set Sn of the code Φn has cardinality enR1 and the common
message set En of the code Φn has cardinality enR0 . (2) The
inequalities
Pb[Wn,Φn, PS n,En ] ≤ exp(−n[Eb(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) − ǫ]),
(231)
Pe[Wn,Φn, PS n,En ] ≤ exp(−n[Ee(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) − ǫ]),
(232)
and
I(S n; Zn|En)[Wn,Φn, PS n,En ]
≤max
[
exp(−n[El+(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) − ǫ]),
n[El−(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) + ǫ]
]
(233)
hold for any sequence of joint distributions PS n,En for the
confidential message S n on Sn and the common message En
on En, and the n-th memoryless extension Wn of any channel
W ∈ W(X, Y ×Z) and n ≥ N.
Then, given a distribution QVU on U × V and a channel
(probability transition matrix) Ξ : V → X, we present a
universally attainable quadruple of exponents and leaked in-
formation rate as follows. Given rates (Rp,Rc,R0,R1) ∈ (R+)4
and a broadcast W ∈ W(X, Y×Z), the quadruple Eb, Ee, El+
and El− are given as
Eb =Eb(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) := ˜Eb(Rp,Rc, (W ◦ Ξ) × QVU),
(234)
Ee =Ee(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) := ˜Ee(Rc, (W ◦ Ξ) ◦ QVU), (235)
El+ =El+(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) := ˜El(Rp − R1, (W ◦ Ξ) × QVU),
(236)
El− =El−(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) := I(V; Z|U) − Rp + R1. (237)
Theorem 59 (Extension of [24, Theorem 1, part (a)]):
Eqs. (234)–(237) are source-channel universally attainable
rates of exponents and information leakage rate in the sense
of Definition 58.
Therefore, our source-channel universal code attaining Eqs.
(234)–(237) depends on Rp, Rc, the distribution QVU on U×V,
and the channel Ξ : V → X.
We prove Theorem 59 by expurgating the messages in
the code given in Theorem 54. The outline of the proof is
as follows: First, in Step (1), similar to Theorem 54, we
evaluate the leaked information when the channel is given
by the conditional types and the source obeys the uniform
distribution. Then, for a given code in Step (1), we expurgate
the common message En in Step (2) and the secret message
S n in Step (3). We evaluate the leaked information of the
expurgated code for an arbitrary source distribution and an
arbitrary conditional type in Step (4). Based on this evaluation,
we evaluate the leaked information of the expurgated code
for an arbitrary source distribution and an arbitrary discrete
memoryless channel in Step (5).
In the following proof, we assume that the secret message
S n and the common message En obey the uniform distributions
on Sn and En. However, expurgations S ′n and E′n of the secret
message S n and the common message En are allowed to obey
arbitrary distributions.
Step (1): Evaluation of the leaked information when the chan-
nel is given as the uniform distribution on a fixed conditional
type:
Recall the fixed code ϕp,n for BCD given in Theorem 13.
The code ϕp,n has the private message set S0,n × B1,n and
the common message set B2,n. We attach the random coding
ΛF,G,n for message S 1,n, . . . , S T,n given as Second Step of Code
Ensemble 3 in Subsection VII-C to the code ϕp,n when T = 2,
S 1,n = S n, S 0,n = En, and S 2,n is the random number subject
to the uniform distribution, which is used as the dummy for
making S n secret for Eve. The uniformity of the distribution
guarantees that
H1+ρ(S 2,n|S 1,n, S 0,n) = n(Rc + Rp − R1 − R2) (238)
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the encoder is given by Φa,n =
(ϕp,n,ΛF,G,n). In the following, Bob’s decoder Φb,n and Eve’s
decoderΦe,n are given as the maximum mutual information de-
coder. We treat the ensemble of codes Φn := (Φa,n,Φb,n,Φe,n).
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For an arbitrary Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ) and an arbitrary ρ ∈ (0, 1),
the combination of Lemmas 21 and 24 yields that
EΦa,n
∑
e
PEn (e)
∑
s
PS n |En (s|e)
· exp(ρD(PZn |S n=s,En=e,Φa,n‖PZn |En=e,Φa,n )[Θn])
≤1 + enρ(R1−Rp)eE0(Θn ,PVn |Un ,mix,Tn (QVU ),Pmix,Tn (QU ))
=1 + εn,ρ,{1}(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU )), (239)
where D(PZn |S n=s,En=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e,ϕa,n)[Θn] denotes the relative
entropy D(PZn |S n=s,En=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e,ϕa,n ) when the channel is
Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV).
The relations (238) and (216) with T = 2 yield
EΦa,n I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ),Φa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−n[Rp−R1−I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]]+ . (240)
Thanks to the Markov inequality in the same way as (35) and
(36), given a fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1), due to (239) and (240), we
can see that there exists at least one code ϕa,n such that the
relations
I(S I,n; Zn|S 0,n)[Υn(WZ), ϕa,n, PS T ,n ]
≤p1(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−n[Rp−R1−I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]]+ , (241)∑
e
PEn (e)
∑
s
PS n|En (s|e)
· exp(ρD(PZn|S n=s,En=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e,ϕa,n )[Θn])
≤p1(n)(1 + εn,ρ,{1}(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU ))) (242)
hold for any WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU) and Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ).
Step (2): Expurgation for common message En:
We choose p3(n) := 2p1(n). When e is randomly chosen
from En subject to the uniform distribution, the element e
satisfies all of the following conditions at least with probability
of 1 − p1(n)/p3(n) = 12 . The relations∑
s
PS n|En (s|e) exp(ρD(PZn|S n=s,En=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e,ϕa,n)[Θn])
≤p1(n)p3(n)(1 + εn,ρ,{1}(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU ))),∑
s
PS n|En (s|e)D(PZn|S n=s,En=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e,ϕa,n )[Υn(WZ)]
=I(S n; Zn)[Υn(WZ), ϕa,n, Pmix,Sn |En=e]
≤p1(n)p3(n)|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−n[Rp−R1−I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]]+ (243)
hold for any elements WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU) and Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ),
and n ≥ N. Thus, there exist |En|/2 elements e ∈ En satisfies
the above conditions. So, we denote the set of such elements
by E′n.
Step (3): Expurgation for secret message S n:
Then, when s is randomly chosen from Sn subject to the
uniform distribution, the element s satisfies all of the following
conditions at least with probability of 1−p1(n)/p3(n) ≥ 12 : The
relations
exp(ρD(PZn|S n=s,En=e′,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e′,ϕa,n )[Θn])
≤p1(n)p3(n)2(1 + εn,ρ,{1}(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU )), (244)
D(PZn |S n=s,En=e′ ,ϕa,n‖PZn |En=e′,ϕa,n )[Υn(WZ)]
≤p1(n)p3(n)2|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−n[Rp−R1−I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]]+ (245)
hold for any elements e′ ∈ E′n, WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU), Θn ∈
Wn,Z(QV), and n ≥ N. Thus, there exist |Sn|/2 elements
s ∈ Sn satisfies the above conditions. So, we denote the set of
such elements by S′n.
Step (4): Universal code that works for all sources when
the channel is given as the uniform distribution on a fixed
conditional type:
In the following discussion, PS ′n,E′n is an arbitrary joint
distribution of the random variables S ′n and E′n on S′n×E′n. For
a given e ∈ E′n, we consider two kinds of marginal distributions
of Zn as follows.
PZn |E′n=e,ϕa,n =
∑
s∈Sn
PS n(s)PZn |S n=s,E′n=e,ϕa,n
P′Zn |E′n=e,ϕa,n :=
∑
s′∈Sn
PS ′n |E′n (s′|e)PZn|S n=s,E′n=e,ϕa,n .
The former marginal distribution is discussed in Steps (1), (2),
and (3). Hence, using (54) and (245), we obtain
I(S ′n; Zn|E′n)[Υn(WZ), ϕa,n, PS ′n,E′n ]
=
∑
e∈E′n
PE′n (e)D(PZn,S ′n|E′n=e,ϕa,n‖P′Zn |E′n=e,ϕa,n × PS ′n|E′n=e)[Υn(WZ)]
≤
∑
e∈E′n
PE′n (e)D(PZn,S ′n|E′n=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |E′n=e,ϕa,n × PS ′n|E′n=e)[Υn(WZ)]
=
∑
e∈E′n
PE′n (e)
∑
s∈Sn
[
PS ′n |E′n (s|e)
· D(PZn |S ′n=s,E′n=e,ϕa,n‖PZn |E′n=e,ϕa,n)[Υn(WZ)]
]
≤p1(n)p3(n)2|Tn,Z(QVU)|e−n[Rp−R1−I(V;Z|U)[WZ×QVU ]]+ , (246)
for any elements WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU), Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ), and n ≥
N. Similarly, using the convexity of x 7→ ex, (54), (244), and
(245), we obtain
eρI(S
′
n;Zn |E′n)[Θn ,ϕa,n,PS ′n ,E′n ]
≤
∑
e∈E′n
PE′n (e)e
ρD(PZn ,S ′n |E′n=e,ϕa,n ‖P′Zn |E′n=e,ϕa,n×PS ′n |E′n=e)[Θn]
≤
∑
e∈E′n
PE′n (e)eρD(PZn ,S ′n |E′n=e,ϕa,n ‖PZn |E′n=e,ϕa,n×PS ′n |E′n=e)[Θn]
≤
∑
e∈E′n
PE′n (e)
∑
s∈Sn
PS ′n|E′n (s|e)eρD(PZn |S ′n=s,E′n=e,ϕa,n ‖PZn |E′n=e,ϕa,n )[Θn]
≤p1(n)p3(n)2(1 + εn,ρ,{1}(Θn, Pmix,Tn(QVU ))) (247)
for any elements WZ ∈ Tn,Z(QVU), Θn ∈ Wn,Z(QV ), and n ≥
N.
Step (5): Evaluation of leaked information for all sources and
all discrete memoryless channels:
Similar to (224) and (227), defining p4(n) :=
p1(n)p3(n)2|Tn,Z(QVU)|2 and p5(n) := p2(n)p3(n)2 and
using (246) and (247), we obtain
I(S ′n; Zn|E′n)[W
Z,n
, ϕa,n, PS ′n,E′n ] ≤p4(n)e−nE
l
+(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W),
(248)
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and
exp(ρI(S ′n; Zn|E′n)[W
Z,n
, ϕa,n, PS ′n,E′n ])
≤p5(n)(1 + εn,ρ,{1}(WZ,n, QnV,U))
=p5(n)(1 + ε1,ρ,{1}(WZ , QV,U)n) (249)
for any sequence of joint distributions PS ′n,E′n and n ≥ N.
Using (248), for an arbitrary ǫ > 0, we can choose an integer
N1 such that
log I(S ′n; Zn|E′n)[W
Z,n
, ϕa,n, PS ′n,E′n ]
≤ − n(El+(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) − ǫ) (250)
for n ≥ N1. Due to (249), we obtain
1
n
I(S ′n; Zn|E′n)[W
Z,n
, ϕa,n, PS ′n,E′n ]
≤ log p5(n) + log(1 + ε1,ρ,{1}(W
Z
, QV,U)n)
nρ
≤ log p5(n) + log 2 + log ε1,ρ,{1}(W
Z
, QV,U)n)
nρ
≤ log 2p5(n)
nρ
+
log ε1,ρ,{1}(WZ , QV,U))
ρ
. (251)
When ρ = 1√
n
, as is mentioned in Lemma 56, the RHS of
(251) converges El−(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) uniformly. Hence, for
an arbitrary ǫ > 0, we can choose an integer N2 such that
I(S ′n; Zn|E′n)[W
Z,n
, ϕa,n, PS ′n,E′n ]
≤n(El−(Rp,Rc,R0,R1,W) + ǫ) (252)
for n ≥ N2.
Therefore, since the original code ϕp,n satisfies (39) and
(40), using (250) and (252), we can see that (Eb, Ee, El+, El−)
is a universally attainable quadruple of exponents in the sense
of Definition 58.
Remark 60: In this section, we treat the leaked informa-
tion asymptotically as (233). However, in Section XII, we
have treated it non-asymptotically as (177) and (178). The
difference is caused by the condition for the sequence of
joint distributions PST ,n . In Section XII, we do not assume
the uniformity. However, in this section, we can use uniform
distribution of S 2,n. Hence, we can calculate the relative Rényi
entropy as (238) non-asymptotically.
Remark 61: Here, we remark the relation with the discus-
sion for secure multiplex coding in [22, Section IV-D]. The
preceding paper [22] showed the existence of the code ϕn
satisfying that
max
s
D(PZn |S i=si,ϕn‖PZn,ϕn) → 0 (253)
when there is no common message En and the random
variables S 1, . . . , S T obey the uniform distribution. However,
to show the source universality for leaked information in
secure multiplex coding we need to evaluate the above value
when the random variables S 1, . . . , S T do not necessarily obey
the uniform distribution. In this section, we show the source
universality for leaked information for S 1 by assuming the
uniformity of the other random variable S 2. Although this
method brings us the source universality for BCC, it cannot
derive the source universality for secure multiplex coding.
XIV. Comparison of Exponents of Leaked Information
In this section, we compare the exponent of leaked infor-
mation given in Sections XII and XIII and the exponents of
leaked information given in Subsection X-B when the source
distribution PS T ,n is uniform. First, in Subsection XIV-A, we
compare the exponent given in Sections XII and XIII with the
above mentioned exponent. Then, we clarify that the exponent
in Sections XII and XIII is greater than one of exponents in
Subsection X-B, which is the same as that in [19]. Next, in
Subsection XIV-B, we give equality conditions between two
exponents. In the remaining subsections, we give proofs of
Lemmas used in Subsections XIV-A and XIV-B.
A. Comparison between Two Exponents ˜El(R,WZ ×QVU) and
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU)
First, we characterize the exponent ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) =
supρ∈(0,1) ρR − E0(ρ|W
Z
, QV |U , QU), which describes the ex-
ponent of leaked information when R is Rp − ∑i∈I Ri and
the source distribution PS T ,n is uniform, as is shown in
Subsection X-B. The exponent can be attained by the code
constructed in the second construction (Subsection VII-C).
Since E0(ρ|WZ , QV |U , QU) is convex with respect to ρ [12],
Fρ(QV |U , QU) := ddρE0(ρ|W
Z
, QV |U , QU) is monotonically in-
creasing with respect to ρ. As limits, we define
F1(QV |U , QU) := lim
ρ→1−0
Fρ(QV |U , QU) (254)
E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU) := lim
ρ→1−0
E0(ρ|WZ , QV |U , QU). (255)
In particular, when QVU equal QV × QU , ˜El(R,WZ ×
QVU), ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU), and the above values depend
only on QV . Then, ˜El(R,WZ × QVU), ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU ),
E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU), F1(QV |U , QU), and Fρ(QV |U , QU) are sim-
plified to ˜El(R,WZ × QV ), ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ), E0(1|WZ , QV ),
F1(QV ), and Fρ(QV ). Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 62: (1) Case of R < F1(QV |U , QU). There uniquely
exists ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that R = Fρ(QV |U , QU). Then, the
exponent ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU ) can be characterized as
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) = ρ0R − E0(ρ0|WZ , QV |U , QU). (256)
(2) Case of R ≥ F1(QV |U , QU). The exponent ˜EE0 (R,WZ×QVU)
can be characterized as
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) = R − E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU). (257)
The quantities appearing in Lemma 62 can be characterized
by Lemma 63, which is displayed in the wide space in the next
page.
The proof of Lemma 63 will be given in Subsection XIV-D.
For a detail analysis for the exponent ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU), we
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Lemma 63: The quantities Fρ(QV |U , QU), F1(QV |U , QU), and E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU) are calculated as
Fρ(QV |U , QU) =
∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v
1
1−ρ (log W
Z(z|v))QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )(∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
−
∑
u QU(u)
∑
z log(
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )(∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
. (258)
F1(QV |U , QU) = −
∑
u QU(u)
∑
z log(
∑
v∈Vz QV |U(v|u)) maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)∑
z maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
(259)
E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU) = log
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
z
max
v∈supp(QV |U=u )
WZ(z|v). (260)
In particular, Fρ(QV ), F1(QV ), and E0(1|WZ , QV) are simplified to
Fρ(QV ) =
∑
z(
∑
v
1
1−ρ (log W
Z(z|v))QV(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )(∑v QV (v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z(
∑
v QV (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
−
∑
z log(
∑
v QV (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )(∑v QV (v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ∑
z(
∑
v QV (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
.
=
∑
z,v( 11−ρ (log W
Z(z|v)) − log(∑v′′ QV (v′′)WZ(z|v′′) 11−ρ ))(QV(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )(∑v′ QV (v′)WZ(z|v′) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z(
∑
v QV (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
(261)
F1(QV ) = −
∑
z log(
∑
v∈Vz QV (v)) maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)∑
u QU(u)
∑
z maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
(262)
E0(1|WZ , QV ) = log
∑
z
max
v∈supp(QV )
WZ(z|v). (263)
Further, the map QV 7→ F1(QV ) is concave.
define
Fρ :=
d
dρE0,max(ρ|W
Z), F1 := lim
ρ→1−0
Fρ, (264)
K := {(z, v) ∈ Z ×V|WZ(z|v) = max
v′
WZ(z|v′)}
Zv := {z ∈ Z|(z, v) ∈ K}, Vz := {v ∈ V|(z, v) ∈ K}. (265)
Due to the compactness of the set P(U), we have
lim
ρ→1−0
max
Q′V
E0(1|WZ , Q′V ) = maxQ′V
lim
ρ→1−0
E0(1|WZ , Q′V ).
Hence, we obtain the following lemma for characterization of
the quantity E0,max(1|WZ) defined in (23).
Lemma 64: We have
E0,max(1|WZ) = log
∑
z
max
v
WZ(z|v) = lim
ρ→1−0
E0,max(ρ|WZ).
(266)
Then, we have the following characterization for a special
case of Case (2) of Lemma 62.
Lemma 65: Assume that ∪v∈supp(Qu)Zv = Z for any u ∈
supp(QU). When R ≥ F1(QV |U , QU), we have
E0,max(1|WZ) = E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU) (267)
and
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) = R − E0,max(1|WZ). (268)
The proof of Lemma 65 will be given in Subsection XIV-E.
For comparison between two exponential decreasing rates
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) and ˜El(R,WZ × QVU ), we prepare the
following lemma.
Lemma 66: Any channel WZ ∈ W(V,Z) satisfies
min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU) − ρI(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU]
≥ − E0(ρ|WZ , QV |U , QU) (269)
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1).
The proof of Lemma 66 will be given in Subsection XIV-I.
Since the inequalities
˜El(R,WZ × QVU)
= min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU)+[R − I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU]]+
≥ min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU)+ρ[R − I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU]]+
≥ min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU)+ρ(R − I(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU])
hold for any ρ ∈ (0, 1), we obtain the following theorem, which
is (26).
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Theorem 67:
˜El(R,WZ × QVU)
≥ sup
ρ∈(0,1)
ρR − E0(ρ|WZ , QV |U , QU) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU ).
(270)
B. Equality Conditions of (270)
In this subsection, we derive equality conditions of (270).
For this purpose, we prepare two lemmas.
Lemma 68: For a fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1), the following three
conditions for a distribution QV are equivalent.
(i) The following value does not depend on v ∈ V.∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
(ii) The following relation holds.
E0(ρ|WZ , QV ) = E0,max(ρ|WZ) = maxQ′V
E0(ρ|WZ , Q′V).
(271)
(iii) The following relations hold for any v ∈ V.∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
=max
Q′V
∑
z
(
∑
v′
Q′V (v′)W
Z(z|v′) 11−ρ )1−ρ
=max
Q′V
eE0(ρ|W
Z
,Q′V ) = eE0,max (ρ|W
Z ).
The proof of Lemma 68 will be given in Subsection XIV-F.
Lemma 69: The following three conditions for a distribu-
tion QV are equivalent.
(i) The following value does not depend on v ∈ V.
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
z∈Zv
WZ(z|v)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
.
(ii) The following relation holds.
F1(QV ) = minQ′V
F1(Q′V).
(iii) The following relations hold for any v ∈ V.
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
z∈Zv
WZ(z|v)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
z
max
v′
WZ(z|v′). (272)
The proof of Lemma 68 will be given in Subsection XIV-G.
Then, we introduce two conditions for a distribution QV .
Condition 70: Given a fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1), the distribution QV
satisfies the condition given in Lemma 68
Condition 71: The distribution QV satisfies the condition
given in Lemma 69
Since Condition 70 depends on ρ, we describe it by “Con-
dition 70 with ρ” when we need to clarify the dependence on
ρ.
Lemma 72: When distribution QV and Q′V satisfy Con-
dition 70 with ρ, the relation ∑v QV (v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ =
∑
v Q′V (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ holds for any z ∈ Z. That is the value∑
v QV (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ does not depend on the choice of QV as
long as the distribution QV satisfies Condition 70 with ρ.
The proof of Lemma 72 will be given in Subsection XIV-F.
Lemma 73: When distribution QV and Q′V satisfy Condition
71 with ρ, the relation
∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′) =
∑
v′′∈Vz Q′V (v′′) holds
for any z ∈ Z. That is the value ∑v QV (v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ does not
depend on the choice of QV as long as the distribution QV
satisfies Condition 71.
The proof of Lemma 73 will be given in Subsection XIV-G.
Hence, we can define the transition matrices WZ,ρ and WZ,1
from V to Z by
WZ,ρ(z|v) := W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ
,
WZ,1(z|v) :=

WZ (z|v)∑
v′′∈Vz QV,1 (v′′)
∑
z′ maxv′ W
Z (z′ |v′)
z ∈ Zv
0 z ∈ Zcv,
where the distributions QV,ρ and QV,1 satisfy Condition 70
with ρ and Condition 71, respectively. These definitions do
not depend on the choices of QV,ρ and QV,1.
Lemma 74: When QV,ρ satisfies Condition 70 with ρ, we
have
Fρ = Fρ(QV,ρ) = I(V; Z)[WZ,ρ × QV,ρ] (273)
D(WZ,ρ‖WZ |QV,ρ) = ρFρ − E0,max(ρ|WZ). (274)
The proof of Lemma 74 will be given in Subsection XIV-F.
Lemma 75: When QV,1 satisfies Condition 71, we have
F1 = F1(QV,1) = I(V; Z)[WZ,1 × QV,1] (275)
D(WZ,1‖WZ |QV,1) = F1 − E0,max(1|WZ). (276)
The proof of Lemma 75 will be given in Subsection XIV-G.
Lemma 76: For any ρ ∈ (0, 1), we choose the distribution
QV,ρ satisfying Condition 70 with ρ. We choose a sequence
ρn such that ρn → 0 as n → ∞ and the limit distribution
limn→∞ QV,ρn exists. (Since the set of distributions over V is
compact, such a sequence ρn exists.) Then, the limit distribu-
tion limn→∞ QV,ρn satisfies Condition 71.
The proof of Lemma 76 will be given in Subsection XIV-H.
Then, using the above lemmas, we can characterize equality
conditions of (270) for the case QUV = QU × QV in the
following way.
Theorem 77: (1) Case of R < F1. We choose ρ ∈ (0, 1)
such that R = Fρ. When QV,ρ satisfies Condition 70 with ρ,
the relations
min
QV
˜El(R,WZ × QV ) = minQV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV )
= ˜El(R,WZ × QV,ρ) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV,ρ) = ρR − E0,max(ρ|WZ)
(277)
hold, which implies the equality in (270).
(2) Case of R ≥ F1. When QV,1 satisfies Condition 71, the
relations
min
QV
˜El(R,WZ × QV ) = minQV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV )
= ˜El(R,WZ × QV,1) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV,1) = R − E0,max(1|WZ)
(278)
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hold, which implies the equality in (270).
Combining the discussions in both cases in Theorem 77, we
obtain
min
QV
˜El(R,WZ × QV ) =minQV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV )
= max
ρ∈[0,1]
ρR − E0,max(ρ|WZ), (279)
which is (27).
Proof of Theorem 77: First, we show (277). Since
I(V; Z)[WZ,ρ × QV,ρ] = Fρ = R follows from (273), we have
˜El(R,WZ × QV,ρ)
(a)≤D(WZ,ρ‖WZ |QV,ρ) + [R − I(V; Z)[WZ,ρ × QV,ρ]]+
(b)
=ρFρ − E0,max(ρ|WZ) (c)= ρR − E0(ρ|WZ , QV,ρ)
(d)
= ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV,ρ), (280)
where (a), (b), (c), and (d) follow from the Definition (24)
of ˜El(R,WZ × QV,ρ), (274), (271), and Item (1) of Lemma 62,
respectively.
Any distribution QV satisfies
ρR − E0,max(ρ|WZ) ≤ ρR − E0(ρ|WZ , QV) ≤ ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ),
which implies
ρR − E0,max(ρ|WZ) ≤ minQV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ). (281)
Combining the above relations and we obtain
˜El(R,WZ × QV,ρ)
(a)≤ ρR − E0,max(ρ|WZ)
(b)≤ min
QV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV )
(c)≤ min
QV
˜El(R,WZ × QV ), (282)
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from (280), (281), and Theorem
67, respectively. Hence, the combination of (282) and (d) of
(280) leads (277).
Next, we show (278). The relations (275) and (276) imply
˜El(R,WZ × QV,1)
≤D(WZ,1‖WZ |QV,1) + [R − I(V; Z)[WZ,1 × QV,1]]+
=F1 − E0,max(1|WZ) + [R − F1]+
=F1 − E0,max(1|WZ) + R − F1 = R − E0,max(1|WZ)
=R − E0(1|WZ , QV,1) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV,1).
Any distribution QV satisfies
R − E0,max(1|WZ) ≤ R − E0(1|WZ , QV ) ≤ ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ),
which implies
R − E0,max(1|WZ) ≤ minQV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV,ρ).
Combining the above relations and Lemma 67, we obtain
˜El(R,WZ × QV,ρ) ≤ R − E0,max(1|WZ) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV,ρ)
≤min
QV
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ) ≤ minQV
˜El(R,WZ × QV ),
which implies (278).
For the general case, we prepare the generalizations of
Lemmas 74 and 75. The following lemmas follow from
Lemmas 74 and 75.
Lemma 78: When QV |U=u satisfies Condition 70 with ρ, for
any u ∈ supp(QU),
Fρ = Fρ(QV |U , QU) = I(V; Z|U)[WZ,ρ × QVU]
D(WZ,ρ‖WZ |QVU) = Fρ − E0,max(ρ|WZ).
Lemma 79: When QV |U=u satisfies Condition 71 for any u ∈
supp(QU),
F1 = F1(QV |U , QU) = I(V; Z|U)[WZ,1 × QVU]
D(WZ,1‖WZ |QVU) = F1 − E0,max(1|WZ).
Then, we can characterize equality conditions for (270)
in the general case. That is, similar to Theorem 77, using
Lemmas 78 and 79, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 80: (1) Case of R < F1. We choose ρ ∈ (0, 1) such
that R = Fρ. When QV |U=u satisfies Condition 70 with ρ for
any u ∈ supp(QU), the relations
min
Q′VU
˜El(R,WZ × Q′VU) = minQ′V
˜El(R,WZ × Q′V )
=min
Q′VU
˜EE0 (R,WZ × Q′VU) = minQ′V
˜EE0 (R,WZ × Q′V )
= ˜El(R,WZ × QVU) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) = ρR − E0,max(ρ|WZ)
(283)
hold, which implies the equality in (270).
(2) Case of R ≥ F1. When QV |U=u satisfies Condition 71 for
any u ∈ supp(QU), the relations
min
Q′VU
˜El(R,WZ × Q′VU) = minQ′V
˜El(R,WZ × Q′V )
=min
Q′VU
˜EE0 (R,WZ × Q′VU ) = minQ′V
˜EE0 (R,WZ × Q′V )
= ˜El(R,WZ × QVU ) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU) = R − E0,max(1|WZ)
(284)
hold, which implies the equality in (270).
Then, we obtain the following two corollaries.
Corollary 81: When the channel WZ is regular and QV is
the uniform distribution, the equality in (270) holds.
Proof: When the channel WZ is regular, the uniform
distribution over V satisfies Condition 70 with ρ. Hence, when
QV is the uniform distribution, the equality in (270) holds.
Corollary 82: When R = Fρ and QV |U=u satisfies Condition
71 for any u ∈ supp(QU), we have
˜El(R,WZ × QVU) = ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QVU)
≤ ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QVU).
In the above case of Corollary 82, the exponent ˜El(R,WZ ×
QVU) cannot improve the exponent ˜Eψ(R,WZ×QVU), which is
the exponent of the code constructed in the first construction
(Subsection VII-B) and is given in Subsection X-B. However,
the relation between ˜El(R,WZ × QVU ) and ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QVU)
remains unknown up to now.
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C. Examples
In this subsection, we numerically compare
˜El(R,WZ × QV )
= min
WZ∈W(V,Z)
D(WZ‖WZ |QV ) + [R − I(V; Z)[WZ × QV ]]+
and
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ) = max
0≤ρ≤1
ρR − E0(ρ|WZ , QV )
˜Eψ(R,WZ × QV ) = max
0≤ρ≤1
ρR − ψ(ρ|WZ , QV )
in the following two examples.
Example 83: In this example, we address the channel given
by a 2 × 2 general transition matrix. Consider the case when
Z = V = {1, 2}. Define the transition matrix WZ by
WZ :=
(
1 − p q
p 1 − q
)
(285)
with p > q ∈ (0, 1/2). When QV (1) = 1/2 and QV (2) = 1/2,
we have
E0(ρ|WZ , QV )
= log((1
2
(1 − p) 11−ρ + 1
2
q
1
1−ρ )1−ρ + (1
2
p
1
1−ρ +
1
2
(1 − q) 11−ρ )1−ρ),
(286)
ψ(ρ|WZ , QV )
= log(1
2
(1 − p)1+ρ(1 − p + q
2
)−ρ + 1
2
p1+ρ(1 − q + p
2
)−ρ
+
1
2
q1+ρ(1 − p + q
2
)−ρ + 1
2
(1 − q)1+ρ(1 − q + p
2
)−ρ). (287)
Fig. 2 suggests that ˜Eψ(R,WZ ×QV ) is larger than ˜El(R,WZ ×
QV ). In Fig. 3, we numerically calculate argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR −
E0(ρ|WZ , QV ) and argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR−ψ(ρ|W
Z
, QV ) which realize
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ) and ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QV ), respectively.
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
Fig. 2. Lower bounds of exponent in Example 83 with p = 0.01 and
q = 0.3. In this case, I(V; Z)[WZ × QV ] = 0.317054. Thick line, Dashed line,
and Normal line plot ˜Eψ(R,WZ ×QV ), ˜El(R,WZ ×QV ), and ˜EE0 (R,WZ ×QV )
as functions of R from R = 0.317054 to R = log 2 = 0.693147 with the origin
(0.3,0).
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Fig. 3. Relation between R and ρ realizing the optimal value.
in Example 83 with p = 0.01 and q = 0.3. Thick line expresses
argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR − ψ(ρ|W
Z
, QV ), which realizes ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QV ). Normal line
expresses argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR − E0(ρ|W
Z
, QV ), which realizes ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ).
There is no graph corresponding to ˜El(R,WZ × QV ) because ˜El(R,WZ × QV )
is not given as maximization with respect to ρ. The origin is (0.3,0).
Example 84: In this example, we consider the case when
states satisfying Conditions 70 and 71 are not unique. Consider
the case when Z = V = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Define the transition
matrix WZ by
WZ :=

1
2 − p p 12 − p p
p 12 − p p 12 − p
1
2 − p p p 12 − p
p 12 − p 12 − p p
 (288)
with p ∈ (0, 1/4). When QV (1) = q, QV (2) = q, QV (3) = 12 −q,
and QV (4) = 12 − q, we have∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
=4(1
2
(1
2
− p) 11−ρ + 1
2
p
1
1−ρ )1−ρ = 21+ρ((1
2
− p) 11−ρ + p 11−ρ )1−ρ.
(289)
for all v ∈ V, which implies Condition 70. Hence,
E0,max(ρ|WZ) = E0(ρ|WZ , QV)
=(1 + ρ) log 2 + (1 − ρ) log((1
2
− p) 11−ρ + p 11−ρ ), (290)
Fρ = Fρ(QV )
= log 2 − log((1
2
− p) 11−ρ + p 11−ρ )
+
1
1 − ρ
( 12 − p)
1
1−ρ log( 12 − p) + p
1
1−ρ log p
( 12 − p)
1
1−ρ + p
1
1−ρ
, (291)
ψ(ρ|WZ , QV) = (2ρ + 1) log 2 + log((12 − p)
1+ρ + p1+ρ).
(292)
Next, we check Condition 71. For this purpose, we check
Condition (i) in Lemma 69 by treating Vz given in (265).
Since V1 = {1, 3}, V2 = {2, 4}, V3 = {1, 4}, and V4 = {2, 3},
42
in the above choice of QV , we have ∑v′′∈Vz QV (v′′) = 12 , which
implies
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
= 2
1
2 − p
1
2
= 4(12 − p) (293)
for all v ∈ V. Thus, Condition 71 holds. Hence,
E0,max(1|WZ) = log 4(12 − p) (294)
F1 = log 2. (295)
Further, Theorem 80 guarantees that ˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ) =
˜El(R,WZ×QV ). So, we numerically compare only ˜Eψ(R,WZ×
QV ) and ˜EE0 (R,WZ×QV ) in Fig. 4. Since ˜EE0 (R,WZ×QV ) at-
tains the minimum value due to Theorem 80, ˜EE0 (R,WZ×QV )
does not depend on q. Further, ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QV ) also does not
depend on q due to the form of ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QV ). Similar
to Fig. 3, Fig. 5 suggests that the parameter ρ realizing
˜EE0 (R,WZ × QV ) has a behavior different from the parameter
ρ realizing ˜Eψ(R,WZ × QV ).
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Fig. 4. Lower bounds of exponent in Example 84 with p = 0.1. In this
case, I(V; Z)[WZ × QV ] = 0.192745. Thick line and Normal line express
˜Eψ(R,WZ×QV ) and ˜EE0 (R,WZ×QV ) = ˜El(R,WZ×QV ) as functions of R from
R = 0.192745 to R = 1.0 with the origin (0.1,0). Thick line is straight when
R ≥ 0.4 because argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR−ψ(ρ|W
Z
, QV ) is 1 when R ≥ 0.4, as in Fig 5.
Normal line is straight when R ≥ 0.7 because argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR−E0(ρ|W
Z
, QV )
is 1 when R ≥ 0.7, as in Fig 5.
D. Proof of Lemma 63
Proof: We can show (258) and (260) by direct calcu-
lations. Now, we show (260). In general, when bi > 0 and
a1 = a2 = . . . = al > ai > 0 for i = l + 1, . . . , k, the relation
lim
ρ→1−0
(
k∑
i=1
bia
1
1−ρ
i )1−ρ
= lim
ρ→1−0
((
l∑
i=1
bi)a
1
1−ρ
1 )1−ρ(1 +
k∑
i=l+1
bi∑l
i=1 bi
ai
a1
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
= lim
ρ→1−0
((
l∑
i=1
bi)a
1
1−ρ
1 )1−ρ = a1 (296)
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Fig. 5. Relation between R and ρ realizing the optimal value in Example 84
with p = 0.1. Normal line expresses argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR − E0(ρ|W
Z
, QV ), which
realizes ˜EE0 (R,WZ×QV ). Thick line expresses argmax0≤ρ≤1 ρR−ψ(ρ|W
Z
, QV ),
which realizes ˜Eψ(R,WZ×QV ). There is no graph corresponding to ˜El(R,WZ×
QV ) because ˜El(R,WZ × QV ) is not given as maximization with respect to ρ.
The origin is (0.1,0).
holds. That is, the difference (∑ki=1 bia
1
1−ρ
i )1−ρ −
((∑li=1 bi)a
1
1−ρ
1 )1−ρ behaves as O(exp(− a1−ρ )) with a constant a.
Applying the above general discussion, we have
lim
ρ→1−0
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
z
[∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
]1−ρ
= lim
ρ→1−0
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
z
[ ∑
v∈Vz(QV |U=u )
QV |U(v|u)
·
(
max
v∈supp(QV |U=u )
WZ(z|v)
) 1
1−ρ
]1−ρ
= lim
ρ→1−0
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
z
[( ∑
v∈Vz(QV |U=u )
QV |U(v|u)
)1−ρ
·
(
max
v∈supp(QV |U=u )
W
Z(z|v)
)]
=
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
z
( max
v∈supp(QV |U=u )
W
Z(z|v)).
where Vz(QV |U=u) := {v ∈
supp(QV |U=u)|maxv∈supp(QV |U=u ) W
Z(z|v)}. Hence, we obtain
(260).
Further, since x 7→ − log x is concave, the map QV 7→
F1(QV ) is concave. The remaining task is the poof of the
equation (259), will be shown in the wide space style in the
next page.
E. Proof of Lemma 65
Proof: Due to (260), we have
E0,max(1|WZ) =maxQ′VU
lim
ρ→1−0
E0(ρ|WZ , Q′V |U , Q′U)
=max
QVU
log
∑
u
QU (u)
∑
z
max
v∈supp(QV |U=u )
WZ(z|v)
= log
∑
z
max
v
WZ(z|v),
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Proof of (259): We have
d
dρE0(ρ|W
Z
, QV |U , QU)
=
∑
u QU (u)
∑
z(
∑
v
1
1−ρ (log W
Z(z|v))QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )(∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
−
∑
u QU(u)
∑
z log(
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )(∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
.
When ρ approaches 1,
∑
v QV |U(v|u)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ approaches (∑v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))(maxv′ WZ(z|v′)) 11−ρ . Hence,
lim
ρ→1−0
d
dρE0(ρ|W
Z
, QV |U , QU)
= lim
ρ→1−0
(∑u QU(u)∑z( 11−ρ log maxv′ WZ(z|v′)(∑v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))1−ρ maxv′ WZ(z|v′))∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))1−ρ maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
−
∑
u QU (u)
∑
z( 11−ρ log maxv′ W
Z(z|v′) + log(∑v∈Vz QV |U(v|u)))(∑v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))1−ρ maxv′ WZ(z|v′)∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))1−ρ maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
)
= lim
ρ→1−0
−∑u QU(u)∑z log(∑v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))(∑v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))1−ρ maxv′ WZ(z|v′)∑
u QU(u)
∑
z(
∑
v∈Vz QV |U(v|u))1−ρ maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
= lim
ρ→1−0
−
∑
u QU(u)
∑
z log(
∑
v∈Vz QV |U(v|u)) maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)∑
u QU(u)
∑
z maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
, (297)
which implies (259).
which implies (266).
Assume that the support of QV |U=u contains {v ∈
V|minz maxv′ W
Z (z|v′)
WZ (z|v)
= 1} for any u ∈ supp(QU). Due to (260),
we have
E0(1|WZ , QV |U , QU) = log
∑
z
max
v
WZ(z|v). (298)
Combining (266), we obtain (267). Hence, as a special case
of (257), we obtain (268).
F. Proofs of Lemmas 68, 72, and 74
Lemma 85: Let f be a concave C1 function from Rd to R
and P(d) be the subset {(x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd |xi ≥ 0,∑di=1 xi = 1}.
The following two conditions for x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ P(d) are
equivalent.
(i)
f (x) = max
x′∈P(d)
f (x′). (299)
(ii) The following relation holds for any i , j.
∂
∂xi
f (x) = ∂
∂xi
f (x). (300)
Proof of Lemma 85: We choose variable y = (y1, . . . yd−1) ∈
Rd−1, and define a function ˜f (y) := f (y1, . . . , yd−1, 1−∑d−1i=1 yi).
Due to the concavity, the condition (i) holds if and only if
∂
∂yi
˜f (y) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , d − 1. This condition is equivalent
to the condition (ii) because ∂
∂yi
˜f (y) = ∂
∂xi
f (y1, . . . , yd−1, 1 −∑d−1
i=1 yi) − ∂∂xd f (y1, . . . , yd−1, 1 −
∑d−1
i=1 yi).
Proof of Lemma 68: In order to apply Lemma 85, we
regard all of probabilities QV (v) as independent parameters by
removing the constraint
∑
v QV (v) = 1. The partial derivatives
are calculated as
∂
∂QV (v)
∑
z
(
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ
=
∑
z
(1 − ρ)(
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρWZ(z|v) 11−ρ .
Hence, Lemma 85 guarantees the equivalence between (i) and
(ii). Condition (iii) trivially implies Condition (i).
The remaining task is showing Condition (i)
implies Condition (iii). Assume Condition (i). Since∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v′ QV (v′)WZ(z|v′) 11−ρ )−ρ does not depend on v
and Condition (ii) holds,∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
=
∑
v
QV (v)
∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV (v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
=
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV (v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ = eE0(ρ|W
Z
,QV )
=max
Q′V
eE0(ρ|W
Z
,Q′V ) = eE0,max (ρ|W
Z ).
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Proof of Lemma 72: Assume that∑
v
QV (v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ ,
∑
v
Q′V (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (301)
for any z ∈ Z. Due to the strict concavity of x 7→ x1−ρ, we
have
1
2
(
∑
v
QV (v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ + 1
2
(
∑
v
Q′V (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
<(
∑
v
(1
2
QV (v) + 12 Q
′
V (v))W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ. (302)
Hence,
1
2
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV (v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ + 1
2
∑
z
(
∑
v
Q′V (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
<
∑
z
(
∑
v
(1
2
QV (v) + 12 Q
′
V (v))W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ. (303)
However, Lemma 68 guarantees that∑
z
(
∑
v
QV (v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ =
∑
z
(
∑
v
Q′V (v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
= max
Q′V
eE0 (ρ|W
Z
,Q′V ). (304)
Since (303) contradicts (304), we obtain the desired argument.
Proof of Lemma 74: As
WZ,ρ ◦ QV,ρ(z) =
(∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ∑
z(
∑
v QV,ρ(v)W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ
,
we can calculate the mutual information I(V; Z)[WZ,ρ × QV,ρ]
as
I(V; Z)[WZ,ρ × QV,ρ]
=
∑
v,z
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ
·
[
log
[
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (∑
v
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)−ρ]
− log
[(∑
v
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ]]
=
∑
v,z
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ
·
[
1
1 − ρ log W
Z(z|v) − log
[∑
v
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
]]
=Fρ(QV,ρ), (305)
where the final equation follows from (261). We obtain the
second equation of (273).
Since the constraint (i) in Lemma 68 for QV,ρ is differen-
tiable with respect to ρ, for a given ρ0 ∈ (0, 1), we can choose
QV,ρ such that the map ρ 7→ QV,ρ is differentiable at least in
an enough small neighborhood of ρ0. Since
d
dρE0(ρ0|W
Z
, QV,ρ)|ρ=ρ0 = 0, (306)
we have
Fρ0 =
d
dρE0(ρ|W
Z
, QV,ρ)|ρ=ρ0
=
d
dρE0(ρ|W
Z
, QV,ρ0)|ρ=ρ0 +
d
dρE0(ρ0|W
Z
, QV,ρ)|ρ=ρ0
=
d
dρE0(ρ|W
Z
, QV,ρ0)|ρ=ρ0 = Fρ0 (QV,ρ0). (307)
Hence, we obtain the first equation of (273).
The conditional divergence D(WZ‖WZ |QV,ρ) is calculated to
D(WV,ρ‖WZ |QV,ρ)
=
∑
v,z
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v′ QV,ρ(v′)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ
·
(
log
[
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
]
− log WZ(z|v)
)
−
∑
v
QV,ρ(v) log
[∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ
(∑
v′
QV,ρ(v′)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)−ρ]
=
∑
v,z
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ
·
(
ρ
1 − ρ log W
Z(z|v) − ρ log
[∑
v
QV,ρ(v)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
])
−
∑
v
QV,ρ(v) log
[∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ
(∑
v′
QV,ρ(v′)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)−ρ]
=ρFρ(QV,ρ) −
∑
v
QV,ρ(v) log
[∑
z
(∑
v′
QV,ρ(v′)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ]
=ρFρ − E(ρ|WZ , QV,ρ).
We obtain (274).
G. Proofs of Lemmas 69, 73, and 75
Proof of Lemma 69: In order to apply Lemma 85, we
regard all of probabilities QV (v) as independent parameters by
removing the constraint
∑
v QV (v) = 1. The partial derivatives
are calculated as
∂
∂QV(v) −
∑
z log(
∑
v∈Vz QV (v)) maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)∑
z maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
= −
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
.
Hence, Lemma 85 guarantees the equivalence between (i) and
(ii). Condition (iii) trivially implies Condition (i).
The remaining task is showing Condition (i)
implies Condition (iii). Assume Condition (i). Since
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∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v′ QV (v′)WZ(z|v′) 11−ρ )−ρ does not depend on v
and Condition (ii) holds, we have
∑
z∈Zv
WZ(z|v)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
v
QV (v)
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
(z,v)∈K
QV (v)maxv
′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
z
∑
v∈Vz
QV (v)maxv
′∈V W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)
=
∑
z
max
v′
WZ(z|v′).
Proof of Lemma 73: We focus on the function
{∑v′′∈Vz QV (v′′)}z 7→ −
∑
z log(
∑
v∈Vz QV (v)) maxv′ W
Z (z|v′)∑
z maxv′ W
Z (z|v′)
, which is
strictly concave. Hence, when there exists an element z ∈ Z
such that
∑
v′′∈Vz QV (v′′) ,
∑
v′′∈Vz Q′V (v′′) for two distributions
QV and Q′V , the convex combination
QV+Q′V
2 gives a strictly
greater value for the above function, which contradicts (ii) of
Lemma 69. Hence, ∑v′′∈Vz QV (v′′) = ∑v′′∈Vz Q′V (v′′) for all
z ∈ Z.
Proof of Lemma 75: Since
WZ,1 × QV,1(v, z) =

QV,1(v)WZ (z|v)∑
v′′∈Vz QV,1(v′′)
∑
z′ maxv′ W
Z (z′ |v′)
z ∈ Zv
0 z ∈ Zcv,
(308)
the mutual information I(V; Z)[WZ,1 × QV,1] is calculated as
I(V; Z)[WZ,1 × QV,1] = −
∑
z log(
∑
v∈Vz QV,1(v)) maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)∑
z maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
=F1(QV,1), (309)
where the final equation follows from (262). Hence, we obtain
the second equation in (275). The first equation in (275)
follows from the limit ρ→ 1 − 0 at (307).
When QV satisfies Condition 71,
D(WZ,1‖WZ |QV )
= −
∑
z,v
WZ,1 × QV,1(v, z) log
[ ∑
v′′∈Vz
QV (v′′)
∑
z′
max
v′
WZ(z′|v′)
]
= − log
[∑
z′
max
v′
WZ(z′|v′)
]
−
∑
z
log
[ ∑
v′′∈Vz
QV (v′′)
]
WZ,1 ◦ QV (z)
= − log
[∑
z′
max
v′
WZ(z′|v′)
]
−
∑
z log
[∑
v∈Vz QV (v)
]
maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
∑
z maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)
=F1 − E0,max(1|WZ),
which implies (276).
H. Proof of Lemma 76
Proof of Lemma 76: Due to Condition 70 with ρ, we can
choose a constant Cρ in the following way: the relation
Cρ =
∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV,ρ(v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ (310)
holds for all v. Due to the general relation as (296), we have
C := lim
ρ→1−0
Cρ
= lim
ρ→1−0
∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ (
∑
v′
QV,ρ(v′)WZ(z|v′)
1
1−ρ )−ρ
= lim
ρ→1−0
∑
z∈Zv
(
∑
v′′∈Vz
QV,ρ(v′′))−ρ max
v′
WZ(z|v′)
=
∑
z∈Zv
maxv′ W
Z(z|v′)∑
v′′∈Vz (limn→∞ QV,ρn(v′′))
.
Since C does not depend on v, the distribution limn→∞ QV,ρn
satisfies Condition 71.
I. Proof of Lemma 66
We show the inequality in (269). First, we obtain the
inequality (314), which is displayed in the wide space in the
next page.
Since 11−ρ +
−ρ
1−ρ = 1, the reverse Hölder inequality yields
that∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ ) ˜QZ(z)
−ρ
1−ρ
≥(
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ) 11−ρ (
∑
z
( ˜QZ(z)
−ρ
1−ρ )− 1−ρρ ) −ρ1−ρ
≥ min
˜QZ∈P(Z)
(
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ) 11−ρ (
∑
z
˜QZ(z))
−ρ
1−ρ
=(
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ) 11−ρ .
The equality holds only when (∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ =
C ˜QZ(z) with a constant C. Hence,
min
˜QZ∈P(Z)
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ ) ˜QZ(z)
−ρ
1−ρ
=(
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ) 11−ρ .
Thus,
− (1 − ρ)
∑
u
QU(u) log
[
min
˜QZ∈P(Z)
∑
z
(∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)
˜QZ(z)
−ρ
1−ρ
]
= − (1 − ρ)
∑
u
QU(u) log
[(∑
z
(∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ) 11−ρ]
= −
∑
u
QU(u) log(
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ)
≥ − log
∑
u
QU(u)(
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ) (315)
= − E0(ρ|WZ , QV |U , QU), (316)
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min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
D(WZ‖WZ |QVU) − ρI(V; Z|U)[WZ × QVU]
= min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
(∑
u
QU(u)(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)
∑
z
WZ(z|u, v) log W
Z(z|u, v)
WZ(z|v)
− ρ min
˜Q∈P(Z)
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)
∑
z
WZ(z|u, v) log W
Z(z|u, v)
˜Q(z) )
)
= min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
max
˜WZ∈W(U,Z)
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)(
∑
z
WZ(z|u, v) log W
Z(z|u, v)
WZ(z|v)
− ρ
∑
z
WZ(z|u, v) log W
Z(z|u, v)
˜WZ(z|u) )
= min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
max
˜WZ∈W(U,Z)
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)
∑
z
WZ(z|u, v) log W
Z(z|u, v)1−ρ ˜WZ(z|u)ρ
WZ(z|v)
= max
˜WZ∈W(U,Z)
min
WZ∈W(U×V,Z)
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)
∑
z
WZ(z|u, v) log W
Z(z|u, v)1−ρ ˜WZ(z|u)ρ
WZ(z|v)
(311)
=(1 − ρ) max
˜WZ∈W(U,Z)
∑
u
QU (u)
∑
v
QV |U(v|u) min
˜PZ∈P(Z)
∑
z
˜PZ(z) log
˜PZ(z)
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ ˜WZ(z|u) −ρ1−ρ
(312)
= − (1 − ρ) min
˜WZ∈W(U,Z)
∑
u
QU(u)
∑
v
QV |U(v|u) log
∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ ˜WZ(z|u) −ρ1−ρ
≥ − (1 − ρ) min
˜WZ∈W(U,Z)
∑
u
QU(u) log
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)
∑
z
WZ(z|v) 11−ρ ˜WZ(z|u) −ρ1−ρ (313)
= − (1 − ρ)
∑
u
QU(u) log min
˜QZ∈P(Z)
∑
z
(
∑
v
QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ ) ˜QZ(z)
−ρ
1−ρ . (314)
The above derivation can be shown in the following way. The equality (311) follows from the minimax theorem [11, Chap.
IV Prop. 2.3] because the function is concave for ˜WZ and is convex for WZ . The equality (312) holds because the minimum
is attained with ˜PZ(z) = WZ(z|v)
1
1−ρ ˜WZ(z|u) −ρ1−ρ /∑z WZ(z|v) 11−ρ ˜WZ(z|u) −ρ1−ρ . The inequality (313) follows from the concavity of
x 7→ log x.
where (315) follows from the concavity of x 7→ log x. The
combination of (314) and (316) yields (269).
The equality in (313) holds if and only if
for an arbitrary fixed u, ∑z WZ(z|v) 11−ρ ˜WZ(z|u) −ρ1−ρ
does not depend on v with ˜WZ(z|u) =
(∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ/∑z(∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )1−ρ,
i.e., the quantity
∑
z W
Z(z|v) 11−ρ (∑v QV |U(v|u)WZ(z|v) 11−ρ )−ρ
does not depend on v for an arbitrary fixed u. The condition
holds when QV |U=u is argminQV E0(ρ|W
Z
, QV ) because of
Lemma 68. Further, the equality in (315) holds in this case.
Hence, when QV |U=u is argminQV E0(ρ|W
Z
, QV ), the equality
holds in the inequality (269).
XV. Conclusion
In order to treat the secure multiplex coding with dependent
and non-uniform multiple messages and common messages,
we have generalized resolvability to the case when input
random variable is subject to a non-uniform distribution.
Two kinds of generalization have been given. The first one
(Theorem 14) is a simple extension of Han-Verdú’s channel
resolvability coding [13] with the non-uniform inputs. The sec-
ond one (Theorem 17) uses randomly chosen affine mapping
satisfying Condition 15 with the non-uniform inputs.
We have constructed two kinds of codes for the above type
of SMC. Similar to BCC in [9], the second construction has
two steps. In the first step, similar to the BCD encoder, we
apply superposition random coding. In the second step, as is
illustrated in Fig. 1, we split the confidential message into the
private message B2 and a part B1 of the common message
encoded by the BCD encoder. Employing the second type
of channel resolvability, we have derived a non-asymptotic
formula for the average leaked information under this kind of
code construction. On the other hand, in the first construction,
the confidential message is simply sent as the private message
encoded by the BCD encoder. Hence, it has only one step.
Employing the first type of channel resolvability, we have
derived a non-asymptotic formula for the average leaked
information under this kind of code construction.
For asymptotic treatment for the non-uniform and depen-
dent sources, we have introduced three kinds of asymptotic
conditional uniformity conditions. Then, we have clarified
the relation among three conditions, especially, that two of
them are equivalent. Further, we have shown that these con-
ditions can be satisfied by data compressed by Slepian-Wolf
compression, in the respective senses. Extending the above
formula for the second construction to the asymptotic case,
we have derived the capacity region of SMC defined in
our general setting, in which, the message is allowed to be
dependent and non-uniform while it has to satisfy the weaker
asymptotic conditional uniformity condition. We have shown
the strong security when the the leaked information rate is zero
and the message satisfies the stronger asymptotic conditional
uniformity condition. Using the both formulas, we have also
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derived the exponential decreasing rate of leaked information.
While the first formula gives an upper bound in any case, the
second one gives a better upper bound in some specific cases.
We have also given two kinds of practical constructions for
SMC by using ordinary linear codes. Following our construc-
tions, we can make a code satisfying a required security level.
Further, we have given a universal code for SMC, which does
not depend on the channel. Extending this result, we have
derived a source-channel universal code for BCC, which does
not depend on the channel or the source distribution.
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Appendix A
Inequality between Re´nyi Entropy and Conditional Re´nyi
Entropy
In this appendix, we derive a useful inequality between
Rényi entropy and conditional Rényi entropy, which was
used in Subsection VIII-B. For this purpose, we prepare the
following lemma.
Lemma 86: Any two distributions PXY and QXY over X×Y
satisfy
ψ(ρ|PX,Y‖QX,Y ) ≥ 11 − ρψ(ρ(1 − ρ)|PX,Y‖QY |X × PX) (317)
for ρ > 0, where PX is the marginal distribution of PX,Y
on X, and QY |X is the conditional distribution of QX |Y on Y
conditioned with X.
When QXY is the uniform distribution, 1ρψ(ρ|PX,Y‖QX,Y ) =
log(|X||Y|)−H1+ρ(X, Y) and 1ρ(1−ρ)ψ(ρ(1−ρ)|PX,Y‖QY |X ×PX) =
log |Y| −H1+ρ(1−ρ)(Y |X), which implies the following corollary
of the above lemma as an inequality between Rényi entropy
and conditional Rényi entropy.
Corollary 87: For ρ > 0, arbitrary random variables X and
Y over X and Y satisfy
log(|X||Y|) − H1+ρ(X, Y) ≥ log |Y| − H1+ρ(1−ρ)(Y |X), (318)
which implies
log |X| + H1+ρ(1−ρ)(Y |X) ≥ H1+ρ(X, Y). (319)
Proof of Lemma 86: Applying
Hölder inequality ∑x PX(x)|A(x)B(x)| ≤
(∑x PX(x)|A(x)| 11−ρ )1−ρ(∑x PX(x)|B(x)| 1ρ )ρ, to the case
A(x) = PX(x)ρQX(x)−ρ(∑y PY |X(y|x)1+ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ)) 11−ρ
and B(x) = PX(x)−ρQX(x)ρ, we obtain the following. In the
following derivation, we employ the above Hölder inequality
in (321), and the Jensen inequality for the convex function
x 7→ x 11−ρ in (320), (322), and (323).
e
1
1−ρψ(ρ(1−ρ)|PX,Y‖QY |X×PX)
=(
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
y
PY |X(y|x)1+ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ))
1
1−ρ
≤
∑
x
PX(x)(
∑
y
PY |X(y|x)1+ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ))
1
1−ρ (320)
=
∑
x
PX(x)
[
(PX(x)ρQX(x)−ρ
·
∑
y
(
PY |X(y|x)1+ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ)
) 1
1−ρ
(
PX(x)−ρQX(x)ρ
)]
≤
[∑
x
PX(x)PX(x)
ρ
1−ρ QX(x)−
ρ
1−ρ
·
(∑
y
PY |X(y|x)1+ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ)
) 1
(1−ρ)2
]1−ρ
·
(∑
x
PX(x)PX(x)−1QX(x)
)ρ (321)
=
[∑
x
PX(x)PX(x)
ρ
1−ρ QX(x)−
ρ
1−ρ
·
(∑
y
PY |X(y|x)
(
PY |X(y|x)ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ)
)) 1(1−ρ)2 ]1−ρ · 1ρ
≤
∑
x
PX(x)PX(x)ρQX(x)−ρ
[
∑
y
PY |X(y|x)
(
PY |X(y|x)ρ(1−ρ)QY |X(y|x)−ρ(1−ρ)
)] 11−ρ
(322)
≤
∑
x
PX(x)PX(x)ρQX(x)−ρ
[
∑
y
PY |X(y|x)
(
PY |X(y|x)ρ(1−ρ)QY |X (y|x)−ρ(1−ρ)
) 1
1−ρ
]
(323)
=
∑
x
PX(x)PX(x)ρQX(x)−ρ
[
∑
y
PY |X(y|x)
(
PY |X(y|x)ρQY |X(y|x)−ρ
)]
=
∑
x,y
PX,Y(x, y)1+ρQX,Y (x, y)−ρ = eψ(ρ|PX,Y‖QX,Y ). (324)
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Appendix B
Existence of Code Required in Theorem 32 with ǫ = 0
In this appendix, we show the existence of Slepian-Wolf
data compression code satisfying the condition (107) required
in Theorem 32 with ǫ = 0 in the two-terminal and i.i.d. case.
For this purpose, we assume that the random variables (S n1, S n2)
are subject to the n-fold i.i.d. distribution of a given non-
uniform joint distribution of S 1 and S 2. For this purpose, we
recall the definition of achievable rate pair for Slepian-Wolf
compression.
Definition 88: A rate pair (R1,R2) is called achievable when
there exists a sequence of encoders ϕn = (ϕn1, ϕn2) (ϕni :
Sni → {1, . . . , ⌈enRi⌉}) and decoders ϕˆn (ϕˆn : {1, . . . , ⌈enR1⌉} ×
{1, . . . , ⌈enR2⌉} → Sn1 × Sn2) such that the decoding error
probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) satisfies
lim
n→∞
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) = 0. (325)
Then, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 89: Let (R1,R2) be a pair of achievable rates for
Slepian-Wolf compression satisfying R1 + R2 = H(S 1, S 2).
When the compression rate pair (R1,n,R2,n) behaves as R1,n =
R1 + c1nt and R2,n = R2 +
c2
nt
with 0 < t < 1/2 and
c1 >, c2 > 0, there exists a sequence of Slepian-Wolf codes
(ϕn, ϕˆn) = ((ϕn1, ϕn2), ϕˆn) for any positive integer n such that
ϕni is a map from Sni to {1, . . . , ⌈enRi,n⌉} for i = 1, 2 and the
decoding error probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) satisfies
lim inf
n→∞
−n2t−1 log ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)
≥min
(
λ
c21
2V(S 1) , λ
c22
2V(S 2|S 1) ,
(1 − λ) c
2
2
2V(S 2) , (1 − λ)
c21
2V(S 1|S 2)
)
, (326)
where V(S 2|S 1) := ∑s1,s2 PS 1,S 2(s1, s2)(log PS 2|S 1 (s2|s1) −
H(S 2|S 1))2 and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the real number satisfying that
(R1,R2) = λ(H(S 1), H(S 2|S 1)) + (1 − λ)(H(S 1|S 2), H(S 2)).
(327)
Further, when R1 = H(S 1) and R2 = H(S 2|S 1) and the
compression rates (R1,n,R2,n) behaves as R1,n = H(S 1) + c1nt
and R2,n = H(S 2|S 1) + c2nt with 0 < t < 1/2 and c1 >, c2 > 0,
there exists a sequence of Slepian-Wolf codes (ϕn, ϕˆn) such
that the decoding error probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) satisfies
lim inf
n→∞
−n2t−1 log ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) ≥ min
(
c21
2V(S 1) ,
c22
2V(S 2|S 1)
)
.
(328)
We will prove Lemma 89 after preparing several lemmas.
Using Lemma 89, we make a Slepian-Wolf compression
whose compressed data satisfies the SACU condition. Let
(R1,R2) be a pair of achievable rates for Slepian-Wolf com-
pression satisfying R1+R2 = H(S 1, S 2). Then, let ϕn = (ϕn1, ϕn2)
and ϕˆn be the Slepian-Wolf encoders and the Slepian-Wolf
decoder given in Lemma 89 with the case of c1 = R1c
and c2 = R2c. We choose the integer mn := ⌊ n1+ c
nt
⌋ =
⌊ R1nR1+R1 cnt ⌋ = ⌊
R2n
R2+R2 cnt
⌋ = ⌊ R1nR1,n ⌋ = ⌊
R2n
R2,n
⌋ for 0 < t < 12
and c > 0. Then, we obtain the Slepian-Wolf encoders
ϕ
mn
i : Smni → {1, . . . , ⌈enRi⌉} and the Slepian-Wolf decoder
ϕˆmn : {1, . . . , ⌈enR1⌉} × {1, . . . , ⌈enR2⌉} → Smn1 × Smn2 . Us-
ing the code, we define the Slepian-Wolf encoders ϕni,u :
Smni → {1, . . . , ⌈enRi⌉} and the Slepian-Wolf decoder ϕˆnu :
{1, . . . , ⌈enR1⌉} × {1, . . . , ⌈enR2⌉} → Smn1 × Smn2 by
ϕni,u(smn ) := ϕmni (smn ) (329)
ϕˆnu(x1, x2) := ϕˆmn (x1, x2). (330)
Then, due to Lemma 89, since mn(R1 + R1 cnt ) = nR1 and
mn(R2 + R2 cnt ) = nR2, the code ((ϕn1,u, ϕn2,u), ϕˆnu) satisfies the
condition (107) in Theorem 32 with ǫ = 0. Theorem 32 guar-
antees that the compressed data satisfies the SACU condition.
Now, in order to show Lemma 89, we prepare several
lemmas.
Lemma 90 ([36], [37], [38]): For a given compression rate
R2 > 0, there exists a pair of the encoder ϕn and the decoder
ϕˆn of the random variable S n2 with the side information S
n
1
such that the decoding error probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) satisfies
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) ≤ e−n(ρR2−E0(−ρ|S 2|S 1)) (331)
for any ρ ∈ (0, 1], where
E0(ρ|S 2|S 1) := log
∑
s1
(
∑
s2
PS 1,S 2 (s1, s2)
1
1−ρ )1−ρ. (332)
Note that when there is no side information, we have
E0(−ρ|S 2) = ρH 1
1+ρ
(S 2). (333)
Lemma 91: The quantity E0(−ρ|S 2|S 1) has the expansion
E0(−ρ|S 2|S 1) = ρH(S 2|S 1) + ρ
2
2
V(S 2|S 1) (334)
with small ρ. In particular, the quantity ρH 1
1+ρ
(S 1) has the
expansion
ρH 1
1+ρ
(S 1) = ρH(S 1) + ρ
2
2
V(S 1) (335)
with small ρ and V(S 1) := ∑s1 PS 1(s1)(log PS 1(s1) − H(S 1))2.
Proof: Take the Taylor expansion of eE0 (ρ|S 2|S 1) as
eE0(−ρ|S 2 |S 1)
=1 + ρH(S 2|S 1)
+
ρ2
2
∑
s1,s2
PS 1,S 2(s1, s2)(log PS 2|S 1 (s2|s1))2 + o(ρ2). (336)
Taking the logarithm, we obtain (334).
Lemma 92: Let (R1,R2) belong to the Slepian-Wolf com-
pression region of (S n1, S n2). We choose the rates R′1, R′2, R′′1 ,
and R′′2 and the real number λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
(R1,R2) = λ(R′1,R′2) + (1 − λ)(R′′1 ,R′′2 ). (337)
Then, there exists a pair of the Slepian-Wolf encoder ϕn
and the decoder ϕˆn such that the decoding error probability
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn) satisfies
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)
≤ inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e
−λn(ρR′1−ρH 11+ρ (S 1)) + inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e−λn(ρR
′
2−E0(−ρ|S 2|S 1))
+ inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e−(1−λ)n(ρR
′′
1 −E0(−ρ|S 1|S 2)) + inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e
−(1−λ)n(ρR′′2 −ρH 11+ρ (S 2)),
(338)
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Also, there exists a pair of the Slepian-Wolf encoder ϕn and the
decoder ϕˆn such that the decoding error probability ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)
satisfies
ε(ϕn, ϕˆn)
≤ inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e
−n(ρR1−ρH 1
1+ρ
(S 1))
+ inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e−n(ρR2−E0 (−ρ|S 2|S 1)), . (339)
Proof: First, we show the existence of a sequence of codes
satisfying (339). We apply the usual data compression for S n2,
and the data compression given in Lemma 90 for S n1. The
decoder is given by combination of the respective decoders.
Since the decoding error probability is bounded by the sum
of the decoding error probabilities of S n1 and S
n
2, we obtain
(339).
Next, we show the existence of a sequence of codes satis-
fying (338). We divide n symbols into two parts, λn symbols
and (1 − λ)n symbols. We apply the construction given in the
previous paragraph with the rates (R′1,R′2) to the first part,
and apply the same construction with the rates (R′′1 ,R′′2 ) to
the second part. Due to Lemma 90, the decoding error proba-
bility of the first part is less than infρ∈(0,1] e
−λn(ρR′1−ρH 11+ρ (S 1)) +
infρ∈(0,1] e−λn(ρR
′
2−E0 (−ρ|S 2|S 1)), and the decoding error probability
of the second part is less than infρ∈(0,1] e−(1−λ)n(ρR
′′
1 −E0(−ρ|S 1|S 2))+
infρ∈(0,1] e
−(1−λ)n(ρR′′2 −ρH 11+ρ (S 2))
. Then, we obtain (338).
Proof of Lemma 89: First, we consider the case when R1 =
H(S 1) and R2 = H(S 2|S 1). Since R1,n = H(S 1)+ c1nt and R2,n :=
H(S 2|S 1) + c2nt , we can show that
lim
n→∞
−n2t−1 log inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e
−n(ρR1,n−ρH 1
1+ρ
(S 1))
=
c21
2V(S 1) (340)
lim
n→∞
−n2t−1 log inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e−n(ρR2,n−E0(−ρ|S 2 |S 1)) =
c22
2V(S 2|S 1) . (341)
Since the proof of (340) is similar to those of (341), we show
only (340). When ρ is sufficiently small, due to Lemma 91,
we have
ρR1,n − ρH 1
1+ρ
(S 1)  ρc1
nt
− ρ
2
2
V(S 1)
= − V(S 1)
2
(ρ − c1
V(S 1)nt )
2 +
c21
2V(S 1)n2t . (342)
Hence, infρ∈(0,1] e
−n(ρR′1,n−ρH 11+ρ (S 1))  e
−n c
2
1
2V(S 1)n2t , which implies
(340). Then, we apply the evaluation (339) for the decoding
error probability in Lemma 92 to the case when R1, R2 are
R1,n, R2,n. Combining the relations (340) and (341), we obtain
(328).
Next, we show the general case. We choose R′1,n := H(S 1)+
c1
nt
, R′2,n := H(S 2|S 1)+ c2nt , R′′1,n := H(S 1|S 2)+ c1nt , R′′2,n := H(S 2)+
c2
nt
. Then, we obtain
(R1,n,R2,n) = λ(R′1,n,R′2,n) + (1 − λ)(R′′1,n,R′′2,n). (343)
Then, similar to (340) and (341), we can show that
lim
n→∞
−n2t−1 log inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e
−λn(ρR′1,n−ρH 11+ρ (S 1)) = λ
c21
2V(S 1) (344)
lim
n→∞
−n2t−1 log inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e−λn(ρR
′
2,n−E0(−ρ|S 2|S 1)) = λ
c22
2V(S 2|S 1)
(345)
lim
n→∞
−n2t−1 log inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e−(1−λ)n(ρR
′′
1,n−E0 (−ρ|S 1|S 2)) = (1 − λ) c
2
2
2V(S 2)
(346)
lim
n→∞
−n2t−1 log inf
ρ∈(0,1]
e
−(1−λ)n(ρR′′2,n−ρH 11+ρ (S 2)) = (1 − λ) c
2
1
2V(S 1|S 2) .
(347)
We apply the evaluation (338) for the decoding error proba-
bility in Lemma 92 to the case when R′1, R
′
2, R
′′
1 , R
′′
2 , are R
′
1,n,
R′2,n, R
′′
1,n, R
′′
2,n. Combining the relations (344), (345), (346)
and (347), we obtain (326).
Appendix C
Equivalence between the SWACU Condition and theWACU
Condition
In Subsection VIII-A, we have introduced three asymptotic
conditional uniformity conditions. The aim of this appendix is
to show the equivalence between the SWACU condition and
the WACU condition, which was used in our proof of Theorem
37.
Lemma 93: Let An be a random variable on the set An with
the cardinality enR and Bn be another random variable for any
positive inter n. Then, the relation
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(An|Bn) = R (348)
holds, if and only if
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+α/n(An|Bn) = R (349)
for any α > 0.
Lemma 93 will be shown after Lemma 94, which is used in
the proof of Lemma 93. Thanks to Lemma 93, we can replace
the WACU condition (99) by the SWACU condition (100).
Indeed, in order to apply our results in Section VII to the
proof of Theorem 37, we need evaluation conditional Rényi
entropy instead of conditional entropy, as is discussed around
(122). Lemma 93 provides the evaluation of conditional Rényi
entropy (349) from the evaluation of conditional entropy (348).
Hence, Lemma 93 is useful for the application of our results
in Section VII to the asymptotic setting.
Lemma 94: Let A be a random variable on the set A with
the cardinality M and B be another random variable. For
arbitrary ǫ1 > 0 and 1 ≥ ǫ2 > 0, we define the subset of
joint distributions for A and B as
PA|B
ǫ1,ǫ2,M := {PA,B|PA,B{(a, b)| − log PA|B(a|b) ≤ log M − ǫ1} ≤ ǫ2}.(350)
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Then,
max
PA,B∈PA|Bǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M
H(A|B) ≤ log M − ǫ2(e−ǫ1 − 1 + ǫ1) (351)
min
PA,B∈PA|Bǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M
H1+ρ(A|B) ≥ − 1
ρ
log((1 − ǫ2)e
ρǫ1
Mρ
+ ǫ2). (352)
Here, since the region PA|B
ǫ1,ǫ2,M is compact, the above maximum
and the above minimum exist.
Proof of Lemma 94: For an arbitrary integer k, we define
the set
PAǫ1,ǫ2,M,k :=
{
PA
∣∣∣∣∣∣ PA{a| − log PA(a) ≤ log M − ǫ1} ≤ ǫ2,|{a| − log PA(a) ≤ log M − ǫ1}| = k
}
PAǫ1,ǫ2,M := {PA |PA{a| − log PA(a) ≤ log M − ǫ1} ≤ ǫ2},
and define the function
f (x) := ǫ2(log x − log ǫ2) + (1 − ǫ2)(log(M − x) − log(1 − ǫ2))
for ǫ2 ∈ (0, 1). The set PAǫ1,ǫ2,M,k is a non-empty set only when
the integer k belongs to [0, ǫ2Me−ǫ1 ]. Under the above choice
of k, we have
max
PA∈PAǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M,k
H(A) = f (k)
and
max
PA∈PAǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M
H(A) = max
k∈[0,ǫ2 Me−ǫ1 ]
f (k),
where k is restricted to an integer in the maximum. Taking the
derivative, we have
f ′(x) = ǫ2
x
− 1 − ǫ2
M − x ,
which is positive when x < Mǫ2. Hence,
max
PA∈PAǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M
H(A)
≤ f (ǫ2 Me−ǫ1 )
=ǫ2(log M − ǫ1) + (1 − ǫ2)(log M+log(1−ǫ2e−ǫ1) − log(1−ǫ2))
= log M − ǫ2ǫ1 + (1 − ǫ2) log[1 + ǫ2(1 − e
−ǫ1 )
1 − ǫ2 ]
≤ log M − ǫ2ǫ1 + (1 − ǫ2) ǫ2(1 − e
−ǫ1)
1 − ǫ2
= log M − ǫ2(e−ǫ1 − 1 + ǫ1).
Since log M − ǫ2(e−ǫ1 − 1 + ǫ1) is an affine function of ǫ2, we
obtain (351).
On the other hand, using the set Ω := {a| − log PA(a) ≤
log M − ǫ1}, we have
max
PA∈PAǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M
e−ρH1+ρ(A) =
∑
a∈Ωc
(PA(a))1+ρ +
∑
a∈Ω
(PA(a))1+ρ
≤(1 − ǫ2)e
ρǫ1
Mρ
+ ǫ
1+ρ
2 ≤ (1 − ǫ2)
eρǫ1
Mρ
+ ǫ2.
Since (1 − ǫ2) eρǫ1Mρ + ǫ2 is a linear function of ǫ2, we obtain
max
PA|B∈PA|Bǫ1 ,ǫ2 ,M
e−ρH1+ρ(A|B) ≤ (1 − ǫ2)e
ρǫ1
Mρ
+ ǫ2,
which implies (352).
Proof of Lemma 93: Since (349) implies (348), we only
show (349) from (348). For an arbitrary small number ǫ > 0,
we define the probability
δn := PAn,Bn{(a, b)| − 1
n
log PAn |Bn(a|b) ≤ R − ǫ}.
Applying Eq. (351) of Lemma 94 to the case when ǫ1 = nǫ
and ǫ2 = δn, we obtain
H(An|Bn) ≤ nR − δn(e−nǫ − 1 + nǫ).
That is,
δn ≤
R − 1
n
H(An|Bn)
e−nǫ−1
n
+ ǫ
. (353)
Thus, limn→∞ δn = 0. Hence, Eq. (352) of Lemma 94 guaran-
tees that
H1+α/n(An|Bn) ≥ − n
α
log((1 − δn)eα(ǫ−R) + δn). (354)
Thus,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+α/n(An|Bn) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
− 1
α
log((1 − δn)eα(ǫ−R) + δn)
=R − ǫ.
Since ǫ > 0 is arbitrary,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H1+α/n(An|Bn) ≥ R.
Since the cardinality of An is enR, we have 1n H1+α/n(An|Bn) ≤
R. Hence,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H1+α/n(An|Bn) = R.
Combining relation (5), we obtain the desired argument.
Appendix D
Extension to general measurable spaces
A. Information quantities
Our results has been obtained based on discrete sets, i.e.,
sets with countable elements. Here, we explain how our results
are extended to the case of measurable spaces, which contain
continuous sets. Firstly, we state the assumptions used in
Appendix D. As before, X is the input alphabet of the channel
and Z is the output alphabet to Eve. In general, a channel from
X to Z is described as a collection of conditional probability
measures µZ|X=x onZ for all inputs x ∈ X, and µZ|X=x might not
have a probability density for some x ∈ X. In this appendix,
however, we assume that there exists a finite measure νZ on
Z such that for all x ∈ X, µZ|X=x is absolutely continuous
with respect νZ. In the following PZ|X(·|x) denotes the Radon-
Nikodym derivative dµZ|X=x/dνZ. We also make the same
assumption on the channel from Alice to Bob.
In addition, as before, we consider probability measures η
on U × V × X. We assume that there exist finite mesures
νU on U, νV on V and νX on X such that η is absolutely
continuous with respect to the product measure νU × νV × νX.
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Under this assumption we can denote by PUVX the Radon-
Nikodym derivative dη/d(νU × νV × νX), and marginal prob-
ability densities PU , etc. and conditional probability densities
PV |U , etc. can be computed from PUVX . In the following, dv,
dz, etc. denote dνV, dνZ, etc. assumed above.
Firstly, we give the definition of the information quantities
in the general measurable case. Although E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV ) and
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) are defined for distributions PV and PU
and conditional distributions PZ|V and PV |U with discrete sets
in (11), they can be defined as follows even when Z, V, and
U are measurable spaces in the sense of [47, Theorem 32.2].
Then, we define
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV )
:= log
∫
Z
dz
(∫
V
dvPV(v)(PZ|V(z|v)1/(1−ρ))
)1−ρ
, (355)
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
:= log
∫
U
du
∫
Z
dz
(∫
V
dvPV |U(v|u)(PZ|V(z|v)1/(1−ρ))
)1−ρ
.
The above definition formally depends on the choices of the
measures dz, du, dv. But in the next paragraph we will explain
the above values are independent of the choice of measures
dz, du, dv.
Now, suppose that we choose other measures dz′, du′, dv′
so that the measures dz′, du′, dv′ and the original measures
dz, du, dv are absolutely continuous with respect to each other,
respectively. As is shown in the left hand side of [43, p.7740],
even when these information quantities are defined with the
measures dz′, du′, dv′, these information quantities have the
same values as those defined with the original measures
dz, du, dv. So, these information quantities do not depend on
the choice of the measures dz, du, dv whenever the measures
and the original measures are absolutely continuous with
respect to each other.
When Q and P are probability density functions on a
measurable space Z with respect to a common finite measure
dz, ψ(ρ|Q‖P) is defined as
ψ(ρ|Q‖P) := log
∫
Z
dzQ(z)1+ρP(z)−ρ.
Further, ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV ) and ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) are defined as
follows.
ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
= log
∫
V
dvPV (v)
∫
Z
dzPZ|V (z|v)1+ρPZ(z)−ρ, (356)
ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU)
= log
∫
U
duPU(u)
∫
V
dvPV |U(v|u)
∫
Z
dzPZ|V (z|v)1+ρPZ|U(z|u)−ρ.
(357)
Similar to the information quantities E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV) and
E0(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU), we can show that the information quanti-
ties ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) and ψ(ρ|PZ|V , PV |U , PU) do not depend
on the choice of the measures dz, du, dv whenever the mea-
sures and the original measures are absolutely continuous with
respect to each other.
The above quantities can be defined for a channel. When
the input and output systems Z and V are measurable spaces,
a channel W is defined as a set of probability density functions
{Wv}v∈V on Z. That is, substituting W into a conditional
probability density function PZ|V as PZ|V (z|v) = Wv(z), we
define the above information quantities for the channel W. So,
when the channels WZ and WY satisfy the above conditions,
the code construction and security evaluation given in the
next subsection work well. Note that the above generalization
works well even when V is a finite set because a finite set is
also a measurable space.
B. Code construction and security evaluation
Under the above extension, our results can be extended as
follows. Firstly, we focus on Theorem 14. Assume that W is
a channel from a measurable space X to a measurable space
Y and that A is a discrete random variable on a finite set A
subject to the distribution PA. Theorem 14 holds even under
this assumption, whose proof can be done by replacing ∑x
and ∑y by ∫X dx and
∫
Y dy. Theorem 17 and Corollary 18
also hold with a slightly different extension. Assume that W
is a channel from a finite-dimensional vector space X over
Fq to a measurable space Y and that A is a discrete random
variable on a finite-dimensional vector space A over Fq subject
to PA. Then, Theorem 17 and Corollary 18 hold even under
this assumption, whose proof can be done by replacing ∑y by∫
Y dy.
Now, we consider the extension of Code Ensemble 1.
Assume that X = V, Y, Z, and U are measurable, and that
the private and common messages S p and S c take values in
finite sets. Then, we can apply Code Ensemble 1 to the above
situation. Hence, Lemma 12 holds even under this assumption
because the proof by Kaspi and Merhav [21, Section II] is still
valid under this assumption.
Next, we proceed to the extension of Code Ensemble 2.
Assume that X, Y, Z, V, and U are measurable, and that
all messages S 0, S 1, . . . , S T take values in finite sets. Then,
we can apply Code Ensemble 2 to the above situation. Hence,
Theorem 20 holds even under this assumption because (57)
holds under this assumption.
Then, we extend the contents of Section VII. We consider
the extension of Code Ensemble 3. Assume that X, Y, Z, V,
and U are measurable, and that B1 and B2 are finite Abelian
groups. In this case, all messages S 0, S 1, . . . , S T take values in
finite sets. Then, we can apply Code Ensemble 3 to the above
situation. First, notice that Theorem 12 still holds in the above
situation. Hence, Lemma 21 and Theorem 22 hold even under
this assumption, whose proof can be done by applying the
extension of Theorems 12 and 17. Lemma 24 holds with a
slightly different extension. That is, Lemma 24 holds when
the sets U and V are finite set, i.e., only the set Z is allowed
to be a general measurable space. This is because we need to
consider the cardinalities of the subsets in U and V. Since
the contents of Sections V and VI are extended to the case of
measurable spaces in the above way, the contents of Sections
VIII and IX also can be extended to the case of measurable
spaces in the same way.
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In Section XI, we have proposed several types of practi-
cal code constructions. Code Constructions 6 and 7 can be
applied to the channel PZ|V from a measurable space V to a
measurable space Z. In these constructions, since the code ϕp
is given, we can restrict the set V to the finite subset given
as the image of the map ϕp. Hence, we can apply Lemma 24
with the above extension in this context.
When the above discussion is applied to the wire-tap chan-
nel model, we obtain an extension of existing results to the
case of the asymptotic uniform dummy message. That is, we
consider the case with no common messages and T = 2 when
S 1 corresponds to the message to be secretly sent to Bob,
and S 2 does to the dummy message making S 1 ambiguous
to Eve. For a given rate R1 of secret message and a given
rate R2 of dummy message, the RHS of (115) coincides with
the Gallager exponents, the RHS of (155) coincides with the
RHS of (59) in [15], and the RHS of (157) coincides with the
exponents of the RHS of (15) in [17].
C. Gaussian case
Finally, when the channel PYZ|X is a degraded Gaussian
channel as (358), we demonstrate how the strong security can
be shown for the wire-tap channel, which is given as the case
with no common messages and T = 2 when S 1 corresponds to
the message S to be secretly sent to Bob, and S 2 does to the
dummy message A making S ambiguous to Eve. Assume that
X, Y, and Z are the set of real numbers. So, we choose the
measures dx, dy, and dz to be the Lebesgue measure. Then,
we assume that the conditional probability density functions
corresponding to the channels are
PY |X(y|x) := 1√2πv1
e
− (y−x)22v1 , PZ|X(z|x) := 1√2πv2
e
− (z−x)22v2 ,
(358)
where v2 > v1. Since the channel is degraded, we do not
need to introduce random variables U and V . Now, we choose
the probability density function PX to be PX(x) = 1√2πv3 e
− x22v3
.
Then,
E0(ρ|PZ|X , PX) =ρ2 log(1 +
v3
(1 − ρ)v2 ), (359)
ψ(ρ|PZ|X=x, PZ) = (1 + ρ)ρ2(v2 + (1 + ρ)v3) x
2 − ρ
2
log v2
+
1 + ρ
2
log(v2 + v3) − 12 log(v2 + (1 + ρ)v3),(360)
ψ(ρ|PZ|X , PX) =1 + ρ2 log(v2 + v3)
− 1
2
log(v2 + (1 − ρ2)v3) − ρ2 log v2
=
ρ
2
log(1 + v3
v2
) − 1
2
log(1 − v3
v2 + v3
ρ2).
(361)
Hereafter, we denote the average leaked information under
our code Φ by I(S ; E)[Φ]. Assume that we use the Gaussian
channel PYZ|X n times, and that the rates of secret message S
and dummy message A are R1 and R2, respectively. When the
dummy message A has the Rényi entropy H1+ρ(A), Theorem
20 guarantees that
EΦ[eρI(S ;E)] ≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ+n(
ρ
2 log(1+
v3
v2
)− 12 log(1−
v3
v2+v3
ρ2)) (362)
i.e.,
EΦ[I(S ; E)] ≤1
ρ
e
−ρH1+ρ+n( ρ2 log(1+
v3
v2
)− 12 log(1−
v3
v2+v3
ρ2)) (363)
for ρ ∈ (0, 1]. Since there is no common messages, the
cardinality of B1 is 1 in Code Ensemble 3. Theorem 22
guarantees that
EΦ[eρI(S ;E)[Φ]] ≤1 + e−ρH1+ρ(A)+n
ρ
2 log(1+
v3
(1−ρ)v2 ), (364)
i.e.,
EΦ[I(S ; E)] ≤1
ρ
e
−ρH1+ρ(A)+n ρ2 log(1+
v3
(1−ρ)v2 ) (365)
for ρ ∈ (0, 1]. When the dummy message A is uniform, (365)
and (363) are simplified as follows
EΦ[I(S ; E)] ≤1
ρ
e
−n(ρR2−( ρ2 log(1+
v3
v2
)− 12 log(1−
v3
v2+v3
ρ2)))
. (366)
EΦ[I(S ; E)] ≤1
ρ
e
−n(ρR2− ρ2 log(1+
v3
(1−ρ)v2 )). (367)
Since limρ→0 1ρ ( ρ2 log(1 + v3(1−ρ)v2 )) = limρ→0
1
ρ
( ρ2 log(1 + v3v2 ) −
1
2 log(1 − v3v2+v3 ρ2)) =
1
2 log(1 + v3v2 ), both (366) and (367) yield
the strong security when R2 > 12 log(1 + v3v2 ).
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